Learning Our Way Forward

Implementation of New Zealand’s Family Violence Strategies

March 2008

Dissertation for Master of Public Policy
Ruth Herbert
Dedication

To my sons Ryan and Jayson.
We have been through so much together.

and

To all women and children who are living in fear in their own homes.

Note

This thesis is based on research undertaken between March 2007 and March 2008. The primary purpose is to fulfil requirements of the Master of Public Policy at Victoria University of Wellington. However, the author hopes the thesis will have a much broader practical relevance to those working at all levels in the development and implementation of public sector strategies.

The research findings reflect the views of the author after full consideration of the available evidence. There may be some errors or omissions due to limitations in sourcing data to enable a more comprehensive evaluation.

Nothing in this thesis should be taken to reflect the views or policies Victoria University of Wellington or any of the government or non-government agencies mentioned herein.

The author welcomes feedback and discussion about the issues raised.
Email: ruth@trio-consulting.co.nz or phone +64 274 486 422
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## Glossary of Terms Used and Abbreviations

### Terms Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Death reviews</td>
<td>Family Violence death review initiative being developed by the Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Implementation has been defined as all activities and all parts of the process that must be undertaken to put each of the actions in the government strategies into effect. When referred to as stages of the MfO cycle implementation is separated into two distinct stages ‘planning for implementation’ and ‘implementation’ the later being the activity of putting the implementation plan (the product of the planning for implementation stage) into action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation status</td>
<td>This thesis assigned one of four statuses to each of the 88 actions in the sample. Implementation status refers to the status assigned in the research for this thesis. Also at times referred to just as ‘status’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘It’s not OK’ media campaign</td>
<td>Also called ‘Changing Attitudes and Behaviours’ media campaign or ‘the media campaign’. This campaign arose from Taskforce Action 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning our way forward</td>
<td>Also referred to as ‘learning as we go’ and ‘learning from what works’. These are terms generally referring to an ongoing cycle of continuous improvement whereby actions are taken, lesson learned and these then used to make improvements to subsequent actions in the future. These terms are also common associated with the government’s Managing for Outcomes public management initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-agency</td>
<td>The term multi-agency is used in the thesis to mean multiple agencies or people with multiple areas of special expertise working together for example one person in a multi-agency forum may be representing Maori issues not a particular agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme of Action</td>
<td>The Taskforce’s First Report contains the 2006/07 Programme of Action. The Ongoing Programme of Action contains the 2007/08 Programme of Action and ongoing Programme of Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td>The Care and Protection Blueprint, February 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHB</td>
<td>District Health Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MfO</td>
<td>Managing for Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZFVC</td>
<td>New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIA</td>
<td>Official Information Act 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing Programme of Action</td>
<td>The Ongoing Programme of Action, December 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>The State Services Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>Taskforce for Action on Violence in Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce First Report</td>
<td>The First Report July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td>Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy, February 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIP</td>
<td>Violence Intervention Programme (in the Ministry of Health)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction and Background

Prosecutor’s daughter ‘strangled by partner’ (Dominion Post 12 June 2007)

Hammer used to hit children (Dominion Post 21 June 2007)

Women killed, toddler sleeps in next room (Dominion Post 4 July 2007)

Man jailed for beating former wife to death (Dominion Post 17 July 2007)

Children’s hell at hands of cruel stepdad (Dominion Post 14 July 2007)

Teenager admits mum’s axe murder (Dominion Post 27 July 2007)

These headlines appeared in one of New Zealand’s leading daily newspapers over a two-month period in 2007. Do they reflect the type of society we want in Godzone and if not what can we do about it? Is it our business what happens within families and personal relationships? Is it the government’s business or are attempts by the government to tackle family violence issues tantamount to the state meddling in the private affairs of individuals?

Twenty years ago, the Report of Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Violence (1987) (commonly referred to as the Roper Report) suggested that violence in the home could account for up to 80 per cent of all violence in New Zealand society. Snively (1994) concluded that a conservative estimate of the potential economic cost of family violence in New Zealand was $1.2 billion a year.

The real levels of family violence are not known. What is known is that there is a vast difference between the actual levels and the number of cases reported to authorities. New Zealand Police estimate they see only 18% of all violence within homes. (The New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (NZFVC) 2007, p 1). In 2005, NZ Police recorded 62,470 offence and non-offence incidents involving family/whānau violence, at which 62,165 children and young people under the age of 17 were involved (Taskforce’s First Report 2006, 32). Studies show that these children are more likely than children who have not experienced any form of family violence to grow up to become perpetrators or victims of family violence, thus continuing the cycle (Te Rito 2002).

The perpetrators of the most severe and lethal cases of family violence are predominately male, and the victims of the most severe and lethal cases of family violence are predominately women and children (Taskforce’s First Report 2006,32). Half of all murders in New Zealand are the result of family violence. But the murders are the tip of a large iceberg. For every person who dies as a result of family violence, hundreds of others will be physically, sexually and psychologically harmed. For many, their injuries will last a lifetime.

Family violence is perhaps one of the most complex, multifaceted and poorly understood issues in western society. Some may think family violence happens only in certain cultures or only in lower socio-economic groups. Wrong – it occurs in all types of families, all cultures, classes, backgrounds socio-economic groups and neighbourhoods. So it is our business and preventing family violence is everyone’s responsibility. We are all in this together, and we all need to be interested and informed about what is being done to address the issue.
So what, we might ask, is our government doing about it? The government released three family violence strategies in the five years 2002–06 inclusive:


These three documents collectively contain nearly 100 actions or new initiatives, indicating that the government is doing a great deal about family violence. But does this mean that the government is actually doing what the strategy documents proposed/recommended? And, if so, are the strategies making a difference?

There are multiple government and non-government agencies working directly or indirectly with family violence and no individual programme can in itself ‘prevent’ family violence. Addressing family violence requires major social change in individual attitudes and relationships, cultural and religious belief systems and society’s opinions as well as changes to government policies and a comprehensive range of services to support families and individuals affected by family violence. It will take a concerted and coordinated effort by multiple agencies and communities before there is real change. Implementing nearly 100 strategic policy actions in a multi-agency environment is by no means an easy task.

The current public sector administration and the coalition governments of the last eight years are to be commended for their vision and commitment to addressing family violence. But this research will show there has been a pattern of failure to fully implement the undertakings made in these strategies.

1.1 Background

There has been a multitude of reports, strategies, investigations and surveys on family violence in New Zealand over the past 20 years. Appendix 1 contains a comprehensive timeline of family violence initiatives since 1968, including 48 family violence reports published since 1983. Collectively these reports have identified countless issues and contained hundreds of recommended changes and new initiatives. Each report, each strategy, each recommendation and each proposed new action means nothing unless it is actually implemented. There is no way of knowing the outcome of all these recommendations or whether family violence has reduced as a result of this constant stream of reports as there is no national system coordinating all activities addressing the issue of family violence.

The three government family violence strategies do not encompass all government family violence initiatives and new developments. Budget 2004, for example, allocated $15.2m to set up four family safety teams as a pilot project and $20.7m to expand a Work and Income (WINZ) intervention programme. Both have been established independent to the three government strategies.
The background relating to each the three government strategies being examined in this thesis is:

In September 2001 The Review of Family Violence Prevention in New Zealand: Plan of Action was released by the then Ministry of Social Policy. This review was conducted partly in response to the government’s commitment to a number of international conventions. The government’s official response to and framework for implementing the Review of Family Violence Prevention in New Zealand: Plan of Action was the Te Rito strategy released by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) in February 2002.

In March 2001 the report entitled Care and Protection is about Adult Behaviour was published following the Ministerial Review of the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services conducted by Judge Mick Brown. This review was conducted in response to a number of high-profile child murders. One of the recommendations from Judge Brown’s 2001 report was the development of a government strategy for child abuse and neglect. The Blueprint, released in February 2003 by MSD, is that strategy.

In 2004 a decision was made to merge the implementation activities of Te Rito and the Blueprint:

Initially Te Rito and the Blueprint were progressed as separate strategies and substantial progress was made on implementing many of the actions. An update of the Blueprint was scheduled for 2004. By that time it had become clear that, because of the strong links between partner abuse and child abuse and neglect, that the work of both strategies should be progressed together. Government and non-government agencies who had been involved in Te Rito and the Blueprint were consulted and they agreed that the strategies should be progressed in a more integrated and holistic way. In some cases this involved integrating remaining actions from the two strategies into joint work streams, with the implementation to be monitored through Te Rito. In other areas, the scope of existing projects was broadened to cover the full spectrum of family violence and care and protection issues (MSD 2005, 1).

The first Ministry of Social Development’s annual Social Report (2001, 40) states: ‘Violence in the home, including child abuse and neglect and domestic violence among adults, is an area of major concern’. Subsequent annual social reports have all similarly flagged family violence as a major social issue for New Zealand. The Office of the Minister for Social Development and Employment released a report entitled Opportunity for All New Zealanders in December 2004. This report was a summary statement of the government’s strategies to improve social outcomes. It identified family violence as a critical social issue requiring sustained interagency attention in the medium to long term. This report led to the establishment of the Family Violence Ministerial Team to provide leadership across the state sector, promote public debate, and demonstrate the government’s commitment to addressing this critical social issue.

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The Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families (the Taskforce) was established in June 2005 to advise the Family Violence Ministerial Team on how to make improvements to the way family violence is addressed, and how to eliminate family violence in New Zealand. The Taskforce provides a forum for the government and non-government sectors, the judiciary, the Children’s Commissioner and the Families Commission to come together and set the strategic direction for family violence prevention in New Zealand. The Taskforce’s First Report was released in July 2006. The actions contained in this report are collectively referred to as the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action. It appears the Taskforce took over responsibility for monitoring the progress with incomplete actions from the Blueprint and Te Rito. Indications are that some of the initiatives from Te Rito were then merged into the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action. It also states (p. 2):

The programme of action set out in this report builds on the initiatives put in place under Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy.

The Taskforce’s *Ongoing Programme of Action* (the Ongoing Programme of Action) was released in February 2008. This report was apparently approved by the Taskforce in June 2007, was published in December 2007, but only publicly released on 15 February 2008. The Ongoing Programme of Action report presents the Taskforce’s achievements to date and outlines its plans and programmes for 2007/2008 and beyond.

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2 July 2006 to June 2007
2. **The Research**

The research for Part One of this thesis was undertaken using a process type evaluation to ascertain the extent to which the government has done what they said they would do in the three family violence strategies. This form of evaluation is used to determine whether a program is being delivered as intended? Part Two of this thesis was undertaken using a formative type of evaluation to identify factors influencing implementation, in order to help us ‘learn our way forward’ and to improve future implementation outcomes and thus reduce the rate of family violence in New Zealand. This concept of continuous learning and improvement or ‘learning our way forward’ is at the centre of the New Zealand public sector ‘Managing for Outcomes’ (MfO) initiative (see 4.1) and is reflected on page 30 of the Taskforce’s First Report. MfO was used as the framework for analysis for Part Two (Chapter 4). Research that focuses on programme improvements is referred to as formative evaluation or sometimes as developmental or implementation evaluation.

The challenge for this thesis was therefore to design a process evaluation for Part One to determine whether the family violence strategies are being delivered as intended and more of a formative type of evaluation for Part Two to ascertain the reasons for identified implementation failures in order to identify improvements that can be made for the future. However, there were limitations to both components. Formative evaluations are generally built into the programme with the evaluator working alongside the implementation personnel. The researcher for either a process or formative evaluation would normally have open access to all related material and do more extensive interviews process than was available for this thesis.

2.1 **Research Questions**

Five research questions were designed to fulfil the overall research aims:

1. **To what extent have the government and non-government sectors implemented the actions contained in the government’s three family violence strategy documents within the specified timeframes?**
2. **How accurately is the implementation status being reported?**
3. **When an action or task has not been fully implemented in the specified timeframe, is this because:**
   - the strategy over-promised
   - the action was not adequately scoped and hence was assigned an unrealistic completion date
   - there appears to have been some breakdown in the implementation process?
4. **What environmental, structural or process factors may be impacting positively or negatively on the implementation of these strategies?**
5. **What changes could be made to improve the situation?**

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3 Te Rito; New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy February 2002; Care and Protection Blueprint February 2003; First report of the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families July 2006
2.2 Research Context

This thesis did not set out to relitigate the strategies themselves or to determine the relevance of each action. Rather it started with the assumption that all the planned initiatives were appropriate, and that once implemented they would individually and/or collectively reduce family violence. The actions from all three government strategies, released over a five-year period, were included for four reasons:

1. The actions have been systematically merged over time. The incomplete work from the Blueprint was merged with Te Rito, and the incomplete work from Te Rito (and the Blueprint) was subsequently passed to the Taskforce. Hence all strategies were in effect linked.

2. Some of the actions from Te Rito or Blueprint have reappeared in the Taskforce's First Report, providing evidence that implementation had not been completed earlier.

3. It is important to determine whether actions not fully implemented under earlier strategies have been 'lost to follow-up' under later governance arrangements.

4. Tracking the actions from the earlier reports indicates if there is a consistent pattern of implementation failure.

Implementation is not often a simple matter of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Implementation is a process and so there are degrees of implementation. Each of the actions in the strategies has a corresponding timeframe. For the purposes of this research:

- ‘timeframe’ has been taken to mean the time within which the strategy stated the action would be implemented
- ‘implementation’ has been defined as all activities and all parts of the process that must be undertaken to put each of the actions in the government strategies into effect. It is acknowledged that some actions only require a report to be written, while others require entirely new services to be established
- ‘implementation status’ refers to one of the four statuses assigned to each of the 88 actions in the sample as part of the research for this thesis.

This thesis assigned one of four statuses to each of the 88 actions in the sample. Implementation status refers to the status assigned in the research for this thesis. Also at times referred to just as ‘status’

2.3 Preparing the Research Sample

The first step was to establish a master-list of actions from the three strategies. Preparation of the sample was particularly difficult because the actions contained in the Taskforce’s First Report are not numbered and there are discrepancies between the action statements in the document and the actions that are being monitored and reported by the Taskforce.

The parameters of the sample were:

- all action statements as they were worded in the original strategy documents
- only actions that had a specified date for completion of implementation on or before 30 June 2007.
**Blueprint**

The Blueprint document contained 10 action areas. This original 1 to 10 numbering has been maintained in this sample.

**Table 2.1: Blueprint actions included in the research sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported action numbers</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>No. of actions included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 10</td>
<td>Actions 1-10 as contained in the Blueprint report with no adjustments made</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal: number of Blueprint actions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Te Rito**

Te Rito contained 18 action areas and the original numbering of these actions as they appear in the Te Rito strategy has been maintained for this sample. Two of the action areas have been split into sub-actions for this thesis. Action 8 states:

Investigate options and make recommendations for establishing a mechanism to co-ordinate national, and collate international, family violence prevention research and evaluation and to widely disseminate information.

The Te Rito strategy breaks Action 8 down into five separate sub-actions. Activity on each of these sub-actions over the past five years has varied significantly; hence to analyse the success of implementation of each sub-action, Action 8 has been separated into Actions 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d and 8e in this research. Evidence tables for sub-actions 8a, 8d and 8e have been included in the research category and 8b and 8c in the evaluation/audit category.

Action 15 states ‘Continue to monitor and implement Māori and Pacific capacity building projects’. The detail of Action 15 in the Te Rito report refers to Māori, Pacific and other ethnic providers. The evidence tables for this research are in separate categories for Māori, Pacific and other ethnicities/new immigrants. Hence the relevant subsections of this action have been included in each of these categories.

**Table 2.2: Te Rito actions included in the research sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported action numbers</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>No. of actions included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Action 8 has been separated into 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d and 8e</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 to 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Action 15 relates to Māori, Pacific and new immigrants so has been repeated in each of those 3 categories</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 18</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal: number of Te Rito actions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Taskforce's First Report

The Taskforce’s First Report has five chapters. The report contains multiple action statements, each with specified implementation timeframes, but there is no numbering system and hence it is much more difficult to extract and track the actions from this report. The Taskforce monitoring reports refer to actions by number, but this is confusing because:

- the numbers do not run sequentially (i.e. there are no action numbers 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 59, or 69). It is assumed these missing numbers were previously assigned to actions that have now been either completed or merged with other actions, but there is no reconciliation available to inform the reader of this
- up until June 2007 the Taskforce monitoring reports were reporting progress against each of the actions by number. However, the August and October 2007 Taskforce monitoring reports are simply a list of update statements not reported against the relevant action number. This makes it much more difficult for the reader to track progress against each action
- actions that do not appear in the Taskforce’s First Report have been added into the Taskforce monitoring reports:
  - Action 23 appears to be a carry-over from Te Rito but is not an action statement from the Taskforce’s First Report and hence has not been included in the sample
  - Actions 40 and 72 relate to statements of fact in the Taskforce’s First Report and are not actual actions. Hence they have not been included in the sample.

The April 2007 Taskforce monitoring report (p.1) says:

The Secretariat has identified linkages between many of the actions identified from the Taskforce’s First Report and has combined or re-ordered some of the actions. Previous iterations of the traffic light report [Taskforce monitoring report] show actions that have been combined.

Unfortunately previous iterations of the Taskforce’s monitoring reports are not available via the Taskforce page of MSD’s website. Clarification regarding these discrepancies was sought from the Ministry of Social Development under the provision of the OIA in a letter dated 23 July 2007. The request was declined.

Actions from the Taskforce’s First Report that have been listed differently in this thesis to the way they appear in the Taskforce’s monitoring reports are:

- Action 7 states: ‘We will draw on the advice of Māori and Pacific Advisory Groups to …’ The evidence tables in Appendix 2 have separate categories for Māori and Pacific. Hence this action has been included in both those categories.
- Action 13 contains three separate actions pertaining to research. Information gathered for this research indicates these three sub-actions have been managed separately and hence a decision was made to report them as three separate sub-actions (Actions 13a, 13b and 13c) in the research category of the evidence tables.
- Action 21 is split into actions 21a and 21b in the Taskforce’s monitoring reports and in the sample.
• Action 22 is reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports as four separate sub-actions, but in this sample it is included as a single action as it appears that way in the Taskforce’s First Report.

• Action 29 is reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports as 29a and 29b. This separation has not been used in this sample as Action 29b is not wording extracted from the Taskforce’s First Report.

• Action 60 is split in this sample as actions 60a, 60b and 60c. It was reported this way in the Taskforce monitoring reports up until June 2007.

There are eight actions in the Taskforce’s First Report that are not due to be completed until the 2007/08 year. The specified completion date for implementation of these actions is outside the scope of this thesis. Hence these eight actions have not been included in the sample.

There are five action statements in the Taskforce’s First Report that are not being reported as separate actions by the Taskforce but have been included in the sample.

Table 2.3: Actions from Taskforce’s First Report not being reported in Taskforce monitoring reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. assigned</th>
<th>Action statement from Taskforce’s First Report</th>
<th>Category in evidence tables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NN1</td>
<td>We will identify communities with [emphasis added] existing family violence prevention programmes and initiatives and put a funding process in place (p. 17)</td>
<td>Service Funding and Contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN2</td>
<td>We will put in place measures that monitor the impact family violence prevention initiatives have on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area (p. 14)</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN3</td>
<td>We will use the information and infrastructure provided by the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (NZFVC) to help us to identify where we need to build our knowledge of family violence and what works to prevent it (p. 14)</td>
<td>Knowledge-building and Knowledge-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN4</td>
<td>We will work with and build on the efforts of the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse to share good practice and new research (p. 14)</td>
<td>Knowledge-building and Knowledge-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN5</td>
<td>The MSD will enable appropriate sharing of information specific to child victims and witnesses to family violence (jointly with Police) (p. 23)</td>
<td>Multi-agency co-ordination collaboration and communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcome of all these adjustments from the Taskforce’s First Report are summarised in Table 2.4.

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4 Actions 62 to 68 and action 70
Table 2.4: Taskforce actions included in the research sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported action numbers</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>No. of actions included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Listed here in both Māori and Pacific categories</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8, 9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Split out here as 13a, 13b and 13c</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14, 15</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Split out here and in earlier Taskforce monitoring reports as 21a and 21b</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Split out as 22a, 22b, 22c and 22d in earlier Taskforce monitoring reports but reported as one action here to reflect wording in the Taskforce’s First Report</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Not included in this research as this action does not appear in the Taskforce’s First Report; it seems to be a carry-over from Te Rito, Action 8d</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>The Taskforce monitoring reports contain 29a and 29b but only 29a is included in this research as 29b is not an action statement extracted from the Taskforce’s First Report</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Not included in this research as the Taskforce’s First Report does not state this as an action but rather as ‘Resources already available’</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 to 58</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Split out here and in earlier Taskforce monitoring reports as 60a, 60b and 60c</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 to 68</td>
<td>Not included in this research as this action not due to be implemented until 2007/08</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Not included in this research as this action not due to be implemented until 2007/08</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Not included in this research as it only appears as a statement in the Taskforce’s First Report (p. 27) not as an intended action</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 to 76</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN 1 to 5</td>
<td>Actions that have been extracted from the Taskforce’s First Report but which do not appear to be being reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal: number of Taskforce actions</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall sample of 88 actions was achieved by combining the three sub-samples (see Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Reconciliation of the 88 actions researched for this thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>No. of actions included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal: number of Te Rito actions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal: number of Blueprint actions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal: number of Taskforce actions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: number of actions included in this research</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 Methodology, Data Gathering and Analysis

The sample of 88 actions was broken down into eight subject areas:
1. Overall Coordination and Multi-Agency Working Arrangements
2. Strategies for Māori, Pacific and New Migrants
3. Research, Monitoring, Evaluation/Audit, Death Reviews, Knowledge-sharing
4. Workforce and Training
5. Service Development
6. Standards and Best Practice Guidelines
7. Legislation, Courts and Law Enforcement

An evidence table was developed for each of the 88 actions, grouped into these eight categories (see Appendix 2). The format of each evidence table is as follows:

- the strategy document the action comes from
- the action number
  - for the Blueprint and Te Rito, the numbering is the same as that of the strategy document
  - for Taskforce actions, the number assigned is the same as the number reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports. The five actions not being reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports have been assigned ‘NN’ numbers (see Table 2.3)
- the specified timeframe as stated in the relevant strategy document
- the current status – each action has been assigned one of the following four status categories:
  - completed in specified timeframe
  - completed but outside specified timeframe
  - not completed
  - no action taken
- the reasons for implementation failure – each action in the last three status categories has been assigned one of the following reasons for implementation failure:
  - the strategy over-promised
  - the action was not adequately scoped and hence has an unrealistic completion date
  - there appears to have been a breakdown in the implementation process
- the evidence to support the findings
- the links between the Blueprint, Te Rito and Taskforce action are noted. Nineteen Te Rito and Blueprint actions were either not completed or had no action taken. Each of these 19 actions note either:
  - ‘Incomplete: has not been taken up by the Taskforce’
  - the Taskforce action where the work is continuing.
The research was conducted in two parts as shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.1 and outlined below. This was done in order to weave together the specific focus on the three family violence strategies with a much broader examination of public sector strategy and implementation and then to bring these two parts together in order to ‘learn our way forward’ into the future. The original intention had been to complete Part One and then move on to Part Two, but it transpired that the parts overlapped and data collection and analysis continued for both until all possible data was on hand.

**Figure 2.1: Research process for this thesis**

- **Part One**
  - Family Violence Strategies
  - Q 1: To what extent have the government and non-government sectors implemented the actions contained in the government’s three family violence strategy documents within the specified timeframes?
  - Q 2: How accurately is the implementation status being reported?
  - Q 3: When an action or task has not been fully implemented in the specified timeframe, is this because:
    - the strategy over-promised
    - the action was not adequately scoped and hence was assigned an unrealistic completion date
    - there appears to have been some breakdown in the implementation process?
  - Evidence from documentation
  - Evidence from interviews

- **Part Two**
  - Public sector strategy and implementation
  - Q 4: What environmental, structural or process factors may be impacting positively or negatively on the implementation of these strategies?
  - Q 5: What changes could be made to improve the situation?
  - Evidence from literature and public sector reports
  - Evidence from interviews
  - The researcher’s knowledge and expertise

**Chapter 3:** Analysis of the evidence pertaining to the sample of 88 family violence actions

**Chapter 4:** Analysis of evidence on public sector strategy and implementation

**Chapter 5:** Findings and implications

**Chapter 6:** Conclusions
Part One

Part One used simple mapping techniques to cluster, and link where appropriate, data pertaining to the 88 actions in the sample. Three data-gathering methods were used for Part One:

1. Publicly available documents, reports, media statements and implementation literature. These were obtained via the Victoria University of Wellington library, from websites of individual government agencies, and by requesting public reports direct from the relevant agency or from the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (NZFVC) website.

2. Reports and other documents that were not publicly available. It is clear from the public documentation that there is also a considerable amount of information relating directly to these three family violence strategies that is not available publicly. Some unpublished material was sourced following requests to different government ministries under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). Other unpublished documentation was provided during interviews.

3. Semi-structured interviews with staff from government and non-government agencies. Fifteen people from a cross-section of government and non-government agencies were interviewed to collect evidence for both Part One and Part Two. Interviewees were asked what they knew about the implementation process and the status of any of the actions.

Evidence was systematically gathered for each of the 88 actions and collated in the detailed tables in Appendix 2. Information from two or more sources was compared where possible before a conclusion was reached. In most instances this involved reaching an interim finding from the available documentation and then checking this finding with one or more of the interviewees. The evidence was subsequently analysed in order to determine the implementation status of each action; how accurately that status was being reported; and, for all actions that had not been fully implemented within the specified timeframe, where the breakdown in implementation had occurred.

A series of letters were sent to relevant government agencies formally requesting information under the OIA that was not available via websites or libraries. Four of the five requests sent to the Minister or Ministry of Social Development (MSD) were declined. This made gathering evidence more difficult, as MSD have overall management responsibility for all three strategies. Table 2.6 summarises the OIA letters sent and the responses received. The original intention had been for the interviews to relate only to Part Two. However, there were so many gaps in information about the status of many of the actions (because of the failure to secure information via the OIA) that the interview process was extended to obtain information from interviewees on the history and current implementation status of the actions.

It was easier to reach a conclusion regarding status for some actions than others. Where there was a discrepancy between sources, this has been identified. Where information to hand explained why an action had not been implemented in the specified timeframe, this has been noted. Otherwise the reason was determined by the available evidence. The overall analysis of the evidence for Part One is contained in Chapter 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date OIA request sent</th>
<th>Agency approached and nature of request</th>
<th>Date response received and nature of response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/7/07</td>
<td>To Hon. David Benson-Pope Minister of Social Development and Employment, requesting documentation relating to the Family Violence Ministerial Team</td>
<td>2/8/07 Meeting held with MSD officials regarding this request and those made to MSD. Officials advised they were formally refusing this request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/7/07</td>
<td>To Ministry of Social Development, requesting information and documentation pertaining to the Taskforce</td>
<td>2/8/07 Meeting held with MSD officials regarding this request and those made to MSD. Officials advised they were formally refusing this request. A revised request was made verbally at this meeting for a considerably reduced number of items. 13/8/07 MSD confirm in writing the details of the modified request agreed at the meeting. 18/9/07 MSD advise they are also refusing to provide any of the items in the modified request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/7/07</td>
<td>To Ministry of Social Development, requesting information clarifying the status of specific Taskforce actions</td>
<td>2/8/07 Meeting held with MSD officials regarding this request and those made to MSD. Officials advised they were formally refusing this request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/7/07</td>
<td>To Ministry of Justice (MOJ) requesting information pertaining to the actions MOJ are lead agency for</td>
<td>9/8/07 MOJ advise they need to extend the timeframe for their response until 17/10/07 (this was accepted). 21/11/07 MOJ refuse three aspects of the request and provide information regarding the others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/7/07</td>
<td>To New Zealand Police requesting information pertaining to the actions the Police are lead agency for</td>
<td>20/8/07 All information requested was provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/7/07</td>
<td>To Accident Compensation Corporation requesting information pertaining to Taskforce Action 22</td>
<td>9/8/07 ACC seek an extension of time to respond until 22/8/07 (this was accepted). 12/9/07 ACC respond providing all the information that was requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/7/07</td>
<td>To Ministry of Health (MOH) requesting information pertaining to Taskforce Actions 41 and 42</td>
<td>30/7/07 MOH advise they had decided the Taskforce was the appropriate body to respond so the request had been forwarded to the secretariat for response. 26/9/07 MSD write saying they have returned the request to MOH. 28/9/07 MOH advise they are starting counting the 20 working days again from the date of the follow-up phone call. 5/10/07 MSD send two documents relating to this request. 24/10/07 MOH advise they are extending the period for response until 24/11/07. 26/11/07 MOH send some of the documentation already provided by MSD and an additional paper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/7/07</td>
<td>To Ministry of Social Development, requesting information and documentation relating to the Blueprint</td>
<td>30/8/07 MSD wrote advising they were formally refusing this request (however, some information was subsequently provided).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/7/07</td>
<td>To Ministry of Social Development, requesting documentation relating to the Te Rito strategy</td>
<td>18/9/07 MSD respond providing the information requested.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part Two

Part Two focused on identifying what environmental, structural or process factors may be impacting positively or negatively on the implementation of these actions.

The five primary sources of evidence for Part Two were:

1. Literature. A cross-section of data pertaining to implementation of public sector policies and strategies was obtained from public policy and general management literature at the Victoria University of Wellington library.

2. Public sector reports. A range of public sector reports were obtained from websites and from the university library databases.

3. The researcher’s own knowledge and expertise in the field of public sector implementation (see Appendix 4)

4. Experiences of interviewees with implementation of any of the 88 actions obtained via semi-structured interviews with staff from government and non-government agencies. The same 15 people who were interviewed for Part One were asked about their experiences with the implementation of the sample of four specific actions or any of the 88 family violence actions. The interview themes were:
   - the transition of the actions from the strategy into the implementation phase, including how much planning for implementation had been done
   - the structure and processes of implementation work: for example, identifying whether there was multi-agency or single-agency involvement at this stage
   - management of the implementation process
   - implementation documentation
   - the process for bringing implementation activities to a conclusion or transitioning into ongoing operational activities
   - aspects and approaches that had worked well or not so well, and what could have been done differently to improve the implementation process
   - the extent to which agencies other than the lead agency were involved or consulted or involved through the implementation process
   - the process used for considering the impact the action would have on service-provider agencies prior to implementation
   - things that could have been done differently that would have improved the implementation process or outcomes.

More than half the interviewees expressed a surprising degree of nervousness about participating in this research. Many requested reassurance that not only would they not be identified in any way, but neither would their agency – not even in terms of whether it was a government or non-government agency. The original intention had been to report the findings from interviews by breaking them into government and non-government agency responses, but this has not been possible due to undertakings made with interviewees. The only details of the interviews that can be reported is that 15 people were interviewed from a mix of government and non-government agencies and each interview lasted between 30 and 90
minutes. Information provided by interviewees has been incorporated throughout this thesis and unidentifiable quotes inserted where relevant. Following the interviews, the interview notes were sent to each interviewee, who was then given the opportunity to check them and make any changes or additional contributions. Ethical approval was obtained prior to the interview process.

More detailed data was collected specific to a small sample of actions or groups of actions that were selected for this purpose:

- Enforcement of Protection Orders. Work in this area, commenced under Te Rito Action 3 but not completed, was subsequently picked up as Actions 60a, 60b and 60c in the Taskforce’s First Report.
- Reviews of family violence-related deaths. This was a good example of a successful multi-agency implementation process from the Taskforce’s First Report.
- Monitoring and evaluation. This was one of the critical areas in which multiple actions had not been fully implemented.
- Child Advocacy Services. This was a good example of a successful multi-agency implementation process from the Te Rito report.

The evidence obtained from the interviews and documentation was analysed together with evidence from public policy implementation and general management literature, public sector reports, and the researcher’s own knowledge and expertise in the field of public sector implementation. There was a high degree of synergy between information gathered from these different sources; hence the analysis contained in Chapter 4 should help to explain some of the issues identified in Chapter 3. Factors that appear to have impacted – positively or negatively – on the implementation of the family violence actions are identified.

2.5 The Thesis Format

This thesis is divided into nine chapters reflecting the research process shown in Figure 2.1.

- Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the issue of family violence, the research questions and methodology, and the overall findings
- Chapter 3 contains a master-list of the 88 actions, an intervention logic that identifies the most critical Taskforce actions, the analysis of the evidence pertaining to the 88 actions broken down into each of the eight categories, and identification of how the actions between the three strategies are linked
- Chapter 4 is a comprehensive analysis of the evidence about public sector strategy and implementation including the implementation environment and all stages of the MfO continuous improvement cycle to identify where the process is failing and where improvements can be made with the family violence strategies
- Chapter 5 contains the findings against each of the five research questions and includes a section outlining opportunities for improvements
- Chapter 6 succinctly presents the overall conclusion of this thesis
Appendix 1 is a timeline of family violence prevention initiatives in New Zealand over the past 30 years.

Appendix 2 comprises the detailed analysis of evidence tables for each of the 88 actions. The detailed evidence behind all matters covered in Chapter 3 and the findings that have been summarised in Chapter 5 are also contained in these detailed tables.

Appendix 3 is a comprehensive bibliography and Appendix 4 contains a brief profile of the researcher to support the use of her own knowledge and expertise in the analysis of the evidence for this thesis.

2.6 Key Findings

The major findings of this thesis are:

- less than 50% of the actions in the government’s three family violence strategies have been fully implemented six months after the completion date stated in the strategy
- the Taskforce monitoring reports have not accurately reflected the implementation status of many actions
- most of the actions not completed under the Te Rito and Blueprint strategies have not been picked up under the Taskforce programmes of action
- the Taskforce programmes of action are not really strategies, but rather a compilation of often unrelated family violence actions not collectively supported by a causal model
- there are several major groups of actions where little or nothing has been done
- the majority of actions that have not been completed or have not been progressed are those where there appears to have been a breakdown in the implementation process
- there has been little or no formal planning for implementation for most of the 54 Taskforce actions
- implementation responsibility is often assigned to agencies and individuals without the resources, skills and experience to do the work
- there is little ‘conversation’ or information-sharing between the Taskforce and family violence providers, and multi-agency involvement is limited in most areas other than Taskforce itself
- the leadership and coordination infrastructure underpinning the Taskforce cannot satisfactorily fulfil the required functions
- significant portions of the government’s Managing for Outcomes (MfO) cycle of continuous improvement are missing or have inadequate linkages.

5 See Chapter 5 for the full findings.
3. Implementation of the Family Violence Strategies

The analysis of evidence in this chapter is focused on research questions 1, 2 and 3.

Q 1: To what extent have the government and non-government sectors implemented the actions contained in the government’s three family violence strategy documents within the specified timeframes?

Q 2: How accurately is the implementation status being reported?

Q 3: When an action or task has not been fully implemented in the specified timeframe, is this because:
- the strategy over-promised
- the action was not adequately scoped and hence was assigned an unrealistic completion date
- there appears to have been some breakdown in the implementation process?

A process evaluation approach was taken to determine the extent to which the family violence strategies have been implemented and hence delivered as intended; and, where strategies were not delivered as intended, to determine the reasons for implementation failure. The data was limited to publicly available documentation, a limited amount of material that was released under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA), and a range of interviews.

The status of each of the 88 actions in the sample was determined using qualitative analysis of the available data and then simple quantitative analysis for some of the overall findings. Due to data limitations the status assigned to some individual actions may be open to challenge; however, the collective findings from all 88 actions are convincing and do give cause for concern.

To provide a framework for the analysis for Part One, the 88 actions in the sample were clustered and analysed into eight categories (see 2.4). This enabled an examination of the linkages between similar types of actions arising from Te Rito, the Blueprint and the Taskforce’s First Report in order to find gaps and overlaps between the three strategies. An assumption was made that the Taskforce’s First Report (i.e., the 2006/07 Programme of Action) contained all actions not fully implemented under the Blueprint and Te Rito. Where the evidence indicates that actions not fully implemented under these earlier strategies have not been taken up by the Taskforce this is identified in the action table (see Appendix 2) and noted in the relevant section of this chapter.

This chapter contains a master-list of the 88 actions in the sample, an intervention logic, and a summary of the analysis of the evidence for the actions grouped in each category; it closes with a section on reporting. The eight sections (3.3 – 3.10) follow the implementation sequence identified in the intervention logic. The detailed tables (see Appendix 2) contain evidence pertaining to each of the 88 actions in the sample. The 24 actions identified as critical in the intervention logic have bolder borders in the detailed tables. Unless stated otherwise the actions referred to in this chapter are Taskforce actions.

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6 Te Rito; New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy February 2002; Care and Protection Blueprint February 2003; First report of the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families July 2006
3.1 Master-list of the 88 actions

Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 include a summary statement of each of the 88 actions in the sample for ready reference. These are abbreviations of the original action. The full wording for each action as it appears in the strategy is shown in the detailed tables (see Appendix 2).

Table 3.1: Master-list of Te Rito actions included in the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action number</th>
<th>Action statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Monitor the implementation and progress of the NZ Family Violence prevention strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Monitor policy and service development for Maori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Processes for ensuring that the legal sanctions are effectively monitored and enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Review the operation of legislation that interfaces with the DV Act 1995,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Plan of action for preventing violence in Māori communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Strategic directions for preventing and/or reducing violence in Pacific Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Funding arrangements for victims without protection orders and not mandated perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a</td>
<td>Establish New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8b</td>
<td>Auditing/evaluating the effectiveness of family violence programmes and services for Māori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8c</td>
<td>Auditing/evaluating the effectiveness of family violence programmes and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8d</td>
<td>Potential effects of violence portrayed in the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8e</td>
<td>Agenda for family violence research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Addressing shortfalls in capacity of family violence crisis intervention and post-support services, prevention services to meet Māori, the needs of Pacific and other ethnic clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Screening and risk assessment tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Standards/competencies, best practice guidelines, staff competency standards and best practice and improve safe practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Improve access to a range of services,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Prevention education/communication strategy and regular prevention campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1. Range of inter-agency co-ordination, collaboration and communication initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Māori capacity building projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Pacific</td>
<td>Pacific capacity building projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Others</td>
<td>Funding applications and administering contract compliance requirements to other ethnic service providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Framework for government investment in parent support and development services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Promote and increase child advocacy services across the sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Family support services and pre-school and school-based services and programmes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Master-list of Blueprint actions included in the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action number</th>
<th>Action statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Māori leadership role at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pacific peoples and other ethnic communities involvement in planning and provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ensure the views of children, young people and their families are incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Outcome measures to assess effectiveness of services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Evaluation of services and programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Address barriers to interagency co-ordination, collaboration and communication at all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Government investment strategy for care and protection services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Strategies for addressing workforce issues in the care and protection community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Role of Care and Protection Resource Panels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Standards for good practice in the delivery of care and protection services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action number</td>
<td>Action statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Developing the next programme of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Overseeing and monitoring the implementation of our programme of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Maori</td>
<td>Draw on the advice of Māori Advisory Groups to ensure Māori perspectives are taken into account and robust processes of consultation and inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Pacific</td>
<td>Drawing on Māori and Pacific advisory groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Incorporating migrant and refugee perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aligning business planning to reflect Taskforce vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maintain overview of government strategies to ensure goals and activities are complementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a</td>
<td>Measures that set the strategic direction of research into family violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Measures that: coordinate research and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13c</td>
<td>Measures that: address the gaps in our knowledge of family violence in New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Measures that monitor the level of family violence in New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Measures that help communities to learn from each other and service providers to share good knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Measures that evaluate this programme of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21a</td>
<td>Measure the level of family violence in New Zealand accurately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21b</td>
<td>Research on elder abuse prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>ACC research programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Using research to guide campaign strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Campaign strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Key messages will be rolled out at local and national level as part of the campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Establish a national leadership group to promote public education and awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Building the capacity of NGOs to support family violence prevention initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Funding for family violence prevention initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 &amp; 42</td>
<td>Family violence-related deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Sharing information … promotes safety and wellbeing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Family violence victims know what support and services are available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Maximising safety factors when managing court rosters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Increased thresholds for legal aid eligibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Review of legal aid remuneration rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Improving information courts provide about legal aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Testing fixed fees for legal aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Building safe and effective programmes for couples and families in addition to the existing programmes for victims and perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Build the capacity of interpreters in the courts (jointly with the Ministry of Justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Investigate introduction of advocates in courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Enhanced ability for courts to contact victims directly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Review purchasing plans for programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Improve processes for prosecutions for non-attendance at programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>MOJ will establish four further dedicated family violence courts: three in Wellington region, one in Auckland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Evaluate the existing models of dedicated family violence courts in Waitakere and Manukau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Forum to identify best practice for information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80a,b,c</td>
<td>Enforcement of protection orders – police training, performance measures and policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Support and training for lawyers working in family violence-related areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Local Case Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Developing new funding model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Cost family violence and family support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Build on existing workforce and organisational development initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Continue to promote the use of integrated contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN 1</td>
<td>Funding prevention programmes and initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN 2</td>
<td>Monitor the impact family violence prevention initiatives have on government and NGO organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN 3</td>
<td>Identify where we need to build our knowledge of family violence and what works to prevent it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN 4</td>
<td>Build on the efforts of the NZFVC to share good practice and new research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN 5</td>
<td>Enable appropriate sharing of information specific to child victims and witnesses to family violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 Intervention Logic and Critical Actions

The critical actions for implementation are traditionally determined by intervention logic. Intervention logic should underpin all public policy and strategy developments, but it is particularly important for complex social strategies where evidence is often not available to support the proposed new initiatives and where the multiple agencies and interest groups may have very different ideas about what will and what will not bring about the ultimate outcomes. Ryan (2002, 34) defines intervention logic as ‘a model that displays how, what, why and when the strategies proposed will lead to the desired outcomes’. The theory and practical implications of intervention logic in strategy development will be discussed in 4.3.

A logic model should have been developed for each of the individual family violence actions and then drawn together in one overall high-level model showing causal links between the different action areas, and thereby identifying the critical actions, the assumptions made at each level and the order these need to be implemented in to create the desired outcome. Adjustments would traditionally be needed at all levels until the overarching logical analysis reflects the logical analysis for all supporting actions. It is unclear whether any causal modelling or intervention logic was done for either of the Taskforce’s Programmes of Action. A simplistic high-level causal model has been prepared for the purposes of this analysis (Table 3.4).

This intervention logic model identifies the actions that are most critical to achieving the outcome sought by the Taskforce and the order in which these need to be implemented to have the greatest chance of achieving the Taskforce’s overall vision. It is important to note that:

- the analysis is based on the views of researcher
- it is limited to those actions contained in the Taskforce 2006/07 Programme of Action
- this analysis does not assume that these are the only actions that would be needed to eliminate family violence
- the assumptions noted are those presumed to have been made by those developing the 2006/07 Programme of Action not the assumptions the researcher would necessarily make in this logical analysis.

The strategic approach contained in the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action appears to have two key components: prevention and intervention. The final layer of actions in the intervention logic has hence been divided in the way.
Table 3.4: Intervention logic and critical path developed from the 2006/07 Programme of Action (Taskforce's First Report 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logical sequence and critical steps</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eliminating family violence will take sustained, coordinated and multilevel action over a number of years.</td>
<td>Social agencies working collaboratively at multiple levels on a range of initiatives can collectively 'eliminate' family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start by doing what needs to be done immediately to stop family violence, better support the individuals and families affected by family violence and lay the foundations for future work.</td>
<td>Leadership and governance are key to linking all actions together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope all actions for implementation</td>
<td>Collectively we know what actions are required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media campaign strategy (Action 35)</td>
<td>Māori are overrepresented in statistics and hence it is important to focus initiatives on needs for Māori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure Māori strategies, perspectives, processes (Action 7)</td>
<td>With adequate resources (budgets, time and suitably trained people), these actions can be achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a Programme of Action or strategy (Action 1)</td>
<td>In order to manage for outcomes, we need to know the current situation and then how the situation has changed once we implement the Programme of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor implementation of the Programme of Action (Action 3)</td>
<td>Actions to eliminate violence (e.g. prevention messages and increased screening) will increase the demand for programmes and services for victims and perpetrators. Before increasing demand, we need to increase capacity and put mechanisms in place to ensure safety of victims and for holding perpetrators to account for their actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research to inform key messages for media campaign (Action 29)</td>
<td>In order to manage for outcomes we need to commence data collection for monitoring and evaluation activities before commencing the new initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a baseline of data (Action 21a)</td>
<td>Establish mechanisms to evaluate the Programme of Action (Action 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish mechanisms for ongoing monitoring (1st part of Action 14)</td>
<td>Commence data collection for ongoing monitoring of incidence of family violence (2nd part of Action 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish mechanisms to monitor the impact of the new initiatives on service providers (1st part of NN2)</td>
<td>Commence data collection for monitoring impact of new initiatives on service providers (2nd part of NN2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure processes are in place for prosecuting perpetrators who don’t comply with court rulings (Actions 55 and 60)</td>
<td>Actions to eliminate violence (e.g. prevention messages and increased screening) will increase the demand for programmes and services for victims and perpetrators. Before increasing demand, we need to increase capacity and put mechanisms in place to ensure safety of victims and for holding perpetrators to account for their actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build capacity of workforce and organisational development (Action 75)</td>
<td>In order to manage for outcomes we need to commence data collection for monitoring and evaluation activities before commencing the new initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build the capacity of organisations that provide support and programmes for victims and perpetrators (Actions 50, 73, 74)</td>
<td>Establish mechanisms to evaluate the Programme of Action (Action 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure processes are in place for prosecuting perpetrators who don’t comply with court rulings (Actions 55 and 60)</td>
<td>Commence data collection for ongoing monitoring of incidence of family violence (2nd part of Action 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commence data collection for monitoring impact of new initiatives on service providers (2nd part of NN2)</td>
<td>Commence data collection for monitoring impact of new initiatives on service providers (2nd part of NN2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes and behaviours of perpetrators can be changed via a social marketing campaign</td>
<td>Identifying those at risk and making appropriate referrals will contribute to elimination of family violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7 Also Pacific and other ethnicities but as Māori are overrepresented in statistics, the critical focus needs to be for Māori
3.3 Leadership and Multi-Agency Working Arrangements

Wherever policies have to be implemented across multiple agencies, the success of the MfO continuous improvement cycle will be directly dependent upon successful leadership, governance, collaboration, coordination and reintegration of the agencies involved and hence concerted effort will be needed to succeed in this area. This is a complex issue that governments throughout the western world are grappling with and is discussed in more detail in 4.1 and 4.7. Ryan (2002, 40) notes this:

The 1990s separation of development and implementation via a purchaser/provider (cf. also policy/delivery) split may have created more problems than it solved and significant levels of reintegration (non-structural as well as structural) are required if the effectiveness of implementation and delivery are to be improved under MfO.

The Taskforce’s leadership and management arrangements are contained in two actions (Action 1 and 3) both of which are shown as critical actions in level 1 of the logical model. Aspects of the undertakings in Action 1 are unrealistic: for example, ‘ensure Taskforce actions are relevant and effective for all of New Zealand’s families, whānau and communities’. In order to ensure the actions are ‘relevant and effective’, each action would have to be based on robust research evidence and have a post-implementation evaluation to ensure it was effective. To ensure actions are relevant and effective for all New Zealanders is probably not possible. To undertake to do all that in the 12 months to June 2007, when the actions themselves were only being implemented in that year, was unrealistic.

The wording of Action 1 is also somewhat confusing. On one hand, the wording indicates the focus of the Taskforce is on developing and managing an overall strategy to end family violence, as the action undertakes to ‘advise Government on what actions are needed to end family violence’. On the other hand, the action makes undertakings about the implementation of its first Programme of Action and the development of its next Programme of Action, indicating that the main focus of the Taskforce is on annual planning. This apparent confusion between long term strategy and annual programmes of action is examined in 4.3.

Action 1 also undertakes to ‘develop the next programme of action’ by June 2007. The next Programme of Action covers the financial year 2007/08 and beyond. The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report stated:

In June 2007, the Taskforce agreed the Ongoing Programme of Action for 2007/08 and beyond, and the work programme detailing objectives from the Ongoing Programme of Action. The Ongoing Programme of Action was considered by the Family Violence Ministerial Team in July 2007. A Cabinet paper is currently being drafted which will be circulated to the Taskforce with a view to submission to Cabinet in early/mid November 2007 (p.9).

The Ongoing Programme of Action was not released until 15th February 2008. It is unclear why it took eight months from the time that the Taskforce agreed the plan until it was publicly released.
The following statement appears to be linked to Action 1 but appears in quite a different part of the Taskforce’s First Report (p. 30) and does not appear to be monitored as a separate action hence it is assume to have been merged into Action 1:

We will report in 2007 on:
- our achievements in the delivery of our programme of action
- the impact our work has had
- how we will build on what we have learnt in our first year
- the new initiatives that hold promise for the future.

The Ongoing Programme of Action (2007) contains a summary of achieved actions and the new initiatives the Taskforce is proposing. There appears to be little publicly available on ‘the impact the work of the Taskforce has had’ or ‘what has been learnt in the first year’.

The second critical action is Action 3. It contains undertakings about the Taskforce overseeing and monitoring the implementation of the 2006/07 Programme of Action. The status of this critical action is seen as ‘not completed’ because the evidence suggests that the Taskforce’s mechanisms for overseeing and monitoring are not robust enough. There are numerous discrepancies between the status of actions as stated in the Taskforce’s monitoring reports and their actual status. This will be discussed further in other chapters of this thesis.

Action 71 is a regional multi-agency action identified as critical in the intervention logic. This action has become known as the Family Violence Interagency Response System (FVIRS). Implementation of FVIRS was achieved within the specified timeframe and this initiative is seen by interviewees as one of the most effectively implemented Taskforce actions. It is a good example of multi-agency approach being used successfully at all levels (ie planning, development and implementation). The programme is being implemented across all districts in New Zealand, assisted by an implementation support team. The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says ‘Anecdotal evidence from sites indicates that this approach is having positive effects’. External contractors have been engaged to carry out an evaluation of this initiative, and it may well provide a model that could be used for the other action areas. It will be important to ensure the findings of the evaluation are used for the continuous improvement of this model.

Six of the seven actions from the three strategies relating to multi-agency activities are deemed ‘not complete’ or have ‘no action taken’ status. Analysis indicates that in four cases this has been due to the strategy wording being unrealistic or over-promising.

Blueprint Action 3 is the only action from any of the three strategies that identifies the need to incorporate in the planning and implementation stages the views of those who have experienced family violence. The toolkit developed as part of this workstream will help those planning and providing services to obtain the views of children, young people and their families, but that is somewhat removed from ‘ensuring those views are incorporated’ as the action states. Incorporating the views of women, children, men and families who have experienced violence is important, and the fact that this work has not been continued under the Taskforce is disappointing.
3.4 Māori, Pacific and New Migrants

Māori whānau/family violence is a complex issue to address. It occurs within the historical context that reshaped the foundations of Māori society through the process of colonisation. It also occurs within the contemporary context of socio-economic disadvantage, which can be linked to Māori health status being lower than that for most other population groups in New Zealand (Ministry of Health 2002 cited in Standards New Zealand 2006). The development of tools and training programmes to improve the sector’s ability to respond effectively is vital in improving the effectiveness of the identification and the appropriate referral of Māori who are victims of family violence (Standards New Zealand 2006). The Te Rito strategy (p. 20) says:

Several New Zealand evaluations and reviews have suggested that there is value in approaches to family violence intervention and prevention that specifically incorporate a Māori perspective that renews cultural links, affirms cultural identity, mobilises and utilises community, whānau, hapu and iwi resources, and takes into account the effects of colonization … family violence prevention should be recognised and given a high priority in policy and service development.

We know that most cases of family violence are unreported and hence the data is unreliable. The available data indicate that Māori are overrepresented as both victims and perpetrators of violence in families/whānau. In the 2006 New Zealand census, 14.6% of people usually living in New Zealand identified themselves as Māori (Statistics New Zealand 2007). The following statistics provide some indication of Māori whānau/family violence levels:

- the 2001 National Survey of Crime Victims showed lifetime prevalence of intimate partner violence was much higher for Māori women (49%) than for New Zealand European (24%) or Pacific women (23%) (Lievore and Mayhew 2007, 55)
- in interviews with 961 women from a community sample of 1,500 New Zealand adults, Kazantzis et al. (2000 cited by Lievore and Mayhew 2007) found that Māori women were 1.6 times more likely than European women to have experienced domestic assault
- the ethnicity of clients attending stopping-violence programmes was: 38% Pakeha, 31% Māori, 23% Pacífica, 7% Other (New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse 2007)
- ethnicity of Child, Youth and Family intake clients was: 45.3% Māori, 37.4% Pakeha, 12.5% Pacific nations and 4.9% other ethnicities (New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse 2007).

Because Māori are overrepresented in statistics, it is important to ensure that all family violence actions or interventions have a high probability of a positive outcome for Māori. Hence Taskforce Action 7, which specifically focuses on Māori issues, has been identified as a critical action in level 1 of the intervention logic. Action 7 should be serving as the umbrella action over all other actions for Māori.

The Blueprint, Te Rito and the Taskforce’s First Report collectively contain five Māori-specific actions and seven other actions that also relate directly to Māori. Ten of these 12 actions were contained in the Blueprint or Te Rito and hence it is appropriate to look back at these

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8 Actions 8b, 8e, 9, 11 and 13 from Te Rito, Blueprint Action 10 and Action 22c from the Taskforce’s First Report
earlier actions for Māori to ascertain their current status. Except for Te Rito Action 5 and Blueprint Action 10, which were completed, and some developments for Māori under Te Rito action area 13, the remaining seven actions have a status of 'not completed' or 'no action taken'. The incomplete work for six of these seven earlier actions does not appear to have been taken up as part of any of the Taskforce actions. It is assumed that Te Rito Action 8b to ‘update an agenda for family violence research which specifically includes an indigenous component’ has been merged into Taskforce Action 13a but this remains unconfirmed because work under that Action 13a is not complete either. Action statements from the incomplete Te Rito and Blueprint actions for Māori include:

- establish a process for monitoring policy and service development
- ensure Māori perspectives and approaches are given a high priority
- reconcile cross-sector funding for provision of services for Māori
- ensure evaluation of services and programmes for Māori is given priority
- develop a framework for auditing/evaluation the effectiveness of services and programmes for Māori
- monitor and implement Māori capacity building projects
- investigate options and make recommendations to assist Māori service providers
- develop a strategy to ensure Māori have a significant leadership role at all levels
- develop and/or implement best practice guidelines around delivery of services to Māori
- examine and identify any shortfalls in the capacity of family violence prevention services to meet Māori client needs.

It is disappointing, to say the least, that after all this time and with ongoing statistics to support the needs of Māori, most, if not all, the above undertakings appear to have slipped off the radar. The Ongoing Programme of Action states:

By June 2008 we will develop a Māori Programme of Action and a Pacific Programme of Action which will build on the Ongoing Programme of Action and provide leadership and co-ordinate actions for Māori and Pacific peoples (p.12).

This is both encouraging and disappointing. It appears to be more of the same. Sadly this new programme of action for Māori will probably contain promising initiatives similar to those contained in Te Rito and the Blueprint (2002 and 2003 respectively) that were never fully implemented under these earlier strategies. Somehow we have to move from developing more and more strategies and programmes of action for Māori and focus on successful implementation. In this way, real change for Māori can be achieved.

A strategic direction document for Pacific family violence was produced under Te Rito Action 6 and implemented in Christchurch, Porirua, Manukau and Waitakere from 2005 to 2007. There is a project team working on this within the Family and Community Services of the Ministry of Social Development. It is not clear whether this project team works closely with the Taskforce’s Pacific Advisory Group.

Blueprint Action 2 for Pacific peoples and other ethnic communities was not completed under the Blueprint and so was later merged with Te Rito Action 15, which undertook to ‘monitor and implement Pacific capacity building projects’ and ‘investigate options and make recommendations to assist Pacific service providers’. However, no specific project was
undertaken against Te Rito Action 15. Rather it was linked to a number of other ongoing government initiatives, and indications are that it was not well coordinated and was never fully addressed. There is no evidence that these combined incomplete actions have been merged into Taskforce Action 7. Te Rito Action 15 also undertook to assist and build the capacity of other ethnic providers. It is unclear whether Taskforce Action 8 is incorporating these Te Rito undertakings.

3.5 Research, Monitoring, Evaluation, Death Reviews, Knowledge-Sharing

Strategies that are based on robust evidence are more likely to be effective in meeting the outcomes. However, in many social policy areas, such as family violence, there is insufficient reliable evidence available, in which case strategies are often no more than good ideas or ‘new initiatives that hold promise for the future’. Where change is implemented without good evidence, there is a particular ethical responsibility to ensure that the interventions are doing more good than harm. The potential for harm, and the need for careful evaluation of the risk of harm, permeate all areas of public policy and definitely areas such as family violence where strategies involve providing, or withholding, interventions from individuals and coercing the public for the greater good, for example social marketing campaigns such as the family violence ‘It’s not OK’ media campaign. It is therefore important to have mechanisms in place to ensure collected data can be used for monitoring and evaluating activities, thus retrospectively confirming that the strategy has been effective and that harm has been minimised.

Monitoring and evaluation, which are often seen as activities that occur after implementation of other actions, are given a low priority in the implementation process. However, data collection mechanisms, monitoring processes, formative evaluation frameworks and baseline measurements must all be established in advance of other implementation activities, in order for effective monitoring and evaluation to occur retrospectively. For this reason levels 2 and 4 of the intervention logic are both dedicated to research and monitoring actions. The need for research, monitoring, audit and evaluation to be built into all aspects of the family violence initiatives appears to have been well understood. Of the five critical research, monitoring and evaluation actions contained in the intervention logic, only two have been implemented. The remaining three have not yet been started.

In addition to the five critical actions, the three strategies collectively contain a further 13 actions or sub-actions in this area. Very few of these have been completed either. These implementation failures potentially expose all three strategies, stakeholders and the public to risk. It is important to examine these implementation failures further.

Research

Of the nine sub-actions relating to research from the Taskforce’s First Report and Te Rito, only three have been successfully implemented. The establishment of the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (NZFVC), under the Te Rito strategy, appears to have been a resounding success. Taskforce Action 21a, a critical research action from the intervention logic to collect baseline data, has been completed and the findings were expected to be

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9 Taskforce’s First Report 2006, 30

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published early 2008, nine months behind target. The research on elder abuse (Action 21b) was published early 2008, six months behind schedule. Action 29, another critical research action, has been completed but is being reported as part of the ‘Public Education and Awareness’ section (see 3.10).

Of the remaining research actions identified as ‘not completed’ or ‘no action taken’, four appear to have faltered in the implementation process; two were not adequately scoped and hence had unrealistic completion dates; and for one, the strategy over-promised.

Evaluation
Taskforce Action 19, to ‘evaluate this programme of action’, is a critical action at level 4 in the intervention logic, and at the end of 2007 no such evaluation had been undertaken. There is an extensive body of literature around post-implementation evaluation in the public sector. It is traditional for new initiatives to be formally evaluated by expert evaluators who are independent of those who have been managing the implementation. Such evaluations focus on whether the new initiative achieved the outcomes expected and are an effective use of public funds. The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report gives this action a ‘completed’ status:

A workshop was held on 10 April 2007 where lessons learnt from the implementation of the first POA [Programme of Action] were discussed. The workshop was well attended (p.8).

However, a workshop where lessons from implementation were ‘discussed’ does not constitute an evaluation. Urgent action is therefore needed in this area. Evidence indicates that only one non-government family violence agency attended this workshop, and this doesn’t constitute good attendance in a multi-agency environment.

There were two Te Rito evaluation actions. Action 8b pertains to evaluating the effectiveness of family violence programmes and services for Māori and has never been actioned as mentioned above (see 3.4). A considerable amount of work was done by MSD in respect to Te Rito Action 8c but evidence collected for this thesis is that MSD have made a decision to stop the project. This means all work done to date in this important area will have been wasted. The reason for the cessation of this initiative is not known. Neither of these incomplete Te Rito actions appears to have been taken up by the Taskforce.

Monitoring
No action has been taken on the two critical monitoring actions from the intervention logic (Action 14 and NN2). Action 14 states: ‘We will put in place measures that monitor the level of family violence in New Zealand’. Ongoing quantitative monitoring requires a starting point, a baseline. Identifying baseline data (Action 21a) was only specified for completion in June 2007. Hence it was somewhat unrealistic to assume that ongoing monitoring could occur in the same timeframe as the baseline was being established. However, as shown in the logical analysis, new service initiatives should not have commenced until a baseline had been established and ongoing monitoring mechanisms were in place. The other critical monitoring action (NN2) is contained on page 14 of the Taskforce’s First Report:

We will put in place measures that monitor the impact family violence prevention initiatives have on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area.
NN2 is not being reported separately in the Taskforce monitoring reports. Instead it has been combined with Action 14:

There are strong linkages between work to monitor the level of family violence in New Zealand and the work to “monitor the impact of family violence prevention initiatives have on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area” which will be maintained (Taskforce monitoring report June 2007, 7).

These claims of ‘strong linkages’ are not accepted. Action 14 involves quantitative monitoring of actual and/or reported cases of family violence. Action NN2 is about monitoring the impact that the new initiatives have had on agencies (both intended and unintended). This is impact monitoring, which is more akin to an evaluation or auditing activity. The two actions do not go together. There is no evidence that any work has been done to monitor the impact family violence initiatives are having on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area. The Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action says:

In our Ongoing Programme of Action we will monitor increases in demand for family violence services as a result of the Campaign for Action on Family Violence and create sustainable responses to the increased demand (2008, 23).

This repetition confirms that Action NN2 has not been actioned under the 2006/07 Programme of Action. There is no date assigned for this repeat action, but whenever it is done it will be a little like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.

**Death reviews**

The death-review actions were both completed on time. The concept of family violence death reviews is a type of case review or audit, whereby the findings of the death reviews form an integral part of the continuous improvement cycle. It is important to note that both the death-review actions involved only selected development and planning work. There is still considerable development, planning and implementation work to be done and indications are that it will be up to two years before the death-review process is fully operational. This is recognised in the Ongoing Programme of Action.

**Knowledge-building**

Action 15 is reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports as being addressed via the NZFVC. However, the NZFVC has apparently not had a contract since July 2007 and agreement has not been reached for them to assume responsibility for this extra work. There are two other actions identified in the knowledge-building and knowledge-sharing category (NN3 and NN4). Neither of these are being reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports but both state they will be addressed via the NZFVC, and hence it can be assumed that they are not being addressed either.

Taskforce Action NN4 states ‘we will work with and build on the efforts of the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse to share good practice and new research’. Many of the research reports commissioned by the Taskforce have not been shared outside the Taskforce. This indicates the Taskforce are not ‘sharing good practice and new research’ themselves. The evaluations of the Waitakere and Manukau family violence courts are due to
be presented early in 2008. At the time of writing this thesis there are no indications whether these will be made public.

In summary, there are five research, evaluation and monitoring action areas that are critical in the intervention logic. Only two have been implemented. No action at all has been taken on any of the other three. The situation is reflected in a comment from Alex Matheson, in his paper ‘Governing Strategically: the New Zealand Experience’ (1998, cited by State Services Commission (2002, 8), concludes that:

> Central agencies have so far failed to provide the external impact information and analysis that will support the assessment of the national benefit derived from current strategies and the development of new strategies.

3.6 Workforce and Training

Level 3 of the intervention logic is dedicated to Action 75 (workforce capacity); Actions 50, 73 and 74 (services for victims and perpetrators); and Actions 55, 60a, 60b and 60c (law enforcement actions aimed at holding perpetrators to account). The assumption behind level 3 is that actions to eliminate violence (e.g. prevention messages and increased screening) will increase the demand for programmes and services for victims and perpetrators. The Taskforce’s mass media advertising campaign and many of the other action areas are aimed at raising awareness both in society at large and among those who are the victims of family violence or who refer victims and perpetrators to appropriate services. Therefore it is critical that before increasing demand, we ensure adequate organisational capacity, particularly a suitably trained workforce, to implement and subsequently operate all the new initiatives. In addition, the lead-in time required to recruit and train staff before service capacity can be increased needs to be factored into all timeframes and planning.

The need for workforce development was identified in the report of the New Zealand Parliamentarians’ Group on Population and Development (2005, 23):

> There is a need for extensive workforce development across all sectors. The workforce development needs of the voluntary and community sector must be resourced separately from their contracts for services. Knowledge at the community level must be regarded by government as a valuable resource and this may require funding mechanisms for sharing that knowledge.

Action 75, ‘to build on existing workforce and organisational development initiatives’ has therefore been designated as a critical action in the intervention logic. This action appears in the chapter ‘Improving Family Violence Service Capacity and Capability’ in the Taskforce’s First Report (p. 28):

> The Ministry of Social Development and non-government organisations will work together to build on existing workforce and organisational development initiatives.

There appears to have been a breakdown in the planning for implementation of Action 75, as the implementation activity is limited to workforce developments within MSD. This limited focus on the MSD workforce is confirmed in a report from the National NGO Family Violence
Prevention Alliance to the Taskforce dated 30 April 2007. Thus Action 75 is another critical action that has not been completed.

Ten of the 24 critical actions from the intervention logic have been analysed so far and already there is a pattern of implementation failure. Only three of these 10 critical actions have been fully implemented, four have been partly implemented, and three have had no action taken at all. The predominant reasons for implementation failure in these seven actions are either a breakdown in the implementation process or unrealistic completion dates being assigned at the scoping stage of planning for implementation. Thus the analysis so far indicates that failure to implement is mainly the consequence of factors occurring in one of the two implementation stages.

3.7 Service Issues

The intervention logic identifies four intervention service actions (Actions 44, 50, 73 and 74) and three prevention service actions (Actions 38, 39 and NN1). The ‘immediate priority’ for addressing service-related matters is reflected in the Taskforce’s First Report (p. 27), which says:

As an immediate priority we need to ensure service providers working in family violence have the capacity to meet the demand for services. A strong non-government sector is essential to responding effectively to family violence, as it can respond quickly to emerging family and community needs, and provide appropriate, accessible and responsive services that can engage vulnerable families. A range of services is needed, including crisis support, therapeutic programmes, education and long-term support to help people with jobs and housing and to get the education they need.

In the detailed tables (see Appendix 2), service-related issues have been separated into two subcategories, but they will be analysed together in this chapter.

Prevention services

Actions 38, 39 and NN1 are all shown on level 5 of the intervention logic. All three actions pertain to the provision of ‘prevention’ services to support the ‘Changing Attitudes and Behaviours’ media campaign. This is in contrast to other service actions that are focused on the provision of intervention or support services for victims and perpetrators. Action 39 was completed outside the timeframe, Action 38 is partially complete, but there is no sign of any action on NN1.

Intervention and support services

Before the status of the Taskforce intervention and support service-related actions are examined, it is worthwhile examining two Te Rito action areas that proposed a bottom-up approach to service issues:

- Te Rito Action 9 undertakes to examine and identify service-capacity shortfalls, then investigate options and make recommendations for addressing the identified shortfalls. No evidence could be found that there was ever a systematic and formal project to
‘examine and identify any shortfalls...’ and hence this action is deemed be ‘no action taken’

- Te Rito Action 12 identifies five specific actions that will be undertaken to improve access to the range of family-violence services including: reviewing current services; developing and implementing strategies to counteract barriers to access; investigating options and making recommendations for improving the availability and accessibility of remedial and support services and services for perpetrators; and developing outreach services for children and families/whānau. The evidence indicates that whilst some work was done under this action it was never completed.

A paper entitled *Building on Te Rito – New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy – the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families* (25 August 2006) provided in response to an OIA request confirms that neither of these actions have been adequately progressed under Te Rito. The Taskforce was to have picked up incomplete actions from Te Rito. However, there is no mention of these specific actions in any of the Taskforce material.

In contrast to the more bottom-up service-review approach of Te Rito, the Taskforce’s approach has been to use top-down funding mechanisms:

   The MSD and non-government organisations will work together to:
   - review current funding models and develop a new model that ensures the appropriate use of grants, contributory funding and full funding (Action 73)
   - cost family violence and family support services (Action 74).

It is difficult to see how these actions will collectively or individually ensure there is sufficient service capacity to meet demand, and they definitely will not facilitate a long-term strategic approach to identifying service-capacity shortfalls, removing barriers to access or approving the range of services available for victims and perpetrators, as articulated in the Te Rito strategy. In the absence of any other Taskforce actions focused on building service capacity, both Actions 73 and 74 have been identified as critical actions in the intervention logic. Neither, however, has been completed.

Evidence collected for this research shows that whilst there is an appearance of considerable activity with respect to costing and funding models, neither model has, to date, delivered the required outcome of ‘ensuring service providers working in family violence have the capacity to meet the demand for services’. The Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action reports the following steps have been taken to address service issues:

**An allocation of $9 million in service funding from Budget 2006**

There appears to be considerable confusion regarding the $9 million of funding from Budget 2006. It is important to clarify what appears to be the reality regarding this funding. The Budget 2006 fact sheet includes the following statements:

- The Government is investing $9 million over the next four years to increase support for people affected by family violence. This additional funding, which represents a 20 percent increase, is the first step in the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families’ programme to improve family violence prevention.
Increased funding for services will contribute to reducing family violence by improving access to family violence service providers.

This could lead the public to believe that the $9 million was buying more services. However, the NGO sector is very clear that the $9 million is not funding for increased capacity. Evidence gathered from interviews conducted for this research resoundingly reiterated that the $9 million was a retrospective CPI adjustment not funding for further service expansion. A press release from Relationship Services dated 10 May 2006 states:

This additional [$9 million spread over four years] funding is welcome, but it is only a start. The challenge is that as the government addresses the NGO funding deficit of the last 10 years, it also prioritises funding to meet the increasing needs of people seeking services to deal with family violence issues.

This is echoed in the Taskforce’s First Report (July 2006, 27):

As a first step towards putting the non-government sector on a sustainable footing, the Government is investing $9 million over the next four years. This recognises that funding has not kept pace with the demand for services over the past 10 years. Further investment is needed to ease the pressure on providers and put the non-government sector on sustainable funding so that services can meet the needs of families into the future.

So there has been an acknowledged funding shortfall for 10 years, $9 million is accepted as being insufficient to put things right, and this is before any moves are made to fund increased services. This is the situation a year before the media campaign and other new initiatives are put in place, which will inevitably create yet more demand on these already ‘pressured’ services.

Pathways to Partnership initiative

A letter to NGOs from Peter Hughes, the Chair of the Taskforce (undated but understood to be July 2007) refers to this initiative by advising:

The Government has established a fund of $20.4 million for Child and Family Services to support the roll out of the Pathways to Partnership initiative [not specific to family violence]. This will see small community based organisations shift to grant funding, which will substantially reduce compliance costs and free up resources.

The Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action (p.22) tells us something similar:

The Government is providing a one-off funding injection of $20.4 million over the next two years to build the capacity and capability of community-based child and family service providers. This is to deliver services including, but not limited to, services in the area of family violence.

At first glance the reader could assume the $20.4 million is for family violence services. But this isn’t the case, as is clarified in the second sentence of the Taskforce extract above. According to the Family and Community Services’ (of MSD) website the $20.4 million is

funding for the Pathways to Partnership initiative. The Pathways to Partnership is not specific to family violence. A long-term plan for this initiative is yet to be developed, but it is in essence a five-year plan that will ‘help [all types of] community-based child and family service providers to get the support they need to deliver effective, high quality and accessible services to children and families’. The $20.4 million referred to in the statements above will be spent on building five strategic partnerships in the first two years; contributing 2.5% to the cost of inflation in service contracts; moving some services towards full funding family and community services sector engagement; and evaluation. At this stage $7 million remains unallocated. It is understood that in April 2007 the National NGO Family Violence Prevention Alliance roundly criticised the Pathways to Partnership funding model.

A NZFVC news archive dated 12 February 2008 says:

In her speech to Parliament today, the Prime Minister Helen Clark announced a move towards sustainable funding for many community services. She indicated family violence was a priority area, saying that preventing family violence and youth offending were ‘critical to building a safer and more sustainable society for us all’. The funding will be implemented through the Pathways to Partnership initiative, which aims to improve the funding and working relationship between the Ministry of Social Development/CYFS, the Ministry of Justice, and the community sector. Ms Clark said, ‘Our new funding model will see essential services with which we have multi year programmes, such as parenting programmes, support for at risk youth, women’s refuge services, family violence programmes, and services for victims of crime, funded for the full cost of delivering the agreed services …..The new sustainable funding path will begin with an extra $37.5 million in 2008/09 and build to an annual increase of $192.8 million in 2011/12 and out years – that’s a total of $446 million over the next four years’, Ms Clark said.

The key phrase in the Prime Minister’s statement is ‘full cost of delivering the agreed services’. The questions remain: ‘What are the agreed family violence services?’, ‘What capacity of services is being funded?’ and ‘What range of services is required to meet the needs of family violence victims and perpetrators?’

Costing models developed between the National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges and Child Youth and Family

An update on current initiatives on the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse website (downloaded 12 July 2007) states

In 2007, the true cost of a range of family violence services will be investigated. The costings will link with other initiatives aimed at improving the service capacity and capability of family violence service providers. The National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges has recently undertaken a costing of Refuge services, in collaboration with Child Youth and Family. The costing models developed for this project will inform this current initiative.

It is understood that the costings of Women’s Refuge services determined in the above costing exercise were used as the basis for a budget bid for increased funding, which was rejected.

Two other Taskforce actions focused on specific service developments have been identified as critical in the intervention logic and hence worthy of mention here:

- Action 44 involved the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) ensuring that the victims of family violence know what support and services are available. This was actioned, albeit outside the specified timeframe.

- Action 50 undertook for MSD to build safe and effective programmes for couples and families in addition to the existing programmes for victims and perpetrators. The April 2007 monitoring report said a working group had been established and key informants and best practice models identified, projected costings, projected demand for services and a budget bid had all been done. Unfortunately the June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report recorded that ‘The bid was not successful and MSD is now meeting with MOJ to work out the way forward in terms of next steps and implementation.’ Hence this is another critical action not completed.

The evidence indicates that the incomplete Te Rito actions have not been picked up by the Taskforce; the Taskforce actions designed to increase funding, and hence increase capacity and capability of non-government family-violence service providers, have not adequately addressed the issue; services provided to victims and perpetrators of family violence remain seriously underfunded and under pressure; and it is highly likely that there is insufficient capacity in the non-government sector to meet the demand being created by the new family violence prevention initiatives. This raises the possibility that women and children may be unsafe, or harmed, as a consequence of the very strategies designed to protect them. Failure to ensure sufficient capacity of services and programmes to help victims and perpetrators of family violence can potentially harm those individuals. This notion is supported by Fanslow (2005, 49):

> Some public awareness campaigns have increased reports of family violence, however, they risk endangering women and children’s safety, if requests for help are not responded to promptly and appropriately. Services must be resourced to meet increased demand.

Before moving on to the next category, it is important to examine the consequences of this pattern of failure to implement service-related actions. The joint NGO submission12 to the New Zealand Parliamentarians’ Group on Population and Development (2005, 23) stated:

> The impediment to reducing family violence of most concern to the [Joint] NGO group is that of capacity. Their experience suggests that there are insufficient services available to meet current need across all aspects of family violence prevention and in particular the area of assisting recovery. Added to this is that many of the government initiatives currently active … have the potential to increase demand for services hugely. The increased demand is not sufficiently planned for … Capability is also an issue. Although there is a great deal of experience within the NGO sector, increased demand for service will increase the demand for skilled workers and workforce development, including ongoing education and professional development.

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12 Age Concern New Zealand, National Network of Stopping Violence, Barnados, Child Abuse Prevention Services, National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges, Royal New Zealand Plunket Society, RMS Refuge Resettlement, Relationship Services, Save the Children Fund and UNICEF.
The New Zealand Parliamentarians’ Group on Population and Development (2005) note that this NGO statement had been echoed in several other submissions they received: namely from the New Zealand Police, UNICEF, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Children’s Commissioner and Pacific Island Women’s Project. Their report states (p. 23):

The capacity of service providers is currently stretched and there is a sense of fatigue within the NGO community. It is imperative that these services are adequately supported for their present levels of service delivery, and that this support increases in anticipation of the inevitable increase in demand in response to raised public awareness around family violence.

On 6 March 2006 Cabinet agreed that Families – Young and Old was one of the Government’s three priorities for the next decade. The Hon. Steve Maharey advised in a subsequent Cabinet paper (2006) that in addition to the seven priority issues for this policy, Ministers have identified an eighth issue:

The capacity and capability of community based and not for profit non-government organisations delivering social services is underpinning the capacity to achieve the Families – Young and Old goal.

Two years after their submission to the Parliamentarian’s Group on Population and Development, the NGOs’ concerns about insufficient capacity had increased. In mid 2007, the National Family Violence NGO Alliance became so concerned about their lack of capacity to cope with any increased service demand that might result from the mass-media campaign that they refused to support the campaign. As a consequence, the media campaign was delayed while the government and non-government sectors discussed these concerns. The outcome was conveyed to the NGOs in a letter from Peter Hughes, the Chair of the Taskforce (undated but understood to be July 2007), which says:

As of 27 June, Cabinet approved a one-off transfer out of MSD baselines in order to create a $5 million backstop fund so that any individual service that does struggle as a result of the Campaign can be supported in a tangible way. I have asked Richard Wood, Deputy Chief Executive, Family and Community Services, to write to family violence service providers by the end of July setting out details of how organisations can apply for this funding.

The flaw in this proposed solution is that family violence victims and perpetrators may have to be turned away during the period between when services become unable to meet demand and when additional service capacity is available. As noted in the previous section there is a considerable lead-in time between decisions to increase capacity and actually having staff appointed and trained and extra infrastructure in place. Some of the key family violence services, for example Women’s Refuge, provide safe houses for victims of family violence. Once all safe houses are full, it is simply not possible to just set up and open a new safe house at short notice. A Dominion Post article on Thursday 6 September 2007 hints at this possibility:

Ms Stokes [Wellington Women’s Refuge office coordinator] said family violence in New Zealand was at ‘crisis point’, citing a 40 per cent increase in caseloads in the past year. Heather Henare, the chief executive said she appreciates the need for a national campaign against violence but is concerned about the pressure it will place on resources for refuges.
In closing this section, it is worthwhile reflecting on some sobering international evidence regarding the consequences of not adequately addressing service capacity and service funding requirements. According to Jane Doe Inc. (the Massachusetts Coalition Against Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence), domestic violence deaths in Massachusetts, USA have nearly tripled from 19 in 2005 to 34 in 2006 and 55 in 2007. The Boston Herald of Sunday 2 September 2007 reported the findings of more than a dozen interviews conducted with advocates, law enforcement officers and state officials on why the rates of domestic violence are skyrocketing in Massachusetts. The interviewees said the following factors were fuelling the bloodshed:

- a clogged domestic violence emergency shelter system
- a disjointed state funding system for domestic violence shelter and support services
- understaffed anti-domestic-violence programmes
- a criminal justice system that relies heavily on victims to protect themselves
- gaps in training on domestic violence for police officers
- a reduction in batters’ programmes statewide.

We must not only take heed of these findings but also take action to ensure that our repeated failure to satisfactorily implement service-related actions does not lead to a situation like that in Massachusetts. This statement from Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action (p. 22) provides some hope:

Sustainable effective services and strong relationships between the government and non-government sectors will improve service capacity, capability and sustainability and will lead to even better response to individuals and families affected by family violence. Government agencies and non-government agencies must work together on the best approach to building and maintaining sustainable family support services. There can be no wrong doors for victims, observers or perpetrators of family violence. Regardless of where they are and at what point they come to our attention, victims, observers and perpetrators of family violence must be directed immediately to those who can most effectively respond.

Only time will tell whether the Ongoing Programme of Action will be more successful in addressing service-related actions that the previous strategies have been.

3.8 Standards and Best Practice Guidelines

The intervention logic developed to assist this analysis identified ‘screening and risk assessment’ as a critical intervention. However, ‘screening and risk assessment’ was not contained in the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action. The assumption behind making this a critical intervention is that identifying those at risk and making appropriate referrals will contribute to the elimination of family violence.

Action 11 in the Te Rito strategy was to develop and/or implement:

- minimum standards/competencies for identifying violence in families/whānau and for responding to situations of family violence
- best practice guidelines to ensure that agencies model non-violent behaviour in their work with children and families/whānau

- best practice guidelines for relevant agencies and service providers around delivery of family violence prevention services to Māori and Pacific and other ethnic peoples
- review existing support and monitoring systems within relevant agencies for maintaining staff competency standards and best practice in family violence prevention work; and
- improve safe practice within family violence prevention services by developing and monitoring guidelines around training, caseloads and supervision.

New Zealand Police were responsible for this workstream. They contracted Standards New Zealand to develop a generic screening and risk assessment tool. New Zealand Standard (NZS) 8006:2006 *Screening, risk assessment and intervention for family violence including child abuse and neglect* was released on 9 June 2006. The release of this document fulfilled the first part of Te Rito Action 11 ‘to develop’ the document. However, the requirement to ‘implement’ remained outstanding when the document was released in June 2006.

A letter dated 2 June from the Acting Assistant Commissioner for Police was circulated with NZS 8006:2006. This letter contains four recommendations:

1. An implementation priority is for a fully funded comprehensive communications plan and training programme, based on the Standard, to be made available to all relevant [emphasis added] organisations, entities and individuals within the public, private, NGO and voluntary sectors.
2. A focus on the systematic implementation of this Standard is given priority to ensure that a consistent best practice approach to screening, risk assessment and intervention is used by all relevant sectors.
3. A scoping project is conducted with a focus on the development and participation in an approved family violence training programme, qualifying participants for recognised accreditation in screening and/or risk assessment in family violence.
4. The implementation of NZS 8006:2006 should be accompanied by ongoing monitoring and evaluation to assess the impact of this Standard on the capacity and capability of NGOs who work with families affected by family violence.

Even though the Taskforce builds on the initiatives put in place by Te Rito, there is no mention of the implementation phase for this standard in the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action, in its Ongoing Programme of Action or in any other Taskforce documentation analysed in the research for this thesis. Hence Te Rito Action 11, identified as a critical action in the intervention logic, remains ‘not completed’. Information gathered from interviewees is that the document has never been implemented as no funding has been assigned for the required implementation. It is unknown whether government or non-government service providers are referring to this standard but the recommended structures and processes to support the screening, risk assessment and intervention activities are definitely not in place.

Four years before the Standards New Zealand guidelines were released, the Ministry of Health published a document entitled *Family Violence Intervention Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse* (2002). In a more recent process, quite separate from the work of the Taskforce, the Ministry of Health have taken their intervention guidelines one step further, developing a ‘Violence Intervention Programme’ (VIP) and producing a tool kit to guide District Health Boards (DHBs) in the establishment of their own VIP programme. It is
understood that this is a voluntary initiative, with each DHB deciding if and how they will establish a violence intervention programme. This initiative is commendable, and anecdotal evidence obtained during this research is that where there is active screening for family violence activities, the referrals from the health sector to government and non-government service providers have increased sharply. Commendable as this initiative is, there are also a number of serious concerns:

- it is being developed in a silo approach quite separate to the government’s main family violence work programme and thus by-passing the multi-agency network and management structures established at a national level
- it creates a risk of different protocol and guidelines operating in different sectors
- it is only happening in the health sector. The intentions of the standard developed under the Te Rito strategy is that screening, risk assessment and intervention would be done by teachers, police and social workers as well as medical personnel.

However, of more serious concern is that the health sector appears to have commenced this ‘programme’ before establishing clear referral pathways. The Standards New Zealand guidelines (p. 14) says:

> Screening should be followed by risk assessments and safety planning if it is to be an effective tool in preventing harm and breaking the cycle of the family/whānau violence.

As already noted, the health care system that identifies the case is not equipped to provide the ‘safety planning’ for family violence cases, and cases have to be referred to external agencies. It would be unethical for a health professional to identify family violence cases unless and until arrangements are in place to manage that case after it is identified. Family violence is a complex social issue and can often be a matter of life and death. It is well known that, particularly in cases of intimate partner violence, the risk of serious injury or death increases after the victim has left the abuser. There are significant potential benefits to victims of family violence from such programmes like the VIP programme as long as the victim’s safety following that intervention can be assured. Without such assurances the health professional could be putting the individual at risk of further physical and psychological harm.

It is important that each DHB confirms that there are appropriate options for women after the health professional has intervened, options that will enable the women and children to be kept safe. This includes confirming that family violence service providers to which the DHB may refer cases have the capacity to accommodate the increased workload that will result from the VIP programme. The VIP guidelines note that a possible disadvantage of the programme is that it could increase demand for services. As already noted, non-government agencies providing family violence services are stretched to capacity and their funding has historically failed to keep up with demand. These agencies primarily rely on government funding, and the health sector has no mechanism to influence the funding and hence the capacity of such agencies in their area.

To summarise, the issues identified in this section are:

- the screening, risk assessment and intervention standards developed under the Te Rito strategy have not been implemented
the Taskforce appears to be taking no action to implement these standards
in the absence of any multi-agency national standards for screening, risk assessment and intervention, the health sector has developed its own intervention programme
the health sector initiative is occurring outside the umbrella of the Taskforce and hence is not being coordinated as part of the overall intervention logic of the national strategy
the health sector's intervention initiative is commendable but raises serious concerns regarding the capacity of an already over-stretched family violence sector to cope with the increased demand. As a result, the risk of harm to individuals identified via the health sector's VIP programme could increase.

3.9 Legislation, Courts and Law Enforcement

This section focuses on Action 55 and Action 60 a, b, and c, all of which have been identified as critical actions to the intervention logic. Action 60, which relates to improving the enforcement of protection orders and the safety of victims, arose from one of the failures of the Te Rito strategy. Te Rito Action 3 to ‘establish and implement processes for ensuring that the legal sanctions under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 are effectively monitored and enforced’ appears never to have been actioned.

Action 60a has been designated ‘completed in specified timeframe’. The evidence gathered shows there are two types of Police training designed to improve the enforcement of protection orders. Training relating to ‘family violence investigation and risk assessment’ was provided to all districts within the specified timeframe. The training on protection orders that is being developed and implemented in 2008 appears to be outside the scope of the original action. There is confusion about what the Taskforce envisaged in Action 60b ‘developing appropriate performance measures’ in relation to enforcement of protection orders. Draft performance measures were developed in the specified timeframe, but a status of ‘completed but outside timeframe’ has been assigned because there is ongoing work (with no completion date yet available) before final performance measures are in place. The third component of Action 60 was the development of better coordinated investigation and prosecution policies. This work is well underway but not yet completed. An extensive amount of work has been done by New Zealand Police on Actions 60a, 60b, and 60c and it appears that robust development and implementation processes have been followed. Unfortunately there may be limitations on measuring the effectiveness of these changes. In an email dated 18 March 2008, New Zealand Police advised:

There are difficulties in quantitative comparisons between baseline data and post-implementation data. Currently there is no well-established pattern of recording which offences are family violence-related offences. This presents a problem for meaningful statistical interpretation of baseline and post-implementation data.

In the same email, the Police suggest two quasi measures that could be used. The need for monitoring and evaluation to determine the impact of the family violence actions is discussed elsewhere in this thesis (see 3.5 and 4.6). It can be expected that the situation outlined with the New Zealand Police action areas will be mirrored in many other action areas.
Progress on Action 55 is somewhat less convincing. This action states ‘MOJ [Ministry of Justice] will improve processes for prosecutions for non-attendance at programmes’. The Taskforce monitoring reports have focused on the process of transferring responsibility for prosecuting non-attendance at programmes from Ministry of Justice to New Zealand Police.

Action 55 is about ‘improving processes for prosecutions’. It is unclear whether transferring responsibility will, of itself, improve processes, or whether the work to improve processes will begin once responsibility has been transferred to New Zealand Police. In the same email dated 18 March 2008, New Zealand Police advised:

> Any work ensuring perpetrators attend/complete programmes is for MOJ [Ministry of Justice] to work towards … the level of attendance and performance of perpetrators at existing programmes [is also] MOJ work.

All the Taskforce monitoring reports in 2007 indicate that work is underway:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Working party met in February. Information such as statistics of likely number of prosecutions, dummy file of information and a copy of current process have been forwarded to Police Prosecutions for consideration. A further meeting was held in March to progress this issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>There have been two further meetings between Justice and Police Prosecutions to develop respective processes. A MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] is currently being drafted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Transfer of prosecutions from Crown Law to the Police will achieve consistency with other prosecutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| October| Consultation is also underway to determine objectives and milestones for:  
  - Determining the level of attendance and performance of perpetrators at existing programmes  
  - Developing options to ensure perpetrators attend and complete programmes |

The update in October says basically the same thing as the April update. These reports indicate there have been a number of meetings but not a great deal of progress. Apparently the transfer from Ministry of Justice to New Zealand Police has not proceeded as quickly as anticipated because:

- internal operational practices had to be confirmed with the full Police executive
- there were ongoing discussions regarding the financial implications of the transfer of function, because there is no discrete budget allocation within MOJ that can simply be transferred to New Zealand Police.

There is insufficient evidence to clarify what the Taskforce’s intended outcomes of this action are or whether work underway by Police and MOJ will achieve those outcomes. New Zealand Police now expect this work to be completed by June 2008. Hence Action 55 has been assigned a status of ‘not completed’.

Actions 56 and 57 are not identified as critical in the intervention logic but the analysis of the evidence around these actions gives cause for concern from the perspective of the implementation process. Dedicated family violence courts were established in Waitakere and
in Manukau in 2001. In a speech dated 22 October 2005, Judge David Mather said, among other things:

Unfortunately no evaluation of the Waitakere Family Violence Court has yet been undertaken, although further efforts are being made to set up an evaluation project.

Despite the fact that the Waitakere court had not been evaluated four years after its establishment, a second dedicated family violence court was established in Manukau in 2005. The Taskforce monitoring reports say that the evaluations of the Waitakere and Manukau Family Violence Courts will be released early 2008. It is unclear why the Manukau court was set up before the Waitakere one was evaluated or why the Taskforce decided to proceed with an action to establish four further dedicated family violence courts by June 2007 (Action 56) at the same time as evaluating the existing models in Waitakere and Manukau, also due for completion June 2007 (Action 57). The intervention logic associated with this initiative should have resulted in the evaluation being completed before any more courts were established. However, the Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action says that two more family courts will be established by June 2008. It also says ‘we want to build on what we have learned about good practice for the new Family Violence Courts and to optimise the expansion of this approach’. It does not elaborate on whether that learning has been via the evaluations and other reports such as the Monitoring Report for the Auckland Family Violence Court (MacKenzie and Carrington 2007).

The National NGO Family Violence Prevention Alliance raised a number of fairly serious concerns about these courts (April 2007, 5):

- There is no national overview of this process [of establishing more and more dedicated family violence courts], which leaves it open to developing in potentially unsafe ways.
- There is no specific alignment of Family Violence Courts with Taskforce outcomes in terms of increased safety for victims and increased accountability for offenders.
- The implementation of these courts does not include any plans to monitor or evaluate outcomes for victims, perpetrators or children in order to ensure safety and accountability.
- Family Violence Courts have developed models of family violence which have not been validated by research, evaluated, discussed or made available to the Taskforce.
- These categories [developed by the courts] may lead to very unsafe outcomes for victims of violence, and it remains of serious concern that they are being utilised in courts which we wish to hold up as best practice.
- NGO members from the Advisory Group for the Manukau Family Violence Court evaluation have raised significant concerns with the draft proposal which are yet to be resolved.
- There is no aligning of these evaluations with Taskforce outcomes of improved safety for victims and increased accountability of offenders.

The report from Robertson et al. (2007, 209) also raises concerns about the Family Violence Courts and recommends that no more be established until the present courts have been properly evaluated to identify both good and problematic practices:

We have serious concerns about the way they [the family violence courts] are being implemented in New Zealand and believe a re-examination of their models of operation is needed before further expansion.
A monitoring report for the Auckland Family Violence Court released in November 2007 (MacKenzie and Carrington) notes that there has been no funding to evaluate this court. This report contains 50 recommendations for improvements, some of which give cause for serious concern. In conclusion MacKenzie and Carrington say:

> It does appear that many of the most significant barriers to achieving a truly specialised family violence court, that achieves significant improvement in victim safety and offender accountability, must be addressed at a national level. This would include, for example, standards for sentencing in family violence cases, funding and guidelines for independent victim advocates, and provision of, or access to, ongoing family violence training for all court stakeholders (p.69).

In this section we have seen that one of the critical law enforcement actions (Action 55) was not implemented within the timeframe indicated in the strategy and the intervention logic and conversely another action (Action 56) was implemented ahead of when intervention logic would have indicated albeit within the timeframe indicated in the strategy. This provides an early indication that the Taskforce strategy was not supported by intervention logic and hence the timeframes and the implementation sequencing are not appropriate.

### 3.10 Public Education and Awareness

In the Budget of 2006, $11 million funding over four years was given to the Changing Attitudes and Behaviours community prevention campaign. The most publicly visible action area in the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action, this is a multifaceted campaign comprising national activities and action, and community-owned and driven initiatives. The first phase of the mass media campaign was launched on 4 September 2007 with TV advertisements going to air for the first time on 9 September. The campaign will run for four years.

Three actions directly relating to the campaign were identified in the intervention logic as critical. Action 29 was completed within the specified timeframe. Action 35 involved developing an overall strategy and an implementation plan for the campaign, but it is unclear whether these have been produced. The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report advises that in October 2006 a working group agreed on the process for developing the campaign strategy, and that by July 2007 an ‘issues management strategy’ would be developed and implemented. An issues management strategy would be considerably narrower than an overall strategy for the campaign, but there are no further updates on an overall strategy or an implementation plan. Action 35 has been assigned ‘completed but outside timeframe’ status in absence of any information to confirm these developments were not completed.

The intervention logic showed Action 36 (the mass media campaign at local and national level) to be the last stage (level five) of the causal model. In other words, all earlier actions needed to be in place before the campaign commenced. It has been shown throughout this chapter that this was not the case. Many of the required preceding actions had not been not done before the media campaign commenced. The evidence suggests that the critical actions identified in the intervention logic to increase service capacity, build capacity of workforce and organisational development, and ensure processes were in place for prosecuting perpetrators.
who don’t comply with court rulings and monitor and evaluate the programme were not implemented before the mass media commenced. It is therefore concluded that the mass media campaign was started prematurely.

High profile prevention initiatives such as the family violence ‘It’s not OK’ media campaign, that coerce the public for the greater good, have potential to do harm as well as good. Davies et al (2003 cited in Fanslow 2005) identify three areas of risk resulting from high-profile campaigns. Firstly they suggest that when children are encouraged to disclose abuse this can lead the abuser to subject the children to further threats in order to prevent such disclosure. The same risk arises in intimate partner violence when the perpetrator recognises that they are more likely to be ‘exposed’ and hence the levels of intimidation and threats may in fact increase: ‘If you tell I will …..’ Davies et al. also note that there are risks of proceeding with such campaigns if there is a lack of resources to meet increased demand for services. This was identified previously in 3.7 in particular National Family Violence NGO Prevention Alliance’s concerns about a lack of capacity to cope with the increase in demand for their services that is likely to result from the ‘It’s not OK’ media campaign. Davies et al. also caution:

Risks associated with public education campaigns include those associated with messages focused primarily on the dangers associated with violence (in some cases these have resulted in increase ‘pro-violent attitudes’) (p.31).

These points bring to focus again on the importance of careful planning and management to reduce these potential risks. There is no evidence whether any risk assessment was done prior to the media campaign commencing.

### 3.11 Reporting on Implementation

Research Question 2 asks ‘How accurately is the implementation status being reported?’ As we have seen, implementation has failed in many action areas. But what of the broad issue of reporting and – more specifically – reporting of the implementation status of the Taskforce actions? The overall findings of this thesis with respect to the accuracy of reporting, including a comparative ‘Traffic Light’ report, can be found in 5.6.

The range of accountabilities in a multi-agency strategy and implementation programme such as family violence makes reporting and information-sharing more challenging. Reporting on the family violence programme is needed for a range of purposes, such as:

- to enable the Taskforce to ‘monitor’ or track progress on the implementation of individual actions
- to fulfil formal reporting requirements to the Family Violence Ministerial Team, individual Ministers, Cabinet and Parliament
- to keep the sector and stakeholders informed about initiatives that are being developed and about progress with implementation, and to share new information that comes to hand as ‘we learn our way forward’
- to meet Parliament’s accountabilities to the wider public, particularly about initiatives that will impact on their lives
to ensure the Taskforce’s work can be assessed objectively and reported publicly.

The only publicly available reports are the Taskforce monitoring reports and these are all fairly high level, non specific and most are not easy to understand. The only information available on the Taskforce’s page of MSD’s website is the Taskforce monitoring reports. This website does not provide links to any other sources for information about the Taskforce’s Programme of Action. The New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse website has a range of information about many of the Taskforce action areas. This is not provided in any formal way, but rather included as part of wider cross-sector updates and in the Clearinghouse’s newsletters. The information seems to be somewhat selective and not part of any formal Taskforce reporting to the sector, stakeholders or the public.

The difficulty experienced in obtaining information about the Taskforce action areas for this thesis is itself evidence that there is no ready source of information available to the public. There is therefore no way an individual service provider, such as a district health board or a local NGO community agency, can find out what is happening nationally with the family violence strategies.

Each of the Taskforce’s monitoring reports has included a ‘traffic light’ report. The concept of a ‘traffic light report’ comes from project management methodology and is traditionally used to provide a very high-level snapshot of progress with multiple implementation workstreams. The concept is that an action that is proceeding according to its original milestones and timeframes is given a green traffic light. An action that has slipped behind in achieving its milestones and timeframes, but is still proceeding as per the original course of action and still expected to be completed within the specified timeframe, is given an amber traffic light. Any action that has stopped or been seriously delayed and is unlikely to be completed within the agreed timeframes is given a red traffic light. The project manager then reports on what is being done to get the actions with amber traffic lights back up to green. The actions with a red traffic light need either a decision not to continue or agreement on mechanisms to get them back on track.

The Taskforce secretariat has not used the traffic-light technique as it was designed. Every action in every Taskforce monitoring report has had a green light. There is not a single amber or red traffic light in any of the Taskforce monitoring reports. With some actions, there are numerous discrepancies between what is actually happening, what is reported, and the traffic light status it is assigned.

The secretariat’s most common technique is that where any action is not advancing according to the original milestones or timeframes, the specified date for completion is simply changed in the report, the action reported as ‘on track’ against the new date and given a green traffic light. There are numerous examples of this, but the three that follow demonstrate the problem.

1. Action 39 that was due for completion in March 2007. In the Taskforce monitoring report dated 11 April 2007, this action simply has a new completion date of June 2007 and a green traffic light.

2. The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report advises that completion of Action 21a is delayed for three months and provides a reason for this delay, but the action still gets a green traffic light.

3. According to the June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report, Action 45 is ‘on track’ for completion in specified timeframe of June 2007 and is assigned a green traffic light, but the commentary says, ‘Consultation with staff has shown that the security policy may need some revision. A further meeting with the Director of Technical and Judicial Security was held in mid May to discuss possible changes. The policy is being drafted at the moment and a report will be given to the Taskforce.’ Clearly the action was not going to be complete on time.

One glaring example of misleading traffic-light reporting is Action 50. The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report (p. 21) states: ‘The [budget] bid was not successful and MSD is now meeting with MOJ to work out the way forward in terms of next steps and implementation’. This is a classic example of an action that needs a red traffic light. For some reason, right next to this commentary, is a green smiley-face traffic light.

In a report from the National NGO Family Violence Prevention Alliance\textsuperscript{15} to the Taskforce dated 30 April 2007, the NGOs raise concerns about a number of issues including:

The first point we wish to make is that there is not one single amber or red ‘traffic light’ in this report, which indicate when deadlines are either ‘not progressing as scheduled or are ‘off track’. This should be cause for celebration, as it should indicate that all initiatives are proceeding as scheduled. In fact however, it is merely misleading, as the report features many milestones which have changed dates or changed the milestone in order to appear ‘on schedule’ (for example actions 9, 23, 29, 37 and 73). We would prefer to see a more transparent recording of outcomes and milestones in order to be able to track how effectively we are all meeting deadlines (p.1).

Coincidently, between June and August 2007, the style of the Taskforce reports changed significantly. The August and October 2007 reports both contain a list of actions of all actions, each with a green smiley face depicting green traffic lights. There are, however, no specified timeframes or milestones for any of these actions. Instead there is a series of numbered paragraphs serving as updates. The numbering of these paragraphs does not correspond to the action numbers, and therefore trying to determine which comment or update pertains to which action is like doing a jigsaw puzzle. Prior to August 2007 it was difficult to determine exactly what progress was being made in implementing the family violence actions. Now it is almost impossible.

\textsuperscript{15} The member organisations of the National NGO Family Violence Prevention Alliance are: Age Concern, Barnardos New Zealand, Jigsaw, National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges, National Network of Stopping Violence Services, National Network – Ending Sexual Violence Together, New Zealand Association of Children’s Supervised Access Services, New Zealand Family Planning, Relationship Services Whakawhanaungatanga, Royal New Zealand Plunket Society, Save the Children New Zealand, and UNICEF New Zealand.
The October report signalled a further change in reporting format, and indications are that this new format may once again include milestones and timeframes.

- objectives, actions and milestones from both the First Programme of Action and the Ongoing Programme of Action will be incorporated into a format that is relevant, provides a high level of information and allows ease of reference
- future monitoring reports will highlight upcoming milestones while closely tracking those milestones that are current and due
- this will be available in an ‘at-a-glance’ format with further details of each upcoming key milestone within each report
- further details will include outlining each milestone with reference to the relevant action, detailing what was done and what was achieved, and outlining how each milestone connects to the other actions or milestones (p.10).

The milestones and timeframes need to directly reflect those assigned in the implementation plan arising from the planning for implementation phase, unless a formal approval has been given, and reported, by the Taskforce for a modification to the milestones and timeframes. This is the only way to ensure transparency in reporting and to avoid confusion for the reader.

Other points of note regarding the Taskforce monitoring reports are:

- no indications are given of any changes made between traffic-light reports; changes can only be found by systematically tracking back between reports for each individual action, as was done for this research
- reports often give the illusion of more activity in an individual action area than is actually occurring
- updates on individual actions often repeat what was reported three months previously
- reports seem to focus on whether the stated milestones have been achieved; as a result the reader has no way of knowing whether those milestones are actually going to deliver on the original intention of the strategy
- reports focus on what being done; there is no mention of what is not being done
- there appears to be a culture of reporting only the good news whereby the secretariat modifies updates to put a positive spin on the current status. Two relevant comments from the interviews are:

  ‘We are not allowed to report any bad news – if a report goes from an individual agency to the Taskforce secretariat saying a workstream is not on track, that is not reported through to the Taskforce or the Minister [or the public]’.

  ‘A huge amount of reporting etc is spin. I wonder if the politicians see the spin. Do they really know what is and is not happening?’

Without access to the Taskforce minutes, agenda papers, and copies of reports from the lead agencies to the secretariat or the Taskforce, it is not possible to determine the source of these discrepancies. Did the lead agencies accurately report the status of their actions to the secretariat? Did the secretariat know how many actions were not progressing as expected and fail to report that information to the Taskforce? Did the Taskforce know the real situation?
but not want it recorded in their monitoring reports? These questions remain unanswered. Several interviewees talked of reports from lead agencies or implementation project managers being sent to the secretariat for the Taskforce but then going through a ‘screening’ process, during which the reports were changed, bad news removed and difficult issues not forwarded to the Taskforce. This not only indicates the Taskforce may not be receiving accurate information about implementation activities, but it also serves to disempower those who are managing implementation.

It is also not possible to ascertain who knew that many actions were not progressing as planned and whether anything was done to try and rectify the situation but one interviewee’s comments reflect the essence of the issues explored here:

‘Making changes in the family violence area is hard. Mistakes will be made. It would be much better if the sector was open about that, rather than always needing to appear to have everything in hand’.

3.12 Status of Implementation

The analysis of the implementation status of the family violence actions contained in this chapter is now summarised. The focus has been on the 24 critical Taskforce actions identified in the intervention logic (see 3.2). Ten of the 24 critical actions have been fully implemented, 10 have only been partly implemented and four have had no action taken at all.

The status of the incomplete Blueprint and Te Rito actions was also examined in each of the eight categories. Overall 19 Te Rito or the Blueprint actions have a status of ‘not completed’ or ‘no action taken’. Seven of these actions appear to have been merged into subsequent Taskforce actions but there is apparently no work continuing on the remaining 12.

It has not been possible to discuss each of the 88 actions in the sample. Appendix 2 contains the detailed evidence collected for each action. Nineteen of the 88 actions were fully implemented in the specified timeframe, and a further 18 actions were completed but not in the target timeframe. This makes a total of 37 fully implemented actions. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show which of the remaining 51 actions were not fully implemented and which have had no action taken on them, along with the reasons for this.

### Table 3.5: Reasons actions were not completed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Over-promised</th>
<th>Unrealistic completion date</th>
<th>Breakdown in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total actions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.6: Reasons no action was taken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Over-promised</th>
<th>Unrealistic completion date</th>
<th>Breakdown in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total actions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results show a breakdown in the implementation process is the predominant reason these actions were not fully implemented. The next question is: Why? The literature suggests that implementers or the implementation process are most often seen as the cause of disappointing results or inadequate policy outcomes. This raises the likelihood that implementation is the ‘weak link in the chain’. (Hill and Hupe 2002, Ryan 2002). The evidence arising from the research for this thesis indicates that implementation has been the ‘weak link in the chain’ for the family violence strategies. However, before drawing this conclusion, it is important to examine the situation more closely.

Until the later part of the 20th century, most policy analysts tended to equate policy decisions with action, assuming that policy decisions were somehow automatically translated into action (Barrett and Fudge 1981). When other aspects of implementation studies came to the fore in the 1970s, analysts started to recognise that policy does not implement itself. This awareness leads us naturally into Part Two of the research for this thesis where the environment and the process of public sector strategy and implementation are examined in order to ascertain why the implementation process appears to be failing with so many of the family violence actions.
4. **Public Sector Strategy and Implementation**

Part Two of the research draws extensively on the literature and reports relating to public sector strategy and implementation in order to answer the fourth and fifth research questions:

Q 4: What environmental, structural or process factors may be impacting positively or negatively on the implementation of these strategies?

Q 5: What changes could be made to improve the situation?

Evidence from the interviews and the researcher’s knowledge and experience in this field (see Appendix 4) are used to add context to the literature. Interviewees were asked about their experiences with, or observations of, the implementation processes. An extensive amount of useful information was obtained from these interviews, and there was considerable consistency in what interviewees saw as the factors that had helped or hindered the implementation process. These findings are incorporated in the relevant sections of this chapter to try and understand the reasons why most of the family violence actions that have not been fully implemented in the specified timeframes appear to relate to the implementation process. There was a high degree of synergy between information gathered from the interviews and the literature, and hence this analysis is expected to assist in explaining many of the implementation failures identified in the previous chapter.

The analysis has been undertaken in a formative style and has two main objectives. The first is to identify changes that can be made in the programme, and the second is to enable the programme to ‘learn its way forward’ and thus improve implementation outcomes in the future. The Managing for Outcomes (MfO) cycle of continuous improvement (see 4.1) has been used as the analytical framework for this part of the research. All stages of the MfO cycle have been included in the analysis as all stages are linked. Both the planning for implementation and the implementation stages are linked to all other stages. Whatever occurs at one stage impacts on all other stages, and the leadership, overall coordination and reporting activities hold all the stages together. In turn the whole cycle is affected by the broader contextual environment.

The analysis contained in sections 4.1 to 4.7 follows the MfO cycle:

4.1 explains the MfO cycle in more detail and contains an expanded MfO process diagram that has been developed for this thesis (Figure 4.2). Subsequent sections cover each stage of this expanded MfO cycle

4.2 examines the environmental influences that can be expected to permeate every stage of the MfO cycle for family violence

4.3 considers the differences between strategic policy and operational policy in order to understand more about the nature of the three family violence strategies

4.4 examines the first stage of the implementation process, planning for implementation, in some detail. The indications are that many of the answers to the question: ‘Why did implementation fail?’ will be found in this stage of the cycle

4.5 looks at the second, more traditional, stage of implementation – putting the implementation plan into action
4.6 covers (at a broad level only) the MfO’s two stages of (a) review and evaluation; and (b) research and evidence.

4.7 shows that leadership and coordination are the glue that holds the whole MfO cycle together and are particularly critical components of the implementation of social change in a multi-agency environment such as the family violence programme.

4.1 Managing for Outcomes in the Public Sector

The MfO initiative was introduced into the New Zealand public sector following a Cabinet decision in December 2001. The State Services Commission (SSC) website[^16] says Managing for Outcomes (MfO) is about looking at the world from the perspective of citizens and asking how government agencies can work together to achieve better outcomes. MfO now underpins all public sector planning, management and reporting and has been progressively implemented across the public service since 2002–03 (Audit New Zealand 2005). MfO focuses the government sector on working to maximise results for New Zealanders, including setting clear desired results, implementing plans based upon these results and learning about ‘what works’ in the process. MfO provides an excellent framework for major government strategies, such as those addressing family violence, that will have a long term horizon and require ‘sustained and coordinated effort over a number of years from all sectors of society’ (Taskforce’s First Report July 2006,8). There is, however, no evidence of whether the Taskforce’s strategies and programmes of action were developed using the MfO framework, nor whether the principles of MfO are permeating all subsequent stages of the implementation and review cycle.

Many factors influence outcomes. Some factors are within the control of chief executives and some are not. Hence CEOs are not held accountable for actual outcomes but rather are held accountable for ‘managing for outcomes’. This involves planning (and delivering) their outputs or activities to maximise the results sought given the resources available. The phrase ‘managing for shared outcomes’ refers to these situations where multiple agencies need to work collaboratively together to achieve major government objectives as is the case with most of the family violence action areas.

MfO places a greater emphasis on how the public sector administration and its related management systems contribute to the desired results, or outcomes. This requires government agencies to adopt a more strategic and outcomes-focused approach to management and reporting. The Steering Group for the Managing for Outcomes (2003) says that government department chief executives have been directed by Cabinet to ensure officials identify the key community, voluntary and tangata whenua organisations in their sphere of activity and build good practice relationships into their policy development and service planning.

Ryan (2002) points out that MfO is not an add-on. It is a big and important idea that modifies many aspects of public management, but it will take some years to come to full maturity. Work done to date on MfO has primarily focused on the ‘direction setting’ and ‘planning’ stages of Figure 4.1. Ryan also notes that as yet there has been no systematic attention paid to what happens at the other two stages: ‘implementation and delivery’ and ‘review’. All parts of the cycle are interrelated. Ryan (2004, 32) identifies two key conditions required for ‘implementation for outcomes’ to be successful:

- Policy development needs to be conducted with an understanding of the prospective conditions of implementation; and
- Implementation and delivery should be carried out with knowledge of the desired policy outcomes as articulated during logic modelling, and expressed in policy and programme plans as immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes and short, medium and long term strategies.

Figure 4.2 is based on the original MfO diagram (Figure 4.1) but incorporates additional aspects that are important for the family violence MfO cycle and which are analysed in this chapter. Key differences in this modified diagram are that it:

- recognises the multi-agency environment that permeates all aspects of the MfO cycle for family violence
- includes the operational service delivery component. Once implementation activities are complete there is a managed hand over to the relevant ongoing operational area. This reminds us that there needs to be bottom-up input from the operational sector into all aspects of strategy, implementation and evaluation
- shows the two-way linkage between each stage of the process, for example, planning for implementation needs to periodically loop back to the strategy stage to ensure each action has been scoped in a manner that will achieve the stated outcomes and so on throughout the cycle.
shows all stages in the family violence diagram being held together by the leadership, governance and overall coordination or project management functions. Monitoring or tracking of progress with implementation is the responsibility of the overall coordination team.

has a separate stage for research and evidence to inform strategy to show that as new evidence becomes available it needs to be used to inform ongoing changes to the strategy. Establishing a baseline of family violence data and ongoing quantitative monitoring over time to measure changes in family violence becomes part of a research and evidence activities.
MULTI-AGENCY AND MANAGING FOR OUTCOMES ENVIRONMENT

Strategy
- Long term vision
- Treaty obligations taken into account
- Logical analysis and consideration of cause and effect to identify order for required interventions
- Immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes
- Goals and clear objectives
- Annual work programme

Research and Evidence
- Identify current baseline
- Ongoing research activities
- Collection and collation of NZ and international material
- Formal mechanism to inform ongoing strategy and implementation activities
- Identify evidence gaps for research to inform ongoing strategies
- Collection and collation family violence data
- Monitoring prevalence and incidence of family violence

Planning for Implementation
- Organisational capacity and competency
- Resources confirmed
- Scoping of implementation
- Implementation plan documents how each action will be achieved
- Risk, issue and change management processes

Governance, Leadership, Overall Project Management and Co-ordination
- Reporting on outcomes
- Monitoring implementation progress
- Overall risk and issues management
- Overall coordination of pre-requisites and linkages
- Change management
- Linking to other family violence activities
- Co-ordination, collaboration and communication
- Top-down and bottom-up flow of information

Review and Evaluation
- Post-implementation evaluations
- Assess effectiveness of the interventions
- Consider unintended consequences
- Assess impact of new initiatives on existing services

Implementation
- Implementing 'the plan'
- Managing to timelines and milestones
- Managing inter-dependencies
- Identifying changing circumstances
- Managing risks, issues and changes

Operational Service Delivery
- Ongoing management on new initiatives post-implementation
- Managed hand-over from implementation to operational management

Figure 4.2: ‘Learning our way forward’ MfO cycle for the family violence programme

Source: Based on Figure 4.1 but developed specifically for this thesis
4.2 The Contextual Environment

A range of contextual situations can influence public policy implementation. Table 4.1 contains the contextual influences identified by Howlett and Ramesh (1995, 155). Three that impact in particular on the implementation of the family violence strategies will be examined in this chapter. These are:

- the nature of the problem
- political influences
- public sector administration influences.

Table 4.1: Contexts affecting implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual influences</th>
<th>Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Nature of the problem           | Some problems are more difficult than others to tackle because of their complex, novel or interdependent nature, and because they involve not a single decision but a series of decisions on how to carry out the policy [strategy]  
Larger and more diverse target populations make implementation more difficult  
The extent of the behavioural change that is being sought determines how difficult it will be to effect that change |
| Cultural environment            | Problems that are deep-rooted in the cultural beliefs of society are hence more challenging for implementers                                                                                             |
| Social and economic             | Wider changes in the demographics of society or the economic circumstances will impact on social problems, which in turn impact on implementation of changes [policies] to address those problems                           |
| New technology                  | The availability of technology can causes changes in policy                                                                                                                                             |
| Political                       | A change in government may lead to changes in the way policies are implemented without change in the policy itself.                                                                                      |
| Public sector administration    | Policy implementation is inadvertently subject to the intra- and inter-organisational conflicts endemic to the public policy process. Each organisation [agency] involved has interests, ambitions and traditions that can hamper the implementation process and shape its outcomes. |
| Lobby groups                    | These are the target groups affected by policy implementation. Powerful lobby groups can condition the character of implementation by supporting or opposing it                                                  |
| Public support                  | For many policies there is a decline in support after their adoption, giving greater opportunity to implementers to vary the original intent                                                                  |

Source: Information sourced from Howlett and Ramesh (1995, 155) and developed in table format for this thesis.

The nature of the problem

Modern governments are grappling with a range of challenging social or environmental problems that are complex and diverse and are rooted in our very social fabric – climate change, crime, poverty, obesity, youth suicide and family violence to name but a few. Key features impacting on implementation activities in these areas include:

- the problems do not run across traditional departmental boundaries. (Howlett and Ramesh 1995)
• the problems often interact in unpredictable ways with numerous contributing factors, and therefore a wide range of government and non-government agencies need to work collaboratively on multiple workstreams to achieve results. (Howlett and Ramesh 1995)
• the diversity of problems targeted by a government programme may make implementation difficult. (Howlett and Ramesh 1995)
• the complexity of these problems and solutions means we often find that each problem we solve is merely one segment of a larger system or process (Irwin 2003)
• public problems are rooted in so many causes that programmes designed to address single or even multiple causes can normally be expected to fall short of their objectives (Howlett and Ramesh 1995)
• tackling these multidimensional and multigenerational issues is considerably more complex than the quest for bottom-line survival of the private sector (Norman 2003).

Political influences

Grappling with these highly visible, complex social issues can cause political tension between the need to govern and the need to solve social problems. This tension and the public nature of social issues like family violence is the equivalent of making and implementing policy in ‘a goldfish bowl, open to scrutiny for all sides by a wide range of often conflicting stakeholders’ (Norman 2003). The more visible the issue is the greater the political pressure is likely to be to implement changes. A government usually wants its policies to be seen in action before the next election. Younis and Davidson (1990) suggest, ‘the inability of a government to successfully implement its policies meets with a poor reception at a subsequent election’. Hence a government strategy is a highly visible area such as family violence will inevitably create pressure on implementation timeframes and may be one of the reasons why many of the family violence action areas appear to have been assigned unrealistic implementation timeframes. This is exacerbated by New Zealand’s three-year electoral cycle. The Prime Minister appears to acknowledge this. A Dominion Post article (Wednesday, January 2 2008, A2) states:

In 2008, she [Helen Clark] is promising action on policy. To her mind, a three-year election cycle does not leave room for a year of consolidation.

Public sector administration influences.

The public sector administration environment has a major influence on the development and implementation of government strategies. The current public administration model evolved out of the widespread public sector reforms that commenced in 1984. The managerialism approach that underpins New Zealand’s public sector administration has created a structural separation of policy and delivery functions, and in some cases funding functions. This often means implementation is left to a managing ‘agent’ with whom the ‘principal’ made a contract specifying expected outputs. Hill and Hupe (2002, 198) suggest ‘implementation was being contracted away and with that, the responsibility for possible failures related to it’; and that managerialism dispensed with implementation: ‘it was management that mattered instead’. They also suggest that this was far from how implementation should have been perceived: in
fact, the very complexity of the issues facing modern public sector governance makes it important to give particular attention to implementation.

The second major public administration influence on implementation is that the reforms created a vast number of agencies that plan and/or deliver public services. Schick (1996) identified more than 2,700 crown entities in addition to a vast number of non-government agencies and private organisations providing government-funded services. Family violence encompasses a wide continuum of issues and a large number and diverse range of organisations/agencies, from both government and non-government sectors. This patchwork quilt of agencies opens possibilities for unnecessary overlaps, inconsistencies, gaps and misunderstandings between agencies and makes multi-agency collaboration at all stages of the MfO cycle both challenging and vitally important.

The combination of the separation of policy and delivery functions, the number of agencies and the type of issues being addressed has brought about the need for multiple agencies to work closely together. The big, complex social problems that governments want to address – from crime and security to poverty, health and family violence – simply cannot be tackled within the fragmented public sector delivery systems that have resulted from over a century of bureaucracy and decades of competitive reform (Parker and Gallagher 2007). These issues run across traditional departmental boundaries and involve crown entities, and non-government organisations.

A wave of experimentation with collaborative arrangements has been unleashed internationally since the late 1990s as government and non-government agencies grapple with the concept of working in a multi-agency way. Public sector administrations throughout the developed world have launched new initiatives for ‘joined-up’ government, local partnerships, place-based policy-making and the co-production and design of services with the public sector.

Over the past eight years, the Labour-led governments in New Zealand have moved to re-integrate policy, funding and delivery functions. Since 2000 a range of modifications have been made to the new public management model to this effect. The Report of the Advisory Group on the Review of the Centre (2001) proposed a range of changes to better facilitate joined-up government activities. The State Sector Development Goals released in 2006 further heralded a new direction for public management and sent a strong signal of the need for more joined-up government.

A plethora of terms refer to the concept of agencies working together. Not only are there multiple terms, but also multiple levels that can be ‘joined-up’. These range from national level to regional, district and community level and involve ministries, crown entities, independent commissions, the judiciary, contracted non-government agencies and private organisations, as well as women, children, men and families who have experienced violence. There could be numerous combinations for ‘joining-up’ any of these entities at any of the traditional public

17 Joined-up government or governance; whole-of-government; all of government; whole-of-sector; multi-agency or inter-agency coordination, collaboration and communication (or any combination of these words); integrated service delivery; cross-cutting issues, cross-departmental linkages; cross-agency; cross-sector; cross-entity; inter-governmental.
policy levels: policy/strategy formulation and decision-making; implementation; service provision/operations; evaluation. ‘Joined-up government’ can be seen as an attempt to enhance structural integration. However, joined-up policy implies a stronger emphasis on political integration and consensus. Clearly the two are linked, and certainly the implicit intention of ‘joined-up government’ is that it will lead to more coherent policy-making and implementation (i.e., political as well as structural) across government as a whole (Clark 2002).

Reference to ‘multi-agency’ should be taken to include multiple areas of expertise. Multi-agency involvement is not only about national agencies working together. In his review of public sector reforms in OECD countries, Matheson (2004) suggests that public consultation and participatory decision-making are planning, implementation, and management devices that help ensure policies are suited to the problem they address by securing involvement and commitment and strengthening the voice of users about policy effectiveness. Many, if not most, of the family violence action areas should be focusing on how to ensure that initiatives can positively impact on the high statistics for Māori, and hence Māori need to be working closely with the lead agency at every stage of that process. For action areas that will impact on victims or perpetrators of family violence, agencies who work at the coal face (the street-level bureaucrats) and women, children, men and families who have experienced violence need to be similarly involved in every step of planning and implementation to ensure what is being implemented will be appropriate for service providers and users. Hence the term ‘multi-agency’ does not refer only to ‘agencies’ but also to people with specific expertise to ensure optimal outcomes are achieved.

Scott (2001) suggests that cooperation between social policy agencies to provide a more integrated response to families in difficult circumstances is an important development in public management. But is it as easy as it sounds? Scott (2001, 358) himself hints at the difficulties of making these joined-up arrangements work:

- Effective joint departmental work requires leadership, high-quality analyses, a mutual commitment to the issues and a willingness to break past patterns. This is difficult to achieve and requires a combination of people, resources, and processes which is not as common as it should be.

Working collaboratively is much more difficult and time-consuming than working within one’s own agency. The need to work collaboratively across multiple departments and agencies not only takes commitment but it takes resources; time, money, staff. If an agency cannot see the benefits of ‘joining-up’, they are unlikely to remain committed. Most government departments remain under unrelenting fiscal pressures. New policies are expected to be funded with old money. Staff numbers are kept to a minimum coupled with ongoing drive for increased productivity. Timeframes are always tight. Budgets and policies are still primarily organised on departmental lines. Many departments and agencies are suffering from overload resulting from a continuing stream of new initiatives. In this pressured environment delivering on core departmental outputs and outcomes will almost always take precedence over working on multiple agency or whole-of-govt activities.
The size of the organisation appears to be influencing the extent to which government and non-government agencies can allocate staff to time-consuming multi-agency activities such as planning and implementation of the family violence strategies. The large government ministries have more flexibility in resource allocation than the very small ministries or the national NGOs. The same happens at when engaging with community level service providers. New Zealand Police and Children Youth and Family Service (CYFs) have large organisations with significantly more resources to contribute to multi-agency activities that the community NGO service providers.

There have been no additional resources provided to family violence NGOs over and above their regular service contracts to enable them to participate in this multi-agency environment and they report that a significant amount of their multi-agency work has been done on good-will outside the parameters of their contracted funding. One interviewee said ‘The NGOs get flooded with requests and simply do not have the resources to respond to all’. Due to this shortage in capacity the smaller ministries and the NGO sector have had to prioritise which of the family violence areas they will have input into. They may elect to take a lead role in some areas but only a monitoring role in others or not be involved at all in some areas. They may decide to be more actively involved at the planning for implementation stage to ensure they are satisfied that the action area is being appropriately interpreted and planned in the best interests of their clients or community and just play a support or monitoring role after that.

This can compromise the contribution agencies could and should be making. Consequently there is a risk that the multi-agency concept becomes a ‘nice to have’ or results in an imbalance where the most involvement and the strongest voice is continually coming from the larger ministries and the voice of the smaller ministries, Commissions, NGOs etc gets lost when they are not able to be at the table. In a study undertaken by the Hay Group (2006 cited by Parker and Gallagher 2007), a third of the interviewees said they felt that the costs of working with others outweighed the benefits. Many interviewees in the research for this thesis said the cost and time required develop and implement something in a multi-agency manner is not generally recognised or accepted and needs to be factored into resource requirements and timeframes for all workstreams.

The success or failure of multi-agency activities is also influenced by tensions in accountabilities. Government agencies are responsible to their Ministers. The non-government agencies have their roots within the community and they generally see themselves as responsible to their communities and their clients while recognising that they are also responsible via one ministry or another to government for services they provide. Ministries such as the Ministry of Women’s Affairs were set up to work across different ministries and hence this is their primary working style. Others, for example the Office of the Commissioner for Children, the Families Commission and the judiciary, are designed to be independent. Hence they have to continually find the right balance between independence and being part of multi-agency activities.

18 Recently a small amount of funding has been provided for the NGO representatives on the Taskforce to collectively employ a person 20 hours a week to attend meetings, disseminate information etc on their behalf.
Furthermore, in a multi-agency environment organisations that are ‘principal’ and ‘actor’ in contractual arrangements are being challenged to work together in a new way. On the one hand that are donning new cloaks and coming together as apparent equals, while on the other hand they remain as unequals in a competitive funding environment. This can send conflicting signals and create tension. Non-government agencies (the ‘actors’) can feel they are operating in a David and Goliath situation whereby they may see their ongoing funding at risk if they challenge their ‘master’/ ‘principal’ in this new collaborative forum. There is a potential for conflict between the principal’s need for formal accountability on the one hand, while on the other hand there is a rhetoric of power sharing between the government sector (Goliath) and their community partners (David).

Maynard and Wood (2002, 86) provide a useful list of factors that they say have impeded the formation of strong, collaborative relationships between government and non-government agencies in New Zealand:

- conservative government views on the extent to which communities should be involved in policy development
- consultation with communities often occurs on an already established position, rather than to inform the development process
- community input may not be reflected in the final product
- expectations are often raised and not delivered on
- feedback to communities on the outcomes of the consultation does not always occur
- officials may feel apprehensive about consulting communities as they are often held accountable for broader departmental issues over which they have little or no influence.

The British Home Office (2005, 6) has issued multi-agency guidance for domestic violence agencies that sums up the situation perfectly:

To be effective, the agencies must work together, not in isolation nor perhaps at cross-purposes. They must coordinate their response. Partnership working between different public agencies might at times seem time-consuming and difficult. However the benefits to be gained from such work should not be underestimated.

For the family violence programme to be ‘relevant and effective for all New Zealand families, whānau and communities’ (Taskforce Action 1) it is essential that multi-agency partnerships are occurring at all stages of the family violence MfO cycle. This will be explored further in subsequent chapters.

**Governance in a multi-agency environment**

Governance arrangements are a key component of successful multi-agency partnerships. The Review of the Centre report (2001) suggested that one way to facilitate multiple agency collaboration and working was via the establishment of networks. They said networks could operate at both the centre and in the regions; and support both policy development and the delivery of joined-up services, with each network being led by a CEO of one of the agencies.
Taskforces are a networking tool to include stakeholders in ‘joined-up’ approaches to ‘cross-cutting’ issues. Pike (2000) identifies the characteristics of the taskforce model as:
- multi-agency involvement
- selective and invited membership
- a temporary but sometimes indeterminate period of operation
- non-statutory status
- specific, targeted purposes
- flexible and rapid response operation, and
- working across a range of interrelated levels (p. 91)

The government’s Opportunity for All New Zealanders report (2004) identified family violence as a critical social issue requiring sustained inter-agency attention in the medium to long term. The report noted that Cabinet had directed the Ministry of Social Development to coordinate interagency action to minimise family violence, and abuse and neglect of children and older persons. The Family Violence Ministerial Team was established in response to this Cabinet directive. There are very few details about the activities of this group. A request was made under the OIA on 23/7/07 for the following information about this group:
- terms of Reference
- minutes of all meetings
- agendas and all agenda papers
- any papers and/or reports circulated to members outside the formal agenda papers
- any papers or reports of work commissioned by, or for, the Family Violence Ministerial Team.

In a subsequent meeting with officials from the Ministry of Social Development, this OIA request was verbally declined and advice given that no minutes are taken of the meetings of the ministerial group. According to an article in the Dominion Post (8 September 2007) the Family Violence Ministerial Team met 12 times between its establishment in 2005 and the date of this article, twice in its first nine months of operation and five times a year since early 2006. The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states: ‘The Family Violence Ministerial Team has indicated they will need to be provided with regular monitoring reports.’ It is not clear from this whether the Ministerial Team received regular monitoring reports prior to October 2007. There is no evidence to indicate how effective this group is.

The Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families (the Taskforce) is the central governance structure for the family violence programme. The Taskforce was established in June 2005 to advise the Family Violence Ministerial Team on how to make improvements to the way family violence is addressed, and how to eliminate family violence in New Zealand.

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19 Meeting held 2/8/07
The intention for collaboration and collective action is reflected in the Taskforce’s First Report (2006, 10) via such statements as:

- We will build on collaborative efforts between non-government organisations and key government agencies
- We will build the capacity and capability of non-government organisations
- Achieving this vision will take sustained and coordinated effort over a number of years from all sectors.

There is a Māori Reference Group and a Pacific Advisory Group operating under the Taskforce umbrella to provide strategic advice to the Taskforce, Family and Community Services and the Ministry of Social Development, on implementing policies, services and initiatives that impact on Māori and Pacific people in New Zealand. Initially a multi-agency advisory group was also set up to support the Taskforce by bringing together a much broader range of non-government agencies to provide subject-matter expertise. The group was seen more as the ‘engine room’ of the detailed work, while the Taskforce operated at a higher level to ‘sign-off’ matters brought to them from the advisory group. A decision was made to disband this group early on in the Taskforce process. There is now no formal mechanism linking the various agencies or personnel who are managing the implementation of the Taskforce’s actions; in other words, there is no overall project team other than the secretariat. The impact of this will be revisited in 4.7.

The Taskforce membership has evolved over the last two and a half years. According to the Ongoing Programme of Action (released in February 2008) the Taskforce membership now consists of the chief executives (or equivalent) of nine government ministries,20 two senior members of the judiciary, two independent commissioners, five non-government agency representatives, a representative from the Māori Reference Group and the Pacific Advisory Group and a senior manager from the Ministry of Social Development.

Focusing family violence at CEO level sends a strong signal that government and its relevant ministries are taking this matter seriously and that is commendable. Interviewees reported the positive side of the CEO oversight was that family violence initiatives within government agencies are seen as having a higher priority than would otherwise be the case. This means the need to deliver on actions is kept in sharp focus all the time at all levels. However, it can also be a two-edged sword. The Taskforce’s First Report (2006, 13) states:

Because Taskforce membership is at chief executive level we can ensure that improvements are swiftly implemented across government agencies.

Firstly, this implies that the involvement of the CEOs will speed up the implementation process. A number of those interviewed said they felt under incredible pressure to be ‘seen to be doing something’ because their CEO was watching their progress. If they did not deliver, they felt they were letting their CEO and their organisation down.

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20 Social Development, Education, Health, Justice, Pacific Island Affairs, Police, Te Puni Kokori, Womens Affairs and ACC
Secondly, the Taskforce members, particularly the CEOs of the large government ministries, are not subject-matter experts on family violence matters and hence it is difficult to ensure they are appropriately briefed prior to debating the issues and making decisions. This does not appear to be happening satisfactorily at present. Two of the comments collected during interviews sum up this matter well:

‘Taskforce papers are only distributed on Friday night or Monday morning for the Wednesday meeting – there is not sufficient time for the papers to be reviewed and a collective discussion held with the wider NGO sector prior to the Taskforce meeting’.

‘There are no electronic copies circulated of Taskforce papers, they are only sent in hard copy to each Taskforce member and generally only circulated two days before each meeting. This means the relevant officials (who know the subject matter) usually do not get to see the papers in advance of the meeting and are thus unable to brief their CEO or agency representative in advance of the meeting and often CEOs or agency representatives are attending Taskforce meetings poorly briefed or not briefed at all on the issues’.

Thirdly it is generally the case that the higher the level of official sitting at the governance table (in this instance CEO level) the lower the level of community involvement. Whilst there are non-government agencies represented on the Taskforce, indications are that the voice of the community is often not being heard. The potential for an imbalance of power when community agencies are in a forum with their funders has been noted. Interviewees reported different sectors not respecting each other’s perspective and that can lead to power and control issues. Two relevant quotes from the interviews were:

‘When the NGO sector is involved they can quickly get silenced if/when they get close enough to an issue to really leverage some action’.

‘There are multiple different agendas and these need to be acknowledged but also managed somehow’.

Indications are that the chair of the Taskforce is trying to ‘manage’ these situations by ‘managing’ the NGOs outside the Taskforce forum. The chair has separate meetings with the NGOs about Taskforce business outside the formal Taskforce meeting. Until recently all communications between the Taskforce and the NGO representatives went via one NGO representative. This served to keep the other NGOs at a distance. Reports are, however, that in recent times the situation has improved and the NGOs now feel they have a more united voice. Some interviewees felt there had been far more community involvement and collaboration with the Te Rito strategy and implementation. The Te Rito governance structure saw the NGOs and the government agencies in good conversation, and NGOs and the community feeling more involved and better informed. The NGOs feel their contribution was given more recognition and their input was also more welcome and respected in all the workstreams under Te Rito than with the Taskforce. But the downside with the Te Rito structure was that the implementation work was not being addressed at senior enough level within government agencies and there was a great deal of competitiveness between government departments and different workstreams. The government agency representatives were ‘too low down the food chain’ and had no authority for decision-making. The strategy struggled for sufficient resources (personnel and budget) and to get commitment from the government agencies to implement the action areas. One interviewee suggested that the Te
Rito groups just tried too hard to work collaboratively and in the end that often blocked the work from really getting done.

A related concern arising from the interviews was that the NGOs representatives on the Taskforce are not permitted to fully share information with the NGO sector they represent. The NGO representatives are not permitted to circulate Taskforce papers or reports to their member groups. One interviewee reported that the only information that can be circulated to other than individual Taskforce members is what is publicly available on the website. This limits information flow between the community and the place where the family violence initiatives are being planned, developed and implemented.

The Taskforce secretariat is housed within the Ministry of Social Development but is supposed to be independent of any single agency. Interviewees had a reasonably consistent view that the Taskforce process is controlled by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and that the secretariat is an agent of MSD and thus does not equally represent the interests of all the Taskforce member agencies. One comment obtained during an interview was:

‘There is no robust process to ensure all issues are taken to the Taskforce and dealt with appropriately and this has led some agencies to just ‘do their own thing’.

The Taskforce agenda is determined by the secretariat. Member agencies are not asked to contribute items for the agenda and this appears to prevent those who are managing implementation from bringing their own actions or related issues to the table. As a result, individual agencies or implementation personnel can be left feeling disassociated from their overall governance group, the Taskforce.

Perhaps there is a happy medium that has not quite been struck yet. The positive and negative impact the multi-agency environment and the family violence governance arrangements will have on the implementation process will be explored further in subsequent sections.

4.3 Strategy Development

Strategy development is generally seen as the starting point of the MfO continuous improvement cycle. This thesis did not set out to examine the family violence strategy development process or the appropriateness of the strategy actions. The analysis in Chapter 3 indicated that many of the problems experienced in the implementation phase had their roots in the strategy formation phase. In this chapter we have so far examined the broader contextual environment impacting on implementation and will now examine what we mean by public sector strategy and the extent to which the strategies themselves may positively or negatively influence the implementation process.

The State Services Commission (SSC) (1998) notes that one of the major shortcomings of New Zealand’s previous public management system was a lack of clarity and certainty about the government’s overall strategic objectives. The shortcomings the SSC were referring to concern the ways in which government strategies interrelated and impacted on the operations and business of state sector agencies. There has been a focus on articulating the
government’s strategic objectives over recent years. The Biosecurity Strategy, the New Zealand Health Strategy, the Digital Strategy, the Workplace Health and Safety Strategy, and the New Zealand Transport Strategy are just a few of the numerous strategies that can be found on the New Zealand Government website.\(^{21}\) Many of the current government strategies pertain to challenging social problems that require multi-agency solutions. This raises questions. What is it that distinguishes these multi-agency strategies for social change from what we may more traditionally think of as public policy? Is ‘strategy’ just a useful term? Is it just policy dressed up as something we call strategy? Or is there a fundamental difference between these terms?

There is very little in the literature to help us understand the difference between public sector policy and strategy. However, three authors (Hill 2005, Dunn 2004, and Matland 1995 cited in Hill 2005) have useful contributions to make. Collectively they show that what we call strategies are really ‘strategic policies’ and that what we have traditionally thought of as public policies are actually ‘operational policies’. To provide a ready comparison between the terms used by each of these authors, their work has been summarised in Table 4.2.

### Table 4.2: Strategic policy versus operational policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dunn</th>
<th>Hill</th>
<th>Matland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic or major policies</td>
<td>Policies as stances</td>
<td>High conflict and more discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That are ill structured</td>
<td>More discretion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary issues</td>
<td>Policies in concrete terms</td>
<td>Low ambiguity and little discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately structured</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional issues</td>
<td>Minor issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For Hill the central issue is that some problems pass out of the legislative stages with very clear rule structures, but others are much less fully formed. Hill refers to the strategic level as ‘policies as stances’ and the operational level as ‘policies in concrete terms’. Dunn (2004) outlines a similar hierarchy: from operational policies that are more minor and likely to be more structured, up to more major issues or strategic policies that are more likely to be ill-structured. As one moves up the hierarchy (from minor issues toward major issues), problems become more and more interdependent, subjective, artificial and dynamic.

\(^{21}\) http://www.newzealand.govt.nz
Hill (2005) clarifies the matter further by listing eight different examples of public policy along the continuum from strategic to operational policies (see Table 4.3). These appear to be similar to types of public policies found in New Zealand.

Table 4.3: Examples of strategic policies versus operational policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Policy</th>
<th>Operational Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political manifesto commitments</td>
<td>Detailed notes, reports and accounts of working practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals in the ‘Queen’s speech’ at the beginning of a parliamentary session</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Green’ and ‘white’ papers, which set out policy objectives in general terms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments expressed during parliamentary debates and questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bill and subsequent Act which gives the policy its primary legal shape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations enacted after the passing of the Bill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circulars, codes and other instructions to officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed notes, reports and accounts of working practice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hill (2005, 188) and reproduced in table format for this thesis.

Hill (2005) says that most public sector implementation has traditionally been implementing ‘operational policies’ ie in the areas towards the bottom of his list and hence more operational, minor issues with clearer rules, lower ambiguity and less discretion. In contrast, the current New Zealand government strategies, including the family violence strategies, are probably more closely parallel to the ‘green and white’ papers’. Accordingly we can conclude that the family violence strategies are policies as stances (Hill 2005); less structured, less fully formed and hence more ambiguous (Dunn 2004); more open to discretion or interpretation and hence more at risk of conflict during the implementation stage (Matland 1995 cited in Hill 2005). There is considerable difference between implementing a multistrand, interdependent strategic policy such as the family violence strategies and the more traditional operational policy on a minor issue. This is examined in detail in 4.4 and 4.5.

There is also often politically a great deal resting on the government sector’s ability to deliver on the actions arising from strategic policies (see 4.2). Scott (2001, 357) explains that ‘for a high-performing government this means great skill in implementation is essential’ because the best strategy will be judged a failure if it is ineptly implemented.

A strategy document would normally be a long-term vision of where things are going. Ideally the strategy will have a five-to-ten year horizon, particularly for complex social issues such as family violence. The traditional way of developing a strategy is to say: we are here now – we want to get there (the overall outcome); this is how long we think it will take us to get to the target destination; these are the steps and stages we think will be needed to get there. In reality it is much more difficult. We need to have a full understanding of where we are now, what services and programmes and initiatives are in place, what is working well and what is not. We need to ascertain whether there is sufficient credible evidence to inform our strategy and what strategies other countries have found to be effective which may be appropriate for New Zealand. We need to bring all available evidence and possible initiatives together and
undertake a robust causal analysis to determine which actions are most likely to achieve the ultimate outcome, and in what order they need to be implemented.

The importance of the strategy being based, implicitly or explicitly, on valid theory of cause and effect is one of the key themes emerging from the literature. This was discussed above (see 3.2). Ryan (2004, 14) sums it up as: ‘Strategies are fundamentally about causality; about making intended things happen…… understanding causality is critical to being effective.’ The causality analysis that needs to be done as part of developing the strategy provides the detail of how the strategy action areas or new initiatives were arrived at, the assumptions behind them and how they will collectively link together to achieve the ultimate outcome. This causal modelling is usually referred to as ‘intervention logic’, ‘logical analysis’ or ‘programme logic’. Intervention logic is a causal model that links a series of immediate and intermediate outcomes together in a hierarchical manner to collectively achieve the ultimate outcomes. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979), Gunn (1980) and Howeltt and Ramesh (1995) all identify the need for policy to be backed implicitly or explicitly by a theory of cause and effect as to why the prescribed measures are expected to resolve the problem. Bakker et al. (2006) note that ‘intervention logics as defined by New Zealand’s State Services Commission are ‘systematic and reasoned evidence-based description(s) of the links between outcomes and outputs [of an intervention]’. The State Services Commission (2005) guidance to government departments says there should be a credible intervention logic or evidence as to how the objective of the policy or programme addresses the need. The most important part of the intervention logic analysis is identifying the assumptions that underpin the logic.

Different agencies may have slightly different techniques for undertaking causal modelling. It can be done as a flow chart, via mapping techniques (for example mind-mapping or backwards and forwards mapping), as a series of matrices or even as a narrative. The one thing all techniques have in common is that to be effective they must be based on causal analysis and linkages. Ryan (2002, 36 and 43) notes that:

Good strategising, the sort of thing that effective strategic managers have done tacitly for some time, involves thinking through the causal logic of a proposed course of action, anticipating the consequences of a particular course of action. It also helps managers identify the steps needed to achieve the desired organisational and policy outcomes. Without it, implementation will lack the strategic direction required; hence, efficacious and appropriate delivery strategies cannot be developed.

Strategies usually contain a set of goals or outcomes that have guided the identification of the more detailed actions. Intervention logic would help to identify immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes, assumptions and risks, and the goals and/or objectives of the strategy. The intervention logic explains how, and in what order, events need to unfold to achieve these outcomes. Hill (2005), John (1998), Norman (2003) Howeltt and Ramesh (1995) all identify the requirement for policy goals or objectives and for their relative ranking to be stated as clearly as possible.
Both the Blueprint and Te Rito strategy documents contain a list of goals that would equate to immediate and intermediate outcomes that underpin the overall vision or ultimate outcome. In each case the goals link to the action areas of the strategy. The Taskforce’s First Report and the Ongoing Programme of Action contain a vision and a range of action statements grouped together with other similar actions but neither document contains any immediate or intermediate outcome targets which traditionally form the basis of the MfO model. The Taskforce’s First Report (p.8) states:

**We will know we are succeeding when:**

1. the levels of all forms of family violence, including child abuse and neglect, intimate partner violence and elder abuse, are consistently reduced each year
2. victims are safe and have the support they and their families need to make choices about their own wellbeing
3. the perpetrators of family violence do not re-offend and are held accountable for their actions
4. New Zealanders and New Zealand institutions do not tolerate family violence
5. families and whānau have the support they need to live free from violence.

Outcomes 1, 2, 4, and 5 are ultimate outcomes rather than immediate or intermediate outcomes. These factors provide further evidence that there is no overall intervention logic or causal modelling underpinning the Taskforce’s strategies or programmes of action. This is cause for concern as there is simply no way of knowing to what extent the actions, individually or collectively, will contribute to the ultimate outcome.

None of the family violence strategy documents have ranked the actions in any way other than by assigning very broad timeframes. Almost all the actions in the Taskforce’s First Report have the same timeframe, indicating their intention was to ‘do everything at once’ and also confirming the actions were not derived from intervention logic.

It is not possible or sensible to try and do everything in year one – the identified actions in a ten-year strategy will usually be divided up into ten annual work programmes, or perhaps the first five years of activities will be identified with a formal process designed at the outset to collect more evidence, evaluate the initiatives that have been implemented and determine the detail of the second five years at around the three-year mark. Alternatively there may be an ongoing strategy process established to modify the strategy as new evidence comes to hand, thus ensuring that the strategy is always appropriate and continues to reflect the overall outcome or end point. Ryan (2002, 39) raises this same point:

As implementation proceeds, learning is recursive, objectives and strategies are adapted, and ‘the plan’ becomes increasingly outdated. The sensible thing would be to modify it on an ongoing basis to match the emerging realities. Unfortunately, in Westminster-derived polities, the promissory documents presented to the budget process specify the matters for which the agency will be held accountable one-year later, come hell or high water. MfO in the future may require more adaptable plans and parliament will need to treat them accordingly.
This in turn raises an interesting question. Is the Taskforce’s First Report actually a strategy or is it just a compilation of a whole range of individual actions that are merely brought together in the same document because they all pertain to family violence? What we do know is:

- the Taskforce was established to advise the Family Violence Ministerial Team on how to make improvements to the way family violence is addressed, and how to eliminate family violence in New Zealand
- the Programme of Action set out in the Taskforce’s First Report builds on the initiatives put in place under Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy
- the Taskforce’s First Report (2006, 33) says ‘The Taskforce provides a forum for the government and non-government sectors, the judiciary, and the Families Commission to come together to set the strategic direction [emphasis added] for family violence in New Zealand’
- the Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action (released February 2008) says ‘we are embarking on a long-term strategy to eliminate family violence that will transform our nation’ (p. 24)
- the Taskforce acknowledges that it will take ‘sustained and coordinated effort over a number of years from all sectors’ to bring about change.

This thesis was not focused on the strategy and there is insufficient evidence to determine what the real situation is. Observations made during this research are, however, worth documenting for possible further exploration:

- the Taskforce’s First Report appears to have been was compiled by individual ministries bringing to the Taskforce table their own family violence work programmes or their ‘suggestions or ideas of what could be done’ and these have all been compiled into one document
- both programmes of action are collections of individual but not necessarily linked actions that do not collectively form part of a causal chain of actions required to achieve a targeted outcome
- many of the action areas do not appear to be supported by evidence
- many of the actions in Taskforce’s First Report are more like operational efficiency activities that are unlikely of themselves to directly contribute to the ultimate outcome, for example action 54: The Ministry of Justice will review purchasing plans for programmes.

This is not to suggest that many of the action areas are not of themselves critical to bringing about the change that is required. It is more an observation that what is missing is the glue that holds them together, the underlying causal analysis that can give us confidence that these initiatives will result in real change, and the mechanisms for ongoing review of evidence to ensure the strategies are up to date.

We have established that there are a range of contextual influences in particular the multi-agency environment that can make implementation even more difficult in complex social policy areas such as family violence. The high public visibility of these social problems, often
referred to by public policy writers as ‘wicked’ problems, coupled with a relatively short three-year election cycle, serve to create specific pressure to be seen to be delivering on the implementation outputs. Strategic policies are, by design, more ambiguous, less structured and therefore more open to interpretation. A strategic policy or strategy usually spans a five-to-ten year horizon; contains specific goals or objectives; immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes and a series of actions designed to achieve those outcomes. A strategy should be underpinned by a causal model that in turn ranks or orders the actions for implementation over the timeframe of the strategy. The 2006/07 Programme of Action contained in Taskforce’s First Report is not underpinned by a causal model, there are no goals, objectives or outcomes and the actions are not prioritised in any way. This means there are no clear instructions to implementers about what they are expected to do and the priority they must attribute to their tasks. The absence of clear policy objectives leaves room for what Barrett (2006) calls ‘differential interpretation and discretion’. This in turn makes the task of implementation more difficult and adds to the risk of implementation failure. So before we have even begun to examine the implementation stages of the MFO cycle, we know there are a range of issues that increase the risk of implementation failure.

4.4 Planning for Implementation

One of the risks with implementation is that once an initiative has been included in the strategy it is simply passed over to the ‘lead agency’ or those charged with ‘making it happen’ and proverbially ‘ticked off the list’. This notion of separation between policy formation and implementation introduces the idea that implementation has special attributes and problems that need to be analysed and solved (John 1998). The main activities that need to occur (or be analysed and solved as John suggests) will now be examined in the stage we will call ‘planning for implementation’.

In reality there is no clear dividing line between strategy development and implementation. Indeed the process is not a one-way movement from developing the strategy to implementing it, but rather there needs to be movement back and forth between these stages, and likewise between other stages in the MFO cycle, as shown in Figure 4.2. In the same way, there needs to be movement back and forth between the activities required within each of the stages in the MFO cycle. Decisions made at one point may involve ‘looping back’ to an earlier stage or another activity within a single stage to make corresponding modifications.

In most instances the planning for implementation stage will be completed within two to three months. In contrast implementation itself may continue for one or two years. Failing to follow a robust planning for implementation process significantly increases the probability of implementation failure and therefore the importance of taking the time at the outset to plan for implementation cannot be over-emphasised. ‘Planning for implementation’ is the single most important section in Chapter 4 and is thus worth considerable attention because the evidence indicates that the majority of the family violence implementation failures are occurring in the planning for implementation stage.

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22 [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org) describe wicked problems as ‘having incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements; and solutions to them are often difficult to recognize as such because of complex interdependencies’. 
In time the MfO framework should be able to assist government agencies to focus on the importance of the implementation phase. But Ryan (2002) points out there is still a huge amount of development work required in respect to the implementation stage of the MfO process and he cautions:

Implementation is not the easy phase of public management following the more difficult stage of development. The challenges are different but they need as much ongoing strategic, outcome-orientated management – maybe even more. Moreover, development should not proceed without full understanding of the conditions of implementation and service delivery (p. 40).

In his speech at the Public Service Senior Management Conference in 2001, the then State Services Commissioner, Michael Wintringham, spoke of the need for innovation and the risks of being innovative, and what that means when we come to implement government’s big picture strategies:

We want to be innovative. Innovation means risk of failure. Failure means political consequences. Political consequences mean blame. Therefore we are risk averse. We have two Ministers speaking to us this morning. Some of you might like to put that proposition to them. But before you do, I want to put some propositions back to you. Innovation is not about running with an ill-thought-through bright idea. It is not about “old is bad, new is good”. Risk aware and risk averse are two different things. We are better at policy development that we are at policy implementation. Big picture strategy is important but the devil is in the detail. Stakeholder management of the environment in which the project takes place cannot be separated from project management itself. Only when all these and more have been squared away tell me that the risks of innovation are too high, and the consequences inevitable (p.3).

Thirty years ago Hood (1976 cited in Younis and Davidson 1990) identified the importance of the implementation processes being able to minimise the adverse effects of all the external factors (see 4.2) by maximising the effectiveness of the implementation process itself. The planning for implementation stage is the platform from which implementation activities are launched. It is critical to start the implementation process from a carefully constructed and sound platform. Hood called this ‘perfect administration’ and described it as:

a condition in which ‘external’ elements of resource availability and political acceptability combine with ‘administration’ to produce perfect policy implementation (p.6)

So a good starting point for examining the ‘planning for implementation’ stage is that implementation is not easy (Ryan), that the devil is in the detail (Wintringham) and it is thus important to maximise the effectiveness of the implementation process itself (Hood).

Pressman and Wildavsky’s seminal work in the 1970s (cited by Younis and Davidson 1990) brought the theory of public policy implementation to the fore. Prior to the 1970s many organisational studies are only ‘de facto’ interest in policy implementation Hill (2005). Academic writers focused primarily on policy formation and paid little attention to how policies were operationalised, or the ‘post-decisional’ phases of public policy. Hargrove (1975 cited Hill 2005) suggested that there had been a ‘missing link’ between policy-making and the evaluation of policy outcomes. Academics began to shift their thinking from the inputs and
processes of policy-making to the outputs and outcomes achieved via implementation of those policies.

It became apparent in the 1970s that many policies and programmes had not performed as well as has been expected. Problems had not been solved; indeed some had been made worse (Parsons 1995). The pioneering implementation studies highlighted the need to examine the process of putting policy into action, and these studies started to challenge those who, at the time, took it for granted that this process would be smooth and straightforward (Hill 2005). Since the 1970s there has been what Hill (2005) describes as an explosion of implementation studies that represents an important advance in policy analysis. As a result, a comprehensive body of literature on public policy implementation has been built up over the last 35 years. This evolution of policy implementation studies has been paralleled by widespread public management reform outlined in 4.2, which in turn changed the environment in which policy formation and implementation occurs.

**Which approach to use?**

The first step in planning for implementation is to determine the appropriate implementation approach to use. Public policy theorists have broken strategy and implementation down into three broad categories.

1. **The top-down approach.** This assumes that we can usefully view the policy and implementation process as a series of chains of command whereby political leaders articulate a clear policy preference which is then carried out at increasing levels of specificity as it goes through the administrative machinery that serves the government (Clarke 1992). Key factors for consideration with the top-down approach include the extent to which policy-makers exercise control over the policy environment and over the implementers, and how much the policy is changed during implementation.

2. **The bottom-up approach.** This was developed in response to the top-down model of implementation. Weatherley and Lipsky (1977 cited in Younis and Davidson 1990) advocated that the focus of implementation should be on the workers at the coal-face as the starting point. They termed these individuals ‘street level bureaucrats’. Barrett and Hill 1981, Howeltt and Ramesh 2003 and Scott 1997 identified key aspects of the alternative bottom-up model as:
   - it enables the views of actors from government, or non-government sectors, particularly the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to be considered
   - it takes into consideration the interactions between agencies and between actors
   - it is more action orientated and inclusive than the top-down model
   - it puts emphasis on both formal and informal policy networks
   - it shifts the focus away from the policy decisions and onto the policy problems.
3. A pluralistic, inclusive approach. The third approach is more pluralistic, whereby the top-down and bottom-up models are combined in a multi-agency, inclusive approach to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the issue. Barrett and Fudge (1981 cited Younis and Davidson 1990, 12) see this as:

a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends.

The family violence strategies have largely been developed at the ‘top’ or the ‘centre’. The complex nature of family violence, the multiple agencies involved in the field at national, regional and local levels and the paucity of evidence to inform prevention and intervention strategies suggest that continual cycling of information between the bottom and the top and visa versa is likely to produce the most effective results, even though it is far more time-consuming and challenging than a straight-forward top-down approach. It is important that government agencies acknowledge that high-level strategy and the implementation of new initiatives that will impact on the community and service level providers cannot be developed in a vacuum. Whilst there have been NGO representatives at the family violence strategy formation table, there appears to have been an absence of effective mechanisms for information to flow in the more ‘interactive and negotiative’ way that Barrett and Fudge (1981 cited in Younis and Davidson 1990) described. Indications are that there was more community input into strategy and implementation in the Te Rito strategy than in the Taskforce strategy.

There is often debate about how prescriptive the ‘centre’ should be regarding new strategies or policies, and how consistent implementation needs to be between regions or local communities. It is not appropriate to reilitigate the extent to which workers at the coal-face or ‘street level bureaucrats’ should have been involved in the development of the Taskforce’s First Report. It is entirely appropriate, however, to examine the extent to which implementation of the action areas arising from that strategy should have taken a more pluralistic or inclusive approach, and in doing so to acknowledge that the first step in any planning for implementation process is determining which of these three models is appropriate. Table 4.4 analyses the 54 actions arising from the Taskforce’s First Report into three groups. This analysis is limited by the data available, and hence there might have been some slight variation in these numbers if there had been more information about each action. The table shows that the vast majority of the Taskforce action areas require one single national implementation process. Others require a consistent and mandated core, outside of which local street-level bureaucrats can have input into determining what is appropriate for their community and their clients. There appears to be only one action (Action 71) that has considerable freedom for the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to do as Ryan (2002, 20) suggests and

use their collective imagination, savvy and courage, manage the risks, bend or work around the rules, mix ‘n match resources, means and methods, and do ‘what it takes’ to be effective – within the limits of cabinet approvals and public sector ethics and probity.
Table 4.4: Taskforce action types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single national initiative</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National core with some local variability</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationally coordinated but largely determined by the community</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Every action is different. What is important is to be clear which strategies and policies are which. Some actions may need only minimal multi-agency involvement: for example, increasing the threshold for eligibility for legal aid (Action 46), while others will require extensive involvement of multiple parties. What is important is to be very clear about which ones are which.

Table 4.5 is a closer analysis of the 42 actions identified in the previous table as single national action areas. Indications are that a pluralistic inclusive approach would be more relevant for 15 of the 24 that are currently being implemented by one single agency. Only 12 of the national initiatives appear to involve multiple agencies or advisers in the implementation process.

Table 4.5: Implementation approach of 54 actions from the Taskforce’s First Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation model</th>
<th>Number currently being implemented under this approach</th>
<th>Number assessed as being relevant for this approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down single agency approach</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralistic inclusive approach</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No action taken to date</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once the appropriate model for each action has been determined, the second step in planning for implementation is to determine which multiple agencies (including multiple areas of expertise) need to be involved. This step applies to all actions except the ‘top-down single agency’ actions. If we are to make ‘multi-agency’ involvement real and meaningful, it is important to involve these ‘other agencies/people’ from the outset – when planning for implementation commences, instead of bringing them in after the key decisions are made and implementation design is done. Multi-agency involvement cannot be real and meaningful unless all agencies are appropriately resourced to enable them to participate fully in the planning and implementation stages.

The Steering Group for the Managing for Outcomes (2003, 11) suggest government agencies ponder the following questions when determining which implementation areas they need to be involved in. These questions are just as relevant for NGOs, advisers and other stakeholders.

1. Which government outcome areas do we have a responsibility to make a significant contribution to?
2. What is the current state of these areas and what factors might cause this state to change in the future?
3. What changes do we think will happen and what changes can we influence?
4. What indicators or other information can we use to monitor this over time? How will monitoring occur?
5. Which outcomes are priorities for us in the next 3–5 years and how does this match the views of our Ministers and stakeholders?
6. What specific contribution to these government outcomes will our department make over the next 3–5 years?
7. How will we know what impact we’ve made? What measures can we use to monitor these impacts?
8. Have we considered Treaty obligations and Māori development aspirations in our direction setting?
9. What interventions should we deliver to have the impacts we are seeking? Are these likely to be the most effective interventions? What is the most efficient way of delivering them?
10. How robust is the rationale for our choice of interventions?
11. What evidence of effectiveness and efficiency do we have to support this?
12. What are the significant evidence gaps where we need to target further evaluative activity?
13. What risks and uncertainties will we need to manage; ie how will we check for unintended consequences from our interventions?

According to interviewees there was no uniform or robust process to identify the relevant agencies to involve in the implementation of each Taskforce action. This has led to some action areas (for example, the media campaign) having a comprehensive multi-agency involvement (including input from Māori, Pacific and other ethnicities) whereas other lead agencies have just ‘done their own thing’ and avoided any multi-agency involvement.

The NGOs interviewed do not feel things are yet working in a true multi-agency way in family violence. They say that where the NGOs have been involved in the planning and implementation stages it has usually been too late, after all the key decisions have been made: ‘There is talk of multi-agency, partnership, consultation, but to date these have largely just been concepts’.

**Governance and lead agency arrangements**

Once the multi-agency configuration has been determined, the third step in planning for implementation is for the multiple agencies to collectively agree on which agency will be identified as the ‘lead-agency’, and also to agree on the appropriate governance arrangements for that action area.

Each of the three family violence strategies (the Blueprint, Te Rito and the Taskforce’s First Report) has identified a ‘lead agency’ for each action area. There was no documentation available to determine how the decisions were made as to which agency would lead each action, but information gathered from a convincing number of interviewees and from very different agencies gives some cause for concern about the processes that were used to identify lead agencies for the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action:

‘The only actions that agencies volunteer to implement are the ones they are already working on (ie business as usual)’. 
‘It seems as though a lot of time is spent with different agencies ducking for cover and trying to avoid getting actions allocated to them’.

‘The process for prioritising and allocating responsibility for initiatives appears to be more ‘buck passing’ with many agencies trying to avoid doing things rather than jostling to get their initiative advanced’.

‘The large government agencies are the only ones with resources to commit to these actions and hence they tend to retain control for the majority of the actions’.

Interviewees also reported instances where the ‘lead agency’ status was assigned to some actions without any prior discussion or agreement with the agency concerned. This creates a risk that the ‘lead agency’ does not feel any ownership of the action and has little or no commitment to implementing it. In other instances, an agency may have agreed in principle to take a lead role but was not consulted about the list of actions or the specified timeframes prior to publication of the strategy. There is no evidence that the Taskforce followed the process proposed here of firstly agreeing on the multiple agency partners and then allowing that group to agree on the lead-agency. This may be why none of the Taskforce workstreams appear to have been assigned a non-government agency as the ‘lead agency’. Alternatively, it may not have been appropriate for an NGO to lead the implementation, or the NGO sector was not keen to take that responsibility, or the government sector was unable to provide the NGOs with the appropriate resources to lead the implementation process for any of the actions.

The absence of a robust, transparent and inclusive process for assigning lead-agency status for each action will have a direct impact on the subsequent implementation process and increase the likelihood of implementation failure.

Each workstream should have an identified governance structure. Governance of the overall strategy in a multi-agency environment was discussed above (see 4.2), and similar issues pertain to each workstream. Different governance arrangements will be appropriate for different workstreams. The more straightforward single-agency actions may only require a simple governance structure: for example a project manager, reporting to a project sponsor. Action areas involving multi-agency planning and implementation are likely to also require a multi-agency steering group or an advisory group or a working group, or perhaps a combination of two or three of these groups. The presence of a multi-agency governance group was seen as a critical success factor in three of the most effectively implemented family violence workstreams. It is important that the multi-agency parties agree on the appropriate governance structure for a particular action area.

Roles, responsibilities and reporting lines

Once the lead-agency and governance structure is identified the next planning for implementation step is clarify and document the roles, responsibilities and reporting lines between the lead-agency, the implementation personnel, the governance group(s) and the Taskforce. This enables all parties to be clear about who is responsible for what, and how accountability will be managed between the multiple agencies. This is particularly important
as it enables the lead-agency to hold all parties collectively responsible for the implementation outcomes, even when they have no line management authority over the other agencies.

Indications are that roles, responsibilities and reporting lines within the family violence implementation teams are not clear to everyone. There is confusion about whether each agency reports to their own CEO, the CEO of the lead agency, the lead CEO for the overall strategy, or to the governance group for the overall strategy – in this instance the Taskforce. Two relevant comments from interviews were:

‘Identifying primary accountabilities for this workstream has been somewhat challenging. It is not clear whether we are accountable through our CEO to our own Minister or through the Taskforce to the Minister of Social Development’.

‘The project does not have a direct reporting link to the Taskforce. The project team reports to the Taskforce via the secretariat and decisions from the Taskforce are fed back via the secretariat’.

When the multi-agency participants, the governance structure, the lead agency, and the relevant roles, responsibilities and reporting lines are identified, the specific aspects of implementation planning can proceed.

Organisational capacity and implementation personnel

The public sector reforms of the past 20 years created a separation between policy personnel (‘the thinkers’) and operational or service delivery personnel (‘the doers’). This separation, coupled with the realisation that implementation does not just happen, has caused confusion about who ‘the implementers’ are. Do operational or service provider (‘doers’) automatically have the skills to manage implementation or are the policy ‘thinkers’ best suited for this work? And what about the managers of the ‘thinkers’ or the ‘doers’? Does being a manager of people mean you have the skills to manage implementation? What capacity and competencies are required to do the job well? These questions have largely gone unanswered in the literature and in guidance to public sector management. It appears as though the sector has a poor understanding of whose job implementation is, and of what the skills and competencies are required.

It has already been determined that public sector implementation is traditionally at the minor, operational, single-agency end of the strategy–policy continuum. Some public sector personnel will have experience in implementing these more operational policies but little experience in implementing interdependent multi-agency strategies for social change. It stands to reason that the competencies required for implementing different types of policies will be different.

Personnel charged with leading and managing implementation are often novice managers or policy analysts who are given a project to implement in what Meredith and Mantel (1989) refer to as a ‘fly’ or ‘die’ mentality. Staff assigned to manage projects invariably have to learn their role the hard way, with little or no training and unrealistic expectations placed on them.
Some of the comments from interviewees reflect the reality of what is happening with the implementation of the family violence strategies:

‘There is a lack of (and hence difficulty in recruiting) people with knowledge of the sector and relevant project management or implementation experience to manage all the implementation work’.

‘There is a skill mismatch between those assigned responsibility for managing the implementation task and the skills required to do the job. Staff who are young policy analysts with no experience in implementation are being assigned implementation responsibility, working in multi-agency environment or in engaging with community’. ‘Some of these staff are out of their league’.

‘Most government workers are European, young and middle class – they usually have a good ‘theoretical base’ but no life experience in the community’.

‘The role and complexity and difficulty of the implementation task is often not understood by management, and staff can feel isolated, unsupported and not sufficiently remunerated for the role they are performing’.

‘The person appointed as full-time staff member had no implementation experience of sole responsibility for a project of this scale’.

‘There was no project management or implementation training provided to the project manager’.

‘The incoming project manager had little or no briefing and thus lacked background knowledge of the work that has already been done, and there was little or no paperwork available on file for them to read’.

‘A lot of the implementation in government agencies rests on one person. If that person leaves, there may not be a replacement appointed to the workstream, and hence the action falls over’.

‘There has been a high turnover of staff in supporting areas of the organisation, and this has impacted on the project’.

‘People are trying to manage implementation on top of their existing workloads’.

‘The action was poorly resourced – no one was able to dedicate any time to it’.

So, we might ask, what personnel are needed to manage the implementation of these multi-agency family violence action areas? Those managing or working on the implementation of government strategies are, in effect, in charge of a change management programme. The implementer is a change agent. Implementation managers are often required to create change with multiple ‘actors’ outside the implementation manager’s line management authority. Implementation requires special relationship management and communication skills. Implementers have to be natural leaders, people who can inspire vision in others, people that others want to believe in, want to follow, and want to perform for. They must also be skilled networkers. Strategy implementers need to take the vision of the strategists, the ‘thinkers’ (those with the ‘helicopter view’ of the world and the overall change required) and translate that into the activities on the ground carried out by the ‘doers’. The implementer needs to be able to move comfortably between the ‘thinkers’ and the ‘doers’. The knowledge and work practices of policy analysts and implementation managers must constantly align, overlap and feed into one another (Ryan 2004). It follows that a similar alignment is required between implementation managers and operational or service providers.
In contrast to these special networking and relationship management skills, implementation personnel also need to constantly focus on the detail, keeping an eye on what needs to happen and in what order, managing issues and risks as they arise, identifying slippage and making adjustments to ensure milestones are still achieved. In addition, they need to be able to differentiate between what needs to be reported upwards versus what they decide themselves. There is no repetition in the life of a strategy implementation manager; there is often no predictability. If management do not have a good understanding of the requirements for planning for implementation or managing for implementation outcomes, they will be unable to give their implementation staff the appropriate support. The implementer's line manager will inevitably be a manager of ‘doers’ or a manager of ‘thinkers’ and will not necessarily have any skills or experience in implementation. Furthermore, implementation personnel may have little or no peer support. Different family violence strategies are being implemented by different agencies or by different parts of the same agency. It appears that personnel implementing the family violence workstreams have little or no links with each other.

Implementation management is therefore often a lonely and thankless job. Implementation project managers are held accountable for delivering a set outcome (or series of outcomes) within a specified timeframe and often with insufficient resources. They can find themselves spinning in ever-decreasing circles, working longer and longer hours, juggling more and more balls, as timeframes loom and their superiors pressure them to deliver. They are often held responsible but have no authority in their own right.

The question is often asked whether it is more important for implementers to have experience and skills in strategy implementation or a good knowledge of the subject matter and the sector. There is no easy answer. Ideally they need both, or special training, support and guidance in the areas where they lack skills. The skills and competencies required to implement complex government strategies are very different from the traditional skills and competencies of a policy analyst ‘thinker’ or an operational manager or staff ‘doer’.

All implementation requires new work – work that is not part of someone’s existing job. In practice, however, implementation activities are very often just added on to the existing role of a ‘thinker’ or a ‘doer’. In a policy ‘thinker’ environment, the implementation component of the job will often be reprioritised downwards due to competing demands of dealing with parliamentary questions, ministerials or other policy matters. Similarly in a service delivery ‘doer’ environment, the implementation components will usually only get attention when there is space in the operational workload. This important area will be discussed further in 4.4.

The evidence available for this thesis indicates that many of the personnel responsible for implementing the family violence actions may not have the appropriate skills, expertise or experience, they are given little or no training, their workload doesn’t allow them to spend the time required on the implementation task and they are not adequately supported within their organisation.
Interviewees also provided some good feedback on approaches that could contribute to positive implementation outcomes for the family violence actions:

‘Each project needs to be appropriately resourced with staff available to work on key issues; administrative support and management buy-in and support are also needed’. 

‘Having a dedicated implementation person assigned to this action was critical to its success’. 

‘It is a huge advantage to have someone working one hundred per cent on a particular action or workstream’. 

‘Previous relevant family violence experience and knowledge as well as the community experience of the project manager and the other workers was invaluable’. 

‘The project manager needs to be someone who is ordered and organised and well connected’. 

‘The project has had to rely heavily on the motivation of the individuals involved to get the work done’. 

‘Those actions that succeeded were contracted out or assigned to people with specific expertise and time to focus on the task’. 

**Budgets**

Full implementation is only possible if the budget aligns with the funding requirements. Each workstream may require an implementation budget (covering costs of the implementation process) and a budget for the new initiative itself. Some of the Taskforce’s 2006/07 actions may have little or no implementation budget requirements. For example, Action 47 (review legal aid provider remuneration rates) would probably be done by existing policy staff. In contrast, Action 35 (relating to the mass-media public-awareness campaign) has a budget allocation of $11 million over four years.

The important thing is not the budget requirement for each workstream but that funding requirements are identified as part of the planning for implementation phase, and that each workstream is appropriately funded. Gunn (1980 cited in Younis and Davidson 1990, 6) identified resource requirements as critical to the success of implementation:

- adequate resources need to be made available to the programme
- not only is it important that there are there no constraints in terms of overall resources, but also that, at each stage in the implementation process, the required combination of resources is available.

Interviewees report that some of the family violence workstreams appear to be well resourced while others are understaffed, underscoped and under-resourced. They also report that in some instances undertakings have been made to implement something, only to find later that there was no budget available. In other instances interviewees report that the funding has been insufficient for additional developments identified as being required during the implementation process.
Scoping the project

One of the most critical activities in planning for implementation is scoping what will be required to turn the strategy, policy or action area into reality: in effect, to ‘make it happen’. We saw in 4.3 that strategic policies by design are less likely to come with specific rules to guide implementation.

Ryan (2004) confirms that implementation and delivery need to be carried out with knowledge of the desired policy outcomes articulated during logic modelling and expressed in policy and programme plans as immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes and short-, medium- and long-term strategies (Ryan 2004). But because the family violence actions have not evolved from intervention logic and there have been no goals or outcomes assigned to each action, there are, in effect, no specific instructions for the implementation personnel to follow. So how does the implementation manager determine what will be required to turn the assigned action area into reality? Mountjoy and O’Toole (1979 cited Younis and Davidson 1990, 7) focus on the combined impact that availability of resources and specific instructions can have on implementation (see Table 4.6)

Table: 4.6: The combined impact of resources and specific instructions on implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Instructions</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) If there are new resources with specific instructions, the goals of individuals within the organisation would be less important and ‘implementation should be relatively straightforward’.</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) If there are new resources with vague instructions, management interpretation of the policy is required; management’s ‘world view’, therefore, would have to be closely related to the policymakers.</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) If there are no resources or specific instructions, it would normally be expected that there would be the least discretion of all; however, it is argued that this would result in subversive activities, whereby administrators would prioritise according to their own judgements and satisfaction.</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) If there are no resources and vague instructions, there would be a necessity for voluntary activity, which was not anticipated.</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The information is from Younis and Davidson (1990,7) and presented here in tabular form. The quotation marks are in Younis and Davidson. These authors reached their conclusions after studying the original work of Mountjoy and O’Toole (1979,466–7). The quoted phrases are consistent with those used by Younis and Davidson.

The evidence indicates that the majority of the 54 Taskforce actions fell either into boxes (3) or (4) of table 4.6. As noted above some of the family violence actions have had dedicated new resources while others are not. All of the actions appear to have passed into the implementation stages with only vague instructions. There appears to have been very little scoping of each action area aside from what is written in the strategy document. Many interviewees reported that very few projects had a formal project plan; some said formal planning for implementation was so rare that they could cite the specific examples of which projects had been formally scoped with formal project documentation. This would suggest that for the ‘business as usual’ actions, the goals and objectives of the action were already known to the lead agency. However, for the new initiatives, the more detailed goals and objectives may not have been agreed between the Taskforce and the lead agency.
There was widespread agreement among interviewees about the need to formally scope the actions at the outset. Scoping for implementation can rarely be done effectively by one person in isolation. Strategy development, planning and implementation must be integrated and coordinated (Ryan 2004) and the scoping work needs to be done by people are experienced in implementation activities and is skilled at working with a diverse range of people with sometimes conflicting views to ensure their perspectives are taken into account.

We have already identified the need to clarify the appropriate implementation model, identify the multiple agency partners, the lead-agency and governance arrangements and the respective roles, responsibilities and reporting arrangements. Determining the organisational capacity and personnel requirements are other aspects already identified that form part of, and support, the scoping for implementation activities. Other scoping activities will include:

- clarifying the vision, goals and objectives of the action area
- identifying the steps and stages and major milestones for implementation
- identifying linkages with other action areas and prerequisites. These may be other family violence actions that need to be implemented before this one, or be additional developments that need to occur before a planned new service can commence (ie standards, policy or legislation)
- ascertaining any infrastructure requirements
- identifying key stakeholders and consultation requirements
- identifying overall timeframes; immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes for this action; potential risks and issues that will have to be managed
- planning the anticipated exit or completion strategy to hand over from implementation to the ongoing operational teams
- clarifying the change management process to be followed for making alterations to the scope during implementation
- confirming communication arrangements.

Intervention logic is used primarily at the strategy or policy development phase, but as Ryan (2002, 40) points out, the analysis of cause and effect is also critical for scoping implementation:

Heuristics such as causal models (e.g. logic models) are still under-utilised in implementation both in understanding existing conditions of implementation and ex-ante modelling of emerging goals, objectives and strategies. Given their potential contribution to effectiveness they should be inherent elements of any MFO framework.

In the absence of clear instructions from the strategy group, it is critical that intervention logic is undertaken at this scoping for implementation stage. Many of the components listed above will be identified via the causal modelling.

Actions often interact with other actions that are being carried out simultaneously. Intervention logic is particularly useful in identifying prerequisites and interdependencies before overall timeframes are assigned to each action because the timeframe for each action will be
dependent upon the timeframes for any linked actions. If these interrelationships have not been identified at the strategy phase they will need to be identified in the scoping phase and they must be managed throughout the implementation process. This is particularly important when implementation of linked actions is being managed by different agencies.

The Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action does not appear to have any prioritisation or sequencing of actions. All actions in the Taskforce’s First Report were scheduled to start at the same time and almost all were due to be completed by June 2007. There are a number of examples where prerequisite actions were not in place before action started in another area.

- a major public awareness campaign was launched before ensuring there was adequate capacity to accommodate an expected increase in referrals
- there was no baseline of data or ongoing system in place to monitor changes in family violence levels before new initiatives, such as the media campaign, were launched. Ongoing surveys being undertaken as part of the media campaign may inform us about changes in the awareness of the general population, but opportunities to check the impact of the campaign (or other initiatives) on the actual levels of family violence are now limited because the requisite baseline analysis and monitoring systems were not in place before the campaign started
- the 2006/07 Programme of Action had the workstream of identifying current levels of family violence (the baseline) starting at the same time as the ongoing monitoring workstream, but ongoing monitoring cannot be done until a baseline has been established. Hence ongoing monitoring was destined to fail to meet the specified implementation date
- new family violence courts have been established with a focus on directing offenders to ‘stopping violence programmes’ before ensuring sufficient capacity within these programmes, before Action 55 ‘to improve processes for prosecutions for non-attendance these programmes’ has been implemented and before the findings of the evaluations were known. Furthermore Mackenzie and Carrington (2007, 68) advise that:

> It is of concern that the family violence court has put so much reliance on stopping violence programs as research has found that these are no guarantee of success

**Timeframes**

A common theme reported by interviewees was that the initial dates, for the Taskforce actions in particular, were unrealistic. The timeframes were often imposed by external parties, not determined by any scoping process, and sometimes without discussion with the lead agency. Implementation managers were then left to retrospectively scope the implementation process to fit within the pre-allocated timeframe. Interviewees also report feeling pressured to deliver to these unrealistic timeframes, particularly because they do not want their own organisation or their CEO to be seen in a bad light. It is not surprising that all except one of the 18 actions that were completed, but not within the specified timeframes, appear to be due to unrealistic completion dates being set at the outset.

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23 A separate issues relating to the establishment of these family violence courts is examined in 3.9.
Implementation Plan

One of the themes stressed by public policy academics – including Howlett and Ramesh (1995), Wilson (1989 cited Irwin 2003) and Irwin (2003) – is the importance of an implementation plan or a blueprint that details the goals, objectives and intentions of the policy or strategy, and is agreed between the policy-makers and those charged with implementation. In essence the implementation plan (or the project plan) is the documented outcome of the scoping process.

Ryan (2002, 24) cautions that the traditional model – a linear process of policies being fully developed, then approved by cabinet, and then ‘implemented’ by staff ‘down-the-line’ – may be a thing of the past. He says that ‘conditions of governance emerging in the 21st century’ are such that the strategy itself ‘can never be more than a hypothesis’, the strategy ‘goals and objectives no more than a vision’, and the implementation process akin to a ‘journey of recursive collective learning’. This lack of clear goals and objectives compromises the likelihood of having a pre-agreed implementation plan to ‘control’ or guide implementation; it also means that implementation is now much more a case of ‘learning as you go’ with appropriate and effective strategies emerging as implementation proceeds. Ryan suggests that in an MfO environment, the implementation plan is ‘replaced by something more fluid, emergent, recursive and altogether unbureaucratic and unWestminster’. This concept is reflected in the Taskforce’s First Report (2006, 30) ‘we will continue to learn our way forward’. It also appears in Ministry of Social Development’s 2006 Statement of Intent, which refers to creating a culture of ‘continuous learning and improvement’.

We need to be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater here. Just because there is now more fluidity in the public management – MfO environment, this does not mean we should give up on the notion of planning for implementation. And if we plan for implementation, we should document what was planned. Failure to plan for implementation seriously compromises the likelihood of successful implementation. Continuous learning, improvement cycles, feedback loops are all appropriate ‘learning our way forward’ concepts, and, if undertaken appropriately, can only enhance the implementation process. Formal systems and processes need not stifle these activities but will provide the framework for maximising opportunities for fluidity while minimising risks. What is critical is that there are mechanisms to make changes as the learning occurs.

It is important to confirm that the outcome of planning for implementation (the plan) aligns with the project objectives or the strategy action. Ideally the body who drafted the strategy and articulated the actions as well as the immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes should review a high-level version of the implementation plan to confirm that the interpretations and assumptions that have been made for that particular action accurately reflect that body’s intentions. This approval of the road map for moving forward then serves to give the implementation project manager authority to proceed. An approved plan, however finite or vague, forms the implementation project manager’s job description. Commencing implementation without an approved plan of some sort would be like starting a job without a job description, or setting off to find your way around a foreign country without a map. It would place the implementation personnel in a very vulnerable position.
In summary, the main points made in this section are:

- implementation is not easy
- the implementation manager must have a range of very special skills and competencies
- implementation planning focuses attention on the detail of what needs to be done, by whom, when, and in what order to achieve the intentions of the strategy
- different approaches will be appropriate for different action areas
- wherever possible, implementation of new social sector initiatives that will impact on multiple agencies nationally and locally and on the community needs to have a pluralistic and inclusive approach
- multiple agencies need to be involved from the outset to ensure implementation is planned and undertaken in such a way as to optimise outcomes
- the lead-agency needs to feel ownership and commitment for the action(s)
- formal scoping needs to be undertaken and documented for each action. When there are no specific instructions in the form of goals, outcomes or intervention logic, instructions for these need to be developed by the implementation personnel before implementation commences
- The outcomes of the planning for implementation stage need to be documented in an implementation plan and signed off by the strategy governance group to confirm the proposed implementation process will achieve the expected outcomes.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the steps and stages of planning for implementation are not a linear set of activities. Each step links to the others and all loop back to the strategy. Work needs to continue until all aspects have been addressed and all parties have agreed on the proposed implementation approach. It is not uncommon for some aspects of implementation to commence before all aspects of planning for implementation are complete. This will be discussed further in 4.5.

There is insufficient evidence to determine which action failed at which stage of the planning for implementation process. The most likely scenario is that implementation failures have been due to a combination of factors. Some of the main weak points in the family violence planning for implementation process appear to be:

- arbitrary process for assigning lead-agency
- lack of clarity about which actions will be implemented in a multi-agency approach and no uniform or robust process to identify the relevant agencies to involve
- insufficient resources to enable multiple agencies to fully participate
- confusion over roles, responsibilities and reporting lines
- failure to ensure organisational capacity and implementation personnel appropriate to the implementation task
- no specific instructions given to implementers by the strategy group in the form of goals or outcomes
- little or no scoping done for each action
- very few action areas have any form of implementation plan
the strategy governance group is not approving implementation plans and hence taking no responsibility for whether the implementation activities will actually achieve their intended outcomes.

It is pleasing to see in the Taskforce’s October 2007 monitoring report that the Secretariat will be seeking a comprehensive list of key milestones for the ongoing actions from the first programme of action and actions from the ongoing programme of action.

This statement indicates that some level of planning for implementation will be undertaken for each workstream. However, scoping of each action should have been done before the Taskforce’s First Report and more recently the Ongoing Programme of Action were finalised and published. To identify milestones for actions already underway is far from ideal.

4.5 Implementation

The closing words of the final log sent by the late Sir Peter Blake were:

To win, you have to believe you can do it. You have to be passionate about it. You have to really ‘want’ the result, even if this means years of work. The hardest part of any project is to begin. We have begun, we are underway, we have a passion and we want to make a difference.

The family violence project is very different from Sir Peter’s project to save the planet from environmental destruction but the sentiments are the same. Implementation is about beginning, and then continuing, no matter what it takes, until the task is completed.

In an ideal world, the implementation plan would be a complete road map of what is required, with all factors identified prior to implementation. Implementation would then be a nice tidy linear and sequential process. However, reality rarely resembles the ideal. There is no clear dividing line between planning for implementation and actually beginning the implementation.

Often the early stages of implementation need to be underway before planning for implementation is complete. This may be due to time constraints or perhaps because it is simply not possible to identify all variables before implementation begins. This is to be expected and is in fact part of the ‘learning as we go’ approach. Implementation starts with what is known, and the rest is worked out as implementation occurs. This creates a balancing act between formal structure, discipline and process on the one hand, and flexibility to move and adapt on the other. There needs to be ongoing and continual feedback loops between implementation and the planning for implementation, with the loops often going right back to the strategy formation stage. These loops may be due to new information that requires a change to the previously approved scope or to the need for continuous improvement reporting purposes. The whole process needs to be carefully managed otherwise what is implemented may bear little or no resemblance to the action that was articulated in the strategy.

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24 http://www.sirpeterblaketrust.org/go.php/blakexpeditions/log/3688
The nature of what is being implemented dictates the appropriate approach. Table 4.7 shows that the family violence actions appear to fall into nine groups. Different types of implementation activities need to be linked with options identified earlier: single national initiative, national core with some local variability, or nationally coordinated but largely determined by the community. Then the variables of whether implementation requires a top-down, bottom-up or pluralistic inclusive approach can be added. As previously stated, there can be multiple combinations of implementation approaches for the Taskforce actions. For example, an action may require a new process to be established as a single national initiative, but that needs to be done in a pluralistic and inclusive manner. In contrast, another action may be a relatively straightforward business intervention that can be done by a single agency using a top-down approach.

Table 4.7: Different types of implementation activities in Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the action</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and coordination</td>
<td>ensure Taskforce actions are relevant and effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy development, planning and advice</td>
<td>develop the next programme of action’ we will draw on the advice of Māori Advisory Group to ensure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoping or collecting information</td>
<td>investigate the introduction of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioning research</td>
<td>evaluate existing models put in place measures that evaluate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>ensure the review of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 enhances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business planning and interventions</td>
<td>review current funding models cost family violence services identify opportunities for building the capacity of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design activities</td>
<td>design an ongoing process for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing new processes</td>
<td>enable appropriate sharing of information maximise safety factors put in place measures that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting up new services or initiatives</td>
<td>develop a new nationwide scheme build safe and effective programmes for establish four further dedicated family violence courts national media campaign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no ‘one approach fits all’ answer to implementation. Every strategy – and every action area within a strategy – may need a different approach and a different level of bureaucratic control. Each will have different timeframe imperatives, different risks and issues, and require different skills from those managing the implementation. The more straightforward strategies may have few interdependencies, no prerequisites and only require one person (part-time) to implement. Others may have multiple interdependencies and prerequisites, and a team from many different agencies may have to come together to manage the implementation.
The most widely used methodology for managing implementation is project management. According to Meredith and Mantel (1989) a project management approach to implementation enables goals to be achieved that could only be achieved with the greatest difficulty if more traditional methods were used. They go on to note that businesses regularly use project management to accomplish unique outcomes with limited resources under critical time constraints. Project management is a systems approach to implementation that has been widely used in the private sector for many years and is now becoming more common in the public sector. It provides one of the best frameworks for those implementing government strategies. Meredith and Mantel (1989, 29) suggest that successful management of projects is:

- simultaneously a human and technical challenge, requiring a far-sighted, strategic outlook coupled with the flexibility to react to conflicts and trouble areas as they arise on a daily basis.

An activity that fits into the category of ‘project’ well, and therefore comes within project management as an approach, usually has a defined start point (a new strategy or idea); a defined end point (when the change has been made or the new service established and it becomes an ongoing operational activity); it is time defined (usually has a specified timeframe for completion); it is a one-off activity; it requires a concentrated effort to achieve; it occurs over a period of time; and often has multiple ‘feeders’ and influences (prerequisites and interdependencies). The project management discipline offers a range of tools and techniques that the project leader can draw on to help them manage the implementation process.

**Project management**

A project generally has an identified project manager or project leader. The required skills and competencies of the implementation project manager were explored in 4.4. The project leader for a small project might work alone to deliver on the outcome, standing or falling on his or her own merits. In contrast the work of a project leader responsible for implementing a large, complex project to establish a new service using a pluralistic inclusive approach could be likened to the conductor of a large symphony orchestra. There are many individuals in the orchestra playing many different instruments. Each is an expert with their own instrument. The players are clustered together in similar groups: the string section, and the percussion section and so on. The conductor does not need to know how to play each instrument but does need to be an expert in blending all the various players and instruments together in the right succession, with perfect timing, to create the overall sound that the audience hears. If one instrument is out of tune or one player is out of time, the music sounds terrible.

Neither the project manager of a complex family violence strategy nor the conductor of the symphony orchestra can do the task without the wider team. Project leaders need to have an overview of all components but must rely on others to perform their part. Their main activities during the implementation process are:

- managing against agreed timelines and milestones
- managing multiple workstreams and interdependencies
- managing multi-agency relationships
• identifying and managing changing circumstances
• managing risks and issues
• monitoring their own progress, reporting and information-sharing
• managing the handover to the ongoing operational team.

Change management

One aspect that appears to be particularly relevant for the family violence action areas is change management. It has been ascertained that strategic policies are generally less fully formed than operational policies and thus more likely to be subsequently renegotiated or modified during the implementation process. There may also be contextual factors that enhance or limit the implementation process and the likelihood of changes being made. The changes may be small changes that the project manager can make a decision on. With others the project manager may make a decision but then seek retrospective approval from the relevant governance group. Changes that have the potential to alter the scope of the project significantly may need prior approval. Barrett and Fudge (1981a cited in Younis and Davidson 1990) suggest that for these more significant changes, consideration needs to be given to whether the strategy itself should be renegotiated, modified or compromised or whether it is the environment or the implementation process that needs to be modified in order to get the policy implemented. Barrett and Fudge (1981b, 11) also note:

If what is being implemented is different from the original policy intention, is this ‘good’, for example, demonstrating that policy was flexible enough to be tailored to the local circumstances or ‘bad’ in that the original policy goals have been distorted in the process?

Stringer and Williamson (1987) suggest that implementers may make changes to the policy to overcome the intellectual limitations of the original policy. They also suggest that implementers may sometimes ‘usurp’ the original intentions of the policy-makers by bringing about changes during implementation to realise their own values. To manage this and other risks of ‘scope creep’ any significant changes after the implementation plan has been approved, are best approved and documented via a formal change management process. This is sometimes referred to as ‘scope management’. Without such controls, the situation that Stringer and Williamson describe is a very real possibility. If this happens repeatedly for multiple action areas in any one government strategy, the collective effect of all the changes could potentially alter the expected outcome.

A number of the family violence action areas appear to have undergone a change between the time they were articulated in the strategy and the actions that were finally implemented. For example:

• Action 15. The action statement is ‘We will put in place measures that help communities to learn from each other and service providers to share good knowledge’. This is being interpreted as being a service that could be provided by the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse. However, some interviewees felt strongly that this action was about community level initiatives for providers to learn from one another and share knowledge. It is unclear whether this confusion is because of a change in the intentions of the action or due to confusion over the wording of the action.
Action 58. The action statement is ‘MOJ will establish a forum to identify best practice for effective information exchange between government agencies and communities, and between the District Court and the Family Court within existing legislation’. What occurred was a single meeting attended by two NGOs, six government departments and the Office of the Commissioner for Children. In response to an official information request, the Ministry of Justice advised that ‘A request for information on any guidelines agencies have developed since the forum should be made to the individual agencies directly’. This would indicate that there is no intention of any multi-agency agreed best practice guidelines, even though the original action statement suggested otherwise.

Action 75. The action statement is ‘The MSD and non-government organisations will work together to build on existing workforce and organisational development initiatives’. Indications are this has been limited from an opportunity for workforce and organisational development in MSD and across the NGO sector to developments within MSD.

There is no evidence available to determine whether or not the Secretariat has a formal change management process whereby such variations are signed off by the Taskforce, and documented in a change management register. Significant changes like this should be stated in the monitoring reports so it is clear to readers of those reports that the intention of the action has been modified.

Perhaps the overarching questions that need to be asked of each action area are:

- how important is it that this action is implemented as per the vision or intentions of those who developed the strategy?
- how will it be confirmed that the implementation approach being taken is the most likely to achieve the expected immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes?

The report of the Steering Group for the Managing for Outcomes (2003, 12) suggests government agencies ask the following questions relating to implementation:

- Are we implementing and delivering as planned, and managing our capability and risks effectively?
- Are roles, responsibilities and timescales for delivering interventions clear (for ourselves and any other agencies we are working with)?
- Are we monitoring our progress and risks to enable us to take corrective actions early where necessary?
- Are we keeping relevant internal and external stakeholders appropriately informed?
- Are we conducting our business in accordance with public sector ethics, values, and standards?

**Bringing the implementation process to a close**

The end point of an implementation project is the hand-over to operational staff or policy staff. As with other stages of the implementation process, hand-over is usually a process whereby the implementation and operational activities run in parallel for some time before hand-over is fully achieved. Again there is no single right way for this to occur. Different implementation types will require different hand-over arrangements. For the large service establishment
projects, there may be a need for ongoing oversight, feedback loops and continuous improvement for some time. Furthermore if the new initiative is being evaluated, the evaluation may identify additional development or implementation work that is required. Thus there will be feedback loops between the implementation stage, the review and evaluation stage, and the operational service delivery stage.

The evidence available for this thesis does not enable a determination to be made as to how many actions had a robust planning for implementation stage but subsequently failed at the more active implementation stage. There is evidence to suggest, as detailed above, that the scope of a number of actions has changed significantly during the implementation stage and consequently they will never deliver against the original wording in the strategy document. It is unknown whether this was an implementation failure or whether these changes in direction were approved by the Taskforce and reported accordingly. This last issue will be raised again in 4.7.

Before moving on to complete the examination of the MfO continuous improvement cycle it is timely to reflect on the findings of this chapter thus far. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 at the end of Chapter 3 showed that nine actions had failed to be fully implemented because the strategy over-promised. In other words, the wording of the action was probably never attainable. Had that action been fully scoped the discrepancy would have been discovered and the wording of the original action could have been amended. Seventeen of the 18 actions fully implemented but outside the specified date in the strategy and six of the 51 actions that have not been fully implemented were not adequately scoped and hence had unrealistic timeframes assigned from the outset. Once again, if these actions had been fully scoped prior to the publication of the strategy they would have had more realistic and more achievable timeframes. Thirty-six of the 88 actions have not been fully implemented due to failures elsewhere in the implementation process.

The analysis that has flowed through Chapter 4 thus far has shown that the first risk to implementation arises from external environmental factors. These risks are compounded for implementation of the Taskforce actions as the strategy is not supported by any causal modelling, and no goals, outcomes, linkages or prerequisites were identified at the strategy stage. In many respects the odds were stacked against many of the actions before they reached the planning for implementation stage. However, had the time been spent planning for the implementation in the manner suggested in 4.4 most of these shortfalls would have been identified and rectified before implementation commenced.

4.6 Review, Evaluation, Research and Evidence

The scope of this thesis has not included the review and evaluation or research and evidence stages of the MfO cycle for the family violence programme (Figure 4.2). The analysis of the evidence regarding the actions in the sample that related to these two stages was discussed previously (see 3.5), and whilst these stages of the MfO cycle are important, they will not be discussed at length in this chapter. The report of the Steering Group for the Managing for Outcomes (2003,12) suggests government agencies should ask the following questions relating to the review and evaluation stage of the MfO cycle:
Will our monitoring systems provide us with the information we need to monitor progress, coverage and impact of interventions so that we can adapt our strategy if necessary?

Do the rationales for our major interventions link to a clear service specification and performance monitoring approach?

What evidence will be gathered to demonstrate change?

Have we prioritised our evaluative activity?

Should we be working with other agencies to evaluate our shared policies and programmes?

Have we delivered the interventions we planned to deliver to the groups or areas we wanted to deliver them to (as specified in our rationales, Statement of Output Objectives and our output plan)?

It is important however, to consider whether any of the monitoring and evaluation actions would have assisted in identifying implementation failures occurring with other actions. Ryan (2002, 55) notes

If learning is becoming a *sine qua non* of public management in the 21st century, the formative approach to evaluation comes into its own. This proposes that evaluation is best undertaken during development and implementation to provide an ongoing flow of clarification, assessment and advice, to help managers and participants find paths to their objectives (even to engage in revisiting their substance).

Action 19 says ‘We will put in place measures that evaluate this programme of action’. This was identified as one of the critical actions in the intervention logic (see 3.2). Unfortunately, as reported in 3.5, no evaluation has been done. Action 19 appears in the Taskforce’s First Report under the heading ‘Learning from what works’. Therefore it could be assumed that a formative evaluation would have been the most appropriate type of evaluation for that purpose. As Ryan explains (above) a formative evaluation would have been undertaken alongside the development and implementation activities. It would have answered the last question from the Steering Group for the Managing for Outcomes list above, and it would most certainly have identified areas where implementation was failing.

It is far from ideal having to rely on the review and evaluation phase of the cycle to ascertain whether earlier stages of the cycle are failing but nevertheless it would have provided a safety net in the overall process.

### 4.7 Leadership and Overall Coordination

Governance and leadership requirements have been extensively canvassed elsewhere in this thesis and concepts already raised will not be repeated. As shown in Figure 4.2 all stages of the continuous improvement ‘learning our way forward’ cycle need to be held together by a range of leadership and coordination functions. When a strategy such as the Taskforce’s First Report contains 54 actions that all need to proceed around the MfO cycle, it is clear that without something gluing all the links in the chain together, failures will occur. This section will examine some of the leadership and coordination activities that will ensure the strategies are successfully implemented.
Strategy development and programmes of action

As already mentioned, the process of implementing strategies is not a linear one. In 4.3 it was noted that there needs to be an ongoing process to collect more evidence to support or modify the strategy over time. The importance of the ‘planning for implementation’ stage looping back to the strategy stage for clarification or modification was identified in 4.4. Likewise, as implementation occurs, changes to the original strategy may require consideration and approval (see 4.5). These processes all need to be coordinated nationally.

Planning for implementation

The two key functions that need to be coordinated nationally would be:

- planning for implementation of all the action areas needs to be woven together into one overall scoping exercise with timeframes, interdependencies and prerequisites, milestones, and so on. Then this high-level scoping should be documented so all parties can have a common understanding of the process
- developing an overall plan or blueprint. The Mental Health Commission was established in 1998. The Commission’s role is to ensure the implementation of the National Mental Health Strategy. The Commission realised early on that the strategy that they were tasked with monitoring was at such a high level that monitoring would not be possible without a more detailed plan, and so they spent considerable time developing the ‘Blueprint for Mental Health Services in New Zealand’. A similar national document is required to ‘operationalise’ New Zealand’s long-term strategy for the family violence programme and the Taskforce programmes of actions.

Implementation

Key implementation functions for the national coordinating body would include:

- coordinating overall timeframes, interdependencies and prerequisites between the various agencies. There would be one master Gantt chart plotting all the actions, identifying who is managing each, tracking the linkages between actions, and monitoring slippage that may occur in any area that impacts on other areas. Keeping lead agencies and implementation managers informed and supported, and ensuring the family violence initiatives are given priority
- overseeing all implementation activities and all workstreams. There are a number of actions in Te Rito strategy that are incomplete, approximately half the 2006/07 actions are not yet complete, and other actions are reported as ‘ongoing’. The 2007/08 Programme of Action contains approximately 29 more actions. In addition some of the 2006/07 actions, for example the research into elder abuse, will require ongoing workstreams to take them towards implementation. Without a single mechanism to coordinate all these ongoing activities, there is a risk of actions being ‘lost to follow-up’ and gaps and overlaps appearing
- managing issues and risks. This would involve preparing and managing a central register for issues and risks, and working with the implementation managers of each workstream
to identify new issues and risks as they arise, agreeing on mitigation strategies and referring matters to the governance team as appropriate

- managing a change management process. This would involve liaising with all implementation managers to identify changes that need to occur to that workstream and identifying which of those changes need to be escalated to the Taskforce for consideration

- managing a process to track progress with achieving immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes

- ensuring that the MfO cycle and feedback loops continue and that systematically all actions are implemented appropriately over time. The less linear the implementation activity, the more national coordination and oversight is required, and these should be ongoing.

Review and Evaluation

Ongoing, robust and consistent quantitative and qualitative monitoring and evaluation activities are a key component of this model of continuous implementation. All these activities need to be coordinated nationally, and feedback loops need to be established to inform changes to existing strategies or the development of new ones.

Research and Evidence

The continuous improvement, or ‘learning our way forward’, cycle is complete with the research and evidence stage. There is a lack of comprehensive family violence data and a lack of robust evidence behind many of the strategies being tried in New Zealand and overseas to reduce family violence. It will be important to establish ongoing mechanisms to review all new research evidence to inform the causal modelling for future strategies and programmes of action that will in turn improve the implementation process.

If the family violence death reviews find a system failure in one region, there needs to be a mechanism to implement the necessary changes in all areas of the country. The implementation of the findings of the death reviews needs to be coordinated and monitored nationally to ensure the continuous improvement focus of the reviews is maximised.

Other national coordination functions

The research undertaken for this thesis has commented extensively on the particular challenges of planning and implementation in a multi-agency environment. A key success factor in ensuring real inter-agency coordination, collaboration and communication will be to have one national focal point to which all agencies can link. There will also be considerable opportunity to build close relationships and partnerships with entities and agencies in other countries, and to learn first-hand from their successes and failures, as well as visa versa.
Implementation and ongoing ‘learning our way forward’ will be further complicated by the wide array of non-Taskforce initiatives already underway nationally, regionally and locally. There is currently no mechanism linking the Taskforce strategies with other initiatives and this creates a risk of implementation activities working in conflict with one another, overlaps and gaps developing, and confusion at a local level.

The new initiatives and expansion of existing services will collectively require a pool of suitably skilled and experienced staff. Nationally consistent training and workforce development initiatives can be the key to maximising consistency between agencies whilst supporting local development and individuality. Implementation, change management and monitoring and evaluation expertise will also be required nationally, regionally and locally.

Indications are that most of these national leadership and coordination activities are not currently occurring. This will have directly contributed to many of the implementation failures. While the source of an implementation failure may be in for example the planning for implementation stage, these failures should have been identified early via these national leadership and coordination activities. A range of very specific national infrastructure changes are seen as vital if the situation is to improve in the future (see 5.6).

This chapter has examined the environmental, structural and process factors that impact on the implementation of these strategies and identified areas for improvement. The evidence indicates that ‘planning for implementation’ is the stage where the majority of the implementation failures are occurring, but weaknesses have also been identified at the strategy stage and after implementation has commenced. Together chapters three and four have shown that had there been more robust review, evaluation, leadership and overall coordination processes, these failures could have identified and rectified much earlier.
5. Findings and Implications

The aim of this research was to ascertain the extent to which recommendations contained in the government’s three family violence strategy documents published in the past five years (2002–06 inclusive) have been successfully implemented, to identify factors influencing implementation to help us ‘learn our way forward’ and to improve implementation outcomes in the future.

The major findings of the analysis of the evidence (Chapters 3 and 4) are now brought together in Chapter 5, with some specific recommendations for changes that could be made to improve the situation. The findings are grouped according to the five research questions.

5.1 Overall Findings

Family violence is a priority issue for the current government. There is an impressive commitment by senior officials from the relevant government and non-government agencies, Māori and Pacific advisers, independent commissioners, and the judiciary. There are many dedicated people working nationally and locally to implement the family violence initiatives. Family violence would not have received the attention it has in recent years without this ongoing focus and concerted effort by so many individuals and agencies. A great deal has been done. But this thesis has found that there is a great deal that has not been done and identified many factors that are negatively impacting on the implementation of the Government’s family violence strategies. The major findings of this thesis are:

- less than 50% of the actions in the government’s three family violence strategies have been fully implemented six months after the completion date stated in the strategy
- the Taskforce monitoring reports have not accurately reflected the implementation status of many actions
- most of the actions not completed under the Te Rito and Blueprint strategies have not been picked up under the Taskforce programmes of action
- the Taskforce programmes of action are not really strategies, but rather a compilation of often unrelated family violence actions not collectively supported by a causal model
- there are several major groups of actions where little or nothing has been done
- the majority of actions that have not been completed or have not been progressed are those where there appears to have been a breakdown in the implementation process
- there has been little or no formal planning for implementation for most of the 54 Taskforce actions
- implementation responsibility is often assigned to agencies and individuals without the resources, skills and experience to do the work
- there is little ‘conversation’ or information-sharing between the Taskforce and family violence service providers, and multi-agency involvement is limited in most areas other than Taskforce itself
• the leadership and coordination infrastructure underpinning the Taskforce cannot satisfactorily fulfil the required functions
• significant portions of the government’s Managing for Outcomes (MfO) cycle of continuous improvement are missing or have inadequate linkages.

5.2 Implementation Status

Research Question 1: To what extent have the government and non-government sectors implemented the actions contained in government’s three family violence strategy documents within the specified timeframes?  

Of the 88 family violence actions and sub-actions in the research sample:
• 22% were implemented within the specified timeframe
• 42% have been implemented regardless of timeframe
• 58% have either not been fully implemented or have had no action taken on them
• no action has been taken on ten of the actions included the Taskforce’s First Report
• 12 of the 19 Te Rito and Blueprint actions that have either not been completed or have had no action taken on them are not being completed by the Taskforce.

Table 5.1 summarises the findings of the analysis of evidence for the 88 actions included in the research for this thesis.

Table 5.1: Implementation status of all 88 actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of actions reported in detailed tables</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total actions</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 shows that the results for the most critical and interrelated actions from the intervention logic that was developed for this thesis (see 3.2) are almost identical to the overall results.

25 Te Rito; New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy February 2002; Care and Protection Blueprint February 2003; First Report of the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families July 2006
Table 5.2: Implementation status of the most critical Taskforce actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of critical Taskforce actions</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that so few critical actions were implemented within the specified timeframe confirms that no causal modelling or intervention logic was done to prioritise implementation efforts. The consequence is that actions have not been implemented in the appropriate order; the foundation work of some actions was not in place before others were implemented; and critical actions were not given the appropriate priority. The combined effect of these factors is that new initiatives may be less effective, may cause unnecessary harm and public resources may have been wasted.

There is a systematic pattern whereby when around half the actions in each strategy are not fully implemented or have had no action taken, a new strategy is developed that supposedly picks up the outstanding actions from the earlier strategy. The Blueprint was superseded by Te Rito. Te Rito was superseded by the Taskforce’s First Report, which in turn has been superseded by the Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action. The evidence suggests that some of the incomplete actions are picked up by the subsequent strategy, but many appear to have fallen off the radar and have never been completed. The time and resources spent on partially implementing actions that are not progressed to completion is a waste of public resources.

The Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action states:

> We are carrying over much of the work started in our first programme into our Ongoing Programme of Action (p.10)

The work being ‘carried over’ is not detailed, and only time will tell whether all the actions identified in this thesis as incomplete are monitored by the Taskforce until they are fully implemented.

The most successfully implemented initiatives appear to be:
- advocates for children and young people who witness family violence
- the community innovations fund
- the mass-media advertising campaign
- the Family Violence Clearinghouse
- the Family Violence Inter-agency Response System.

The action areas of greatest failure were found to be strategies for Māori; intervention services; and research, monitoring and evaluation. These are discussed below.
Strategies for Māori

Māori continue to be overrepresented in the statistics and yet strategies to address Māori family violence continue to fail to be implemented. There are 11 actions areas in the three strategies that relate directly to Māori, and all except two have a status of ‘not complete’ or ‘no action taken’. Seven of the incomplete or non-actioned initiatives are contained in the Blueprint or Te Rito strategies and six of them have not been picked up under the Taskforce’s programmes of action. The Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action says:

- Another key aspect will be a Māori Programme of Action and a Pacific Programme of Action to provide leadership and to co-ordinate action in Māori and Pacific communities (p. 2).
- The Taskforce will also focus on the quality and diversity of approaches to eliminating violence in Māori and Pacific families (p.3).

This reiteration in the Taskforce’s 2006/07 Programme of Action supports the finding that previous attempts to develop and implement Māori-specific strategies have failed.

Intervention services

There has been repeated rhetoric about ensuring family violence intervention services have the capacity and capability to meet demand. However, none of the actions designed to identify service shortfalls, improve access to a range of services, cost family violence services and review current funding models have been fully implemented. The only additional funding provided to non-government service providers has been a partial correction after over 10 years of underfunding for the current level of service provision. Some funding has been provided for additional community prevention initiatives, but none for increasing capacity of intervention services for victims or perpetrators.

Programmes such as the mass media campaign and the health sector’s violence intervention programme are expected to increase the demand for family violence services. However, most services were stretched to the limit before these new initiatives were introduced. As a result, there is a risk that women and children might not be able to be kept safe if they leave the violent situation.

Research, Monitoring, Evaluation

Research, monitoring and evaluation are a critical part of developing and implementing public sector strategies. The Taskforce 2006/07 Programme of Action contains a comprehensive suite of research, monitoring and evaluation actions. These actions are crucial to ensure the outcomes are achieved; to ascertain the impact and effectiveness of the initiatives for individuals and service agencies; and to facilitate the Managing for Outcomes cycle of continuous improvement and the Taskforce’s ‘learning our way forward’ approach. However, the most crucial have not yet been done. These include:

- evaluating the Programme of Action
- establishing ongoing monitoring mechanisms
- monitoring the impact the new initiatives are having on service provider organisations.
5.3 Accuracy of Reporting

Research Question 2: How accurately is the implementation status being reported?

Reporting issues were examined in 3.10. The major findings regarding accuracy of reporting are:

- There are significant discrepancies between the actual status of many actions and the status reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports.
- The scope, milestones, and timeframes of individual actions are frequently changed from the original strategy and then reported as ‘on track’. This makes reporting redundant, as all actions will always appear to be ‘on track’.
- There are cases where the green smiley face/traffic light, representing ‘on schedule’ does not correspond with the written comment contained in the report.
- The secretariat appears to filter information coming from individual agencies so any bad news is not reported.
- There is insufficient information in the Taskforce monitoring reports to determine whether the activities will achieve the action stated in the strategy.
- There is considerable repetition between monitoring reports.
- The actions are not numbered in either of the Taskforce’s programmes of action, and the numbering system being reported is not sequential so it is difficult to ascertain if all actions are being monitored and which comment pertains to which action.
- The reporting changes proposed in the October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report are promising. However, it is a little like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted to be asking for actions to be scoped with key milestones well after the actions have been published and implementation is underway.
- There is no reporting to wider sector. The Taskforce website contains only the Taskforce monitoring reports. To find out further details about the implementation of the actions requires considerable research.

Table 5.3 is a ‘Traffic Light’ report in the same format that appears in each of the Taskforce’s monitoring reports. It compares the status assigned to each of the 54 Taskforce actions in the research sample for this thesis with the status as reported in the October 2007 Taskforce’s monitoring report. An extra category has been added to signal those actions that were completed, but outside the specified timeframe.
Table 5.3: Comparison between the status assigned in the Taskforce’s ‘Traffic Light’
monitoring reports and status assigned in this thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action number</th>
<th>Taskforce action</th>
<th>Status as per October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report</th>
<th>Status at December 2007 concluded by the research for this thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Developing the next programme of action</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Successful implementation of the [2006/07] programme of action</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Drawing on Māori and Pacific advisory groups</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Incorporating migrant and refugee perspectives</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aligning business planning to reflect Taskforce vision</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maintain overview of government strategies to ensure goals and activities are complementary with our work</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Family violence research strategy</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Monitoring the level of family violence in New Zealand</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Horizontal learning</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Evaluate this programme of action</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Families Commission research programme</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>ACC research programme</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Review violence in media</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Using research to guide campaign strategy</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Campaign strategy</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Mass media campaign</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Nurturing leaders</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Building capacity of NGOs</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Community Action Fund</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Building knowledge – media advocacy etc</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41/42</td>
<td>Family violence death reviews</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Sharing information … promotes safety and wellbeing</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Family violence victims know what support and services are available</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Maximising safety factors when managing court rosters</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Increased thresholds for legal aid eligibility</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Begin a review of legal aid remuneration rates</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Improving information courts provide about legal aid</td>
<td>☒</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Task Description</td>
<td>Findings of this research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Testing fixed fees for legal aid</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Building safe and effective programmes for couples and families</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Build capacity of interpreters in courts</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Investigate introduction of advocates in courts</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Enhanced ability for courts to contact victims directly</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Review purchasing plans for programmes</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Improve process for prosecutions for non-attendance at programmes</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Establish four additional Family Violence Courts</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Family Violence Courts evaluation</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Forum to identify best practice for information exchange</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Enforcement of protection orders – police training, performance measures and policies</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Support and training for lawyers working in family violence-related areas</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Local Case Collaboration</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Govt investing $9 million over the next four years</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Developing new funding model</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Cost family violence and family support services</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Build on existing workforce and organisational development initiatives</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Continue to promote the use of integrated contracts</td>
<td>☺</td>
<td>☹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN1</td>
<td>Funding for prevention initiatives by existing family services</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN2</td>
<td>Monitor the impact of new initiatives on family violence organisations</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN3</td>
<td>Use information from NZFVC to identify where we need to build our knowledge and what prevention strategies work</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN4</td>
<td>Build on NZFVC to share good practice and new research</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN5</td>
<td>MSD will enable sharing of information specific to child victims and witnesses to family violence</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce’s ‘Traffic Light’ monitoring reports</th>
<th>Findings of this research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On schedule</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not progressing as scheduled</td>
<td>Completed but outside specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off track</td>
<td>Not completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.4 Reasons for Failure to Implement

*Research Question 3: Where the actions were not fully implemented in the specified timeframe was this because the strategy over-promised; the action was not adequately scoped and hence was assigned an unrealistic completion date; or there appears to have been some breakdown in the implementation process?*

Each of the 88 actions in the research sample was assigned a reason for implementation failure based on the information available (see Appendix 2). A summary of findings relating to the reasons implementation failed was provided in 3.12 in order to focus the analysis of evidence undertaken in Chapter 4. Hence this section should be read in conjunction with 3.12. A full evaluation would be required to identify the exact reasons that some actions were not fully implemented.

Table 5.1 showed that only 19 of the 88 actions in the sample were fully implemented within the timeframes specified in the strategy document. Table 5.4 shows that 94.5% of the 18 actions that were fully implemented outside the specified timeframe were late because unrealistic completion dates were specified in the strategies.

**Table 5.4: Reasons actions completed but outside timeframe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Over-promised</th>
<th>Unrealistic completion date</th>
<th>Breakdown in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total actions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 3.5 and 3.6, which summarised the findings of the Part One analysis (see 3.12), have been combined here into Table 5.5. This shows that 70% of the 51 actions were either not completed or had no action taken because of a breakdown in the implementation process.

**Table 5.5: Reasons for actions not being completed or having nothing done**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Over-promised</th>
<th>Unrealistic completion date</th>
<th>Breakdown in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total actions</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The inadequate scoping of an action, and hence its unrealistic completion date, is the result of a breakdown in the planning for implementation process (see 4.4). Hence by combining Table 5.4 and 5.5 we can see 87% of all actions that were not implemented in the specified timeframes were late because of a failure in the planning for implementation stage or during actual implementation.

5.5 Factors Impacting on Implementation

Research Question 4: What environmental, structural or process factors may be impacting positively or negatively on the implementation of these strategies?

A wide range of factors that impact on public sector implementation were examined in Chapter 4 in an attempt to find possible reasons for the implementation failures identified in Chapter 3 and summarised in this chapter.

Family violence issues interact in unpredictable ways; they are diverse and complex and are rooted in multiple causes. The family violence strategies are being planned and implemented in a fragmented public sector, in which multiple agencies from large public ministries to small non-government agencies all need to work together. The fact that family violence has a high political and public profile can both assist and hinder implementation activities.

The roots of many of the implementation problems appear to lie in the strategy process. The Taskforce programmes of action contain a random collection of new initiatives that do not necessarily link together into one overarching strategy or long-term plan. They are not supported by intervention logic, and hence there is no overall prioritisation of the actions; prerequisites and interdependencies are not articulated; actions are assigned unrealistic completion dates; and there are no immediate or intermediate outcomes.

Strategic policies are designed to be less structured, more ambiguous, more open to interpretation and hence more difficult to implement than operational policies. There is no interconnectedness between the high-level actions articulated at the strategy phase and the detailed planning for the implementation phase, and this has opened the way for misinterpretation. Actions do not appear to have been scoped prior to publication, and hence detailed steps and stages, milestones, required resources and timeframes are not identified prior to public undertakings being made. As a result, the implementation project managers are often left to cut their coat according to the cloth of available resources, and to do so in the specified timeframe rather than in the timeframe necessary to achieve the outcomes. There does not appear to be any standardised process for implementation plans to be formally approved, and hence implementation occurs without personnel having any confirmation that their approach is appropriate.

There is still a predominant single-agency implementation culture. Multi-agency implementation is appropriate for 75% of the Taskforce’s 2006/07 actions, but at least 66% are being implemented by only the lead agency. Working collaboratively between a number of
different agencies is more difficult, more time-consuming and requires more resources than implementing a new initiative within a single agency. To date the smaller government agencies, NGOs and expert advisers have not been resourced to enable them to participate appropriately. When NGOs have been involved in the planning and implementation activities, it has usually been too little, too late. This significantly reduces the likelihood that the outcomes will be appropriate for the target community. All relevant agencies and expert advisers need to be involved from the outset and at every step of the cycle.

The new public management model has created a separation between policy and service-delivery functions, resulting in poor understanding of whether implementation is in the policy or operational domain, or in neither. It is not widely recognised that implementation requires skilled and experienced personnel. Some public sector personnel may have experience in implementing the more traditional operational policies, but few have any experience in implementing strategic policies in a multi-agency environment.

Responsibility for implementing the family violence strategies has often been assigned to personnel who are poorly equipped to do the job and who are given little or no training, specific briefings or implementation support. Yet they are charged with networking between multiple agencies to bring about change, operating outside traditional organisational boundaries and without any line management authority over the parties they are working with. The personnel implementing the family violence actions have had little or no contact with one another, leaving them often feeling misunderstood, unsupported and with minimal peer support.

Government agencies have to juggle changing requirements of their Ministers, and operational providers have to constantly juggle the pressures of their day-to-day service activities with their involvement in strategy and implementation work. Even though family violence has a high priority in all the organisations involved, sometimes the implementation work has had to be reprioritised in favour of more pressing issues, thus causing slippage in timeframes.

The continuous improvement cycle of the government’s Managing for Outcomes (MfO) model of public management would provide an excellent framework for implementation of these strategies. However, a lot of work is needed before the family violence programme is operating in accordance with the MfO model. At present there is a form of strategy, little planning for implementation, a rather ad hoc approach to implementation itself, little or no evaluation and monitoring, and inadequate research and evidence functions. There are no formal mechanisms for looping back and forth between the different stages of the MfO cycle in order to ‘learn as we go’.

The Taskforce is a good model for the overall governance of the family violence programme, and it is certainly serving to keep the issue of family violence as a priority on everyone’s agenda. However, it is as though the Taskforce is in a hot air balloon, with only thin threads linking them to the reality of what is happening on the ground. The voices of the implementation managers, the service providers working at the coalface, the community and women, children, men and families who have experienced violence are not being heard.
There is little or no consultation with the wider sector when strategies are formed or during planning for implementation. As a result these workers may not feel any particular ownership of the changes being implemented.

There is minimal top-down flow of information and even less from the bottom up. There is insufficient infrastructure underneath the Taskforce to hold everything together. The secretariat is seen as part of the Ministry of Social Development and not acting equitably in the interests of all the agencies involved. Implementation managers and individual agencies feel disconnected from the Taskforce, and there is confusion over roles, responsibilities and reporting lines between the implementation workstreams and the Taskforce, with implementation managers often feeling they have multiple masters.

There is no mechanism to link the work of the Taskforce with major family violence initiatives and developments outside the umbrella of the Taskforce. The absence of such a mechanism raises the risk of fragmentation and gaps or overlaps in planning and service provision, and may jeopardise the accuracy of monitoring and evaluation activities.

The overall leadership, governance and coordination activities are inadequate to support all stages of the MfO cycle for addressing family violence. No one appears to have overall responsibility for implementation. There is no evidence of an overall implementation plan or Gantt chart to link all actions together and track prerequisites and interdependencies. The current implementation process appears to be more a case of the lead agencies ‘doing their own thing’ without reference to any others. There is no sign of any overall risk and issue management, nor any formal change management process. The scope and timeframes of many actions have been changed during implementation, but there is no indication of Taskforce approval of these modifications or Taskforce confirmation that outcomes will not be compromised by them. However, indications are that the secretariat is now initiating a formal variation process.

There appears to be a culture of lack of trust and a failure to share information. The high-level Taskforce monitoring reports may be satisfactory for the Taskforce and the Ministerial team, but the wider community need more detail – not just about the few high profile action areas that are progressing well, but about everything that is being done to bring about change. If we want ‘everyone to play a part’ and to ‘embrace the vision’ there must be more open sharing of information.

New Zealand’s State Services Commissioner, Dr Mark Prebble, has been at the forefront of public policy issues for much of his 32 years in the public service. In an interview with Nick Venter (Dominion Post, Saturday 1 March 2008, E3) he says:

If you are not working on the hardest issues facing the collective will of New Zealand, you’re not trying hard enough. But if you are working on those issues, of course you won’t always get it right. If the answer was obvious it wouldn’t be a public policy issue.

Some degree of failure is to be expected, and failure itself is not a bad thing as long as we learn from it and make changes. This thesis has found systemic failures at all levels of the family violence programme. The challenge now is to make every effort to rectify those failures.
so that we can ‘learn our way forward’. The next section has drawn from the analysis contained in Chapter 4 to propose a range of initiatives that would significantly improve the implementation outcomes for the family violence strategies.

5.6 Opportunities for Improvement

*Research Question 5: What changes could be made to improve the situation?*

Implementation is not just about achieving a series of outputs. Strategy plus activity does not automatically equate to outcome. A new focus is required to ensure the actions identified in the strategies and programmes of action are not only appropriately implemented but that they actually have the desired effect. There needs to be a concerted focus on outcomes at every step of the journey.

Improving implementation of the family violence actions will require improving all stages of the MfO cycle. Each stage is dependent upon the others, and thus the whole process is only as strong as the weakest link. Currently all links in the chain are weak. Planning for implementation is the weakest link but no individual part of the MfO cycle is strong enough to compensate for failures in any other part.

Making improvements is not about stopping the work currently being done and starting again; nor is it about taking random remedial actions to correct things, as that would only exacerbate the situation. What is needed is the continuation of the current programme but in a more effective way. Being more effective is about bedding down and building on what is already in place. It is about ‘learning our way forward’. Fully scoping the changes that need to occur will take time, focused effort, and consultation with all relevant parties. Planning for change would best be done by taking same approach as MfO: decide on the direction (the changes required); plan for implementation; implement the changes; evaluate the effectiveness of those changes; continue to gather evidence over time and make further modifications as required.

Theorists have long debated whether form should come before function or the other way around. In essence the two are inextricably linked. The functions or processes of any system are restricted without the appropriate form or structure and visa versa. The functions or processes dictate what form or structure is appropriate as well as what people and other resources are required.

Before any real improvements can be made family violence needs an overall governance, leadership and coordination structure that will glue all stages of the MfO cycle together and enable full participation and a sense of ownership by all relevant agencies. The following modified structure for the family violence programme appears to be most relevant (shown diagrammatically in Figure 5.1):

- the Taskforce transitions into a high-level body for consideration and sign-off to work done at other levels
- two new groups support the Taskforce: one focused on strategy and the other on implementation. All stages of the MfO cycle link via one or other of these groups, and all
matters going before the Taskforce first go through one of these groups. Each group is made up of a range of subject-matter experts and multi-agency representatives, and the working arrangements of each group are more open-door and the groups are able to consider the issues in more detail than is currently possible with just the Taskforce

- the strategy group keeps an ongoing strategy activity running in parallel and linked to the other stages.
- the implementation group links directly with the strategy group and visa versa
- the national multi-agency coordinating office and secretariat external to MSD are not bureaucratic control mechanisms but are responsible for facilitating, supporting, and networking between all parties:
  - ensuring visibility to the community sector and the public
  - providing a conduit for information flowing between agencies, between the community and the Taskforce (and other national groups), and from implementation personnel and lead agencies to the Taskforce and visa versa
  - being one central point that has its ‘finger on the pulse’ of everything happening in the family violence arena
  - coordinating and managing all implementation workstreams
  - linking review, evaluation, research and evidence functions to the Taskforce and to the wider sector
  - building close relationships, partnerships and linkages within New Zealand and overseas
  - providing secretariat, support and project functions for the Māori and Pacific reference groups, the strategy and implementation groups and the Taskforce
  - maintaining an overview of all family violence initiatives, including those outside the Taskforce Programme of Action, assisting in aligning business planning between multiple agencies and ensuring financial planning aligns with the family violence strategy and programmes of action
  - reporting upwards, sideways and downwards in open and transparent way

- the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (NZFVC) links closely into the national infrastructure or becomes part of the national coordination office. The work of the NZFVC is integral to the work of the strategy group

- Māori and Pacific reference groups, supported by personnel from within the national coordination office, work across the strategy and implementation groups to develop strategies for Māori and Pacific people, provide peer support and guidance to people working in the various multi-agency workstreams and ensure all evaluation, monitoring and research activities are appropriate for Māori and Pacific people

- independent evaluation functions are given a high priority, in particular post-implementation evaluations of the programmes of action as a whole and of many of the individual initiatives, and evaluating the impact of new initiatives on existing services. These are done independently to ensure objectivity and robustness of findings. Processes are in place for findings of these evaluations to inform changes to implementation processes and ongoing strategies and programmes of action

- the governance, roles, responsibilities and reporting arrangements for each action area are identified from the outset.
Figure: 5.1: Proposed modified structure for the family violence programme

Māori Reference Group and Pacific Reference Group

Family Violence Taskforce

Strategy group
Develop and manage an agenda for family violence research
Collect and collate information to inform ongoing strategies
Oversee research activities
Monitor family violence statistics
Share information up and down with community
Identify gaps in knowledge
Continue to review of new evidence from NZ and overseas
Propose new or modified strategies
Consider the findings of death reviews

National multi-agency coordination office
Secretariat
Functions listed above and in Chapter 4.8

Implementation group
Confirm immediate and intermediate outcome targets for each action area
Oversee all planning for implementation and implementation activities
Consider and approve detailed implementation plans
Oversee change management and risk and issues management of all implementation workstreams
Monitor implementation activities

Independent review and evaluation

Implementation workstreams
Scope each action area, including identifying key milestones, overall timeframes, resourcing requirements, likely risks and documenting that scoping work in an implementation project plan
Manage the multi-agency implementation networks
Establish and maintain linkages with other inter-dependent workstreams, with assistance of the national co-ordinating office as required
Update the implementation plan as required
Monitor progress and reporting upwards
Keep all internal and external stakeholders informed as implementation progresses
Link with operational providers to plan staged handover once implementation is complete

Community service providers
Women, children, men and families who have experienced violence
Once the functions and structures are confirmed, the personnel and other resource requirements can be accurately scoped. Key principles and considerations include:

- the need to balance between ‘top-down’ high level chief executive input and ‘bottom-up’ involvement from the community and service providers
- the need to ensure appropriately resourced multi-agency involvement at all levels
- accessibility, approachability and inclusiveness for all agencies and all personnel working in family violence
- an open, negotiated process for assigning lead agency status for each action
- ensuring capability and capacity to undertake implementation
- required resources are identified and approved before implementation is started
- acknowledging that implementing strategic policies is more challenging than implementing operational policies and requires specific skills and expertise
- training and peer support may be required for implementation personnel
- the national coordination office could be staffed fully or partly by secondments from agencies to further enhance multi-agency involvement at all levels.

It would be worthwhile considering establishing an independent watchdog group to provide ongoing oversight to the government and non-government’s performance in planning and implementing new family violence initiatives and in particular monitor progress against international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Perhaps UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) or the National Council of Women could be jointly contracted to take on this role. An independent watch-dog group would form part of the programme’s independent evaluation; ensure ongoing objectivity and transparency of the family violence programme; enable women, children, men and families who have experienced violence and the community to have an independent voice; and provide an important component for ‘learning our way forward’. The group would potentially meet with the Strategy and Implementation groups once a year and prepare a report identifying areas of concern. The Mental Health Commission and the Cancer Control Council both have similar roles in that they monitor progress with implementation of the Mental Health Blueprint and the Cancer Control strategies respectively and report areas of concern to the relevant ministers. There was also an independent evaluation group working alongside the Taskforce that planned and implemented changes recommended in Judge Cartwright’s report of the Inquiry into the Treatment of Cervical Cancer at National Women’s Hospital (1988).

The family violence programme currently has no consumer input. Over the past 20 years consumer involvement has become an integral part of policy, strategy and service development in most countries. Until now women, children, men and families who have experienced violence have largely been a silent group. Family violence has traditionally drawn its ‘consumer voice’ from front-line workers who may or may not have experienced family violence themselves. This creates a conflict of interests when someone tries to represent
service providers and service users at the same time. Consideration needs to be given to how the ‘bottom-up’ input required at all stages of the process can include input from women, children, men and families who have experienced violence.

The government’s MfO approach to public management provides an excellent framework for issues such as family violence that requires a long term horizon and sustained and co-ordinated effort over a number of years from all sectors of society. The implementation phase of the MfO model is as yet not fully developed, but there may be an opportunity for the family violence programme to work with the State Services Commission to further develop the MfO model, thus benefiting others who will in future also face the challenging task of planning, implementing and reviewing strategic policies for complex social problems.

All those involved in the family violence sector will benefit if improvements are made to the national programme of family violence strategy, implementation and evaluation. But there are also opportunities for the whole public sector to ‘learn its way forward’ as a result.
6. Overall Conclusions

If words and good intentions alone could reduce family violence, we would be half way there. Over the last eighteen years there have been countless formal groups, meetings and conferences, and even more written strategies, investigations, research reports, and surveys. Yet despite the plethora of documents, a strong legislative framework and the efforts of many dedicated groups and individuals, real improvements seem to remain illusive.

Over 50% of all actions from the last three family violence strategies have not been fully implemented within six months of the completion date stated in the strategy.

This research has shown that implementing strategic policies is difficult. Addressing complex social problems that are rooted in multiple causes is difficult. Implementing changes in a fragmented public sector involving multiple agencies is difficult. If similar research were undertaken on other government strategies, similar failure rates would be likely. The New Zealand public sector has historically focused on a single-agency model of implementing operational policies. Implementing complex strategic policies in a multi-agency environment has required the public sector to venture into new territory. It is as though the techniques and approaches that are being used are simply not developed enough for this new territory.

When strategies fail to be implemented, it is easy to blame the implementers. But successful implementation is dependent upon other factors. Unless all the stages of the continuous cycle of strategy, implementation and evaluation are operating effectively, and all linked with one another, we will continue to fall short of the mark.

A range of likely reasons for these failures has been identified in this thesis, together with a range of suggested improvements. The devil is in the detail, but with attention to the detail, new techniques and approaches, more robust structures and processes, and skilled and experienced personnel, we can learn our way forward and we can make a real difference. It will require money and it will require taking risks.

The current administration is to be commended for their efforts over recent years. Family violence now has a high public and political profile. We have come a long way and to reduce our efforts would be tragic. We must not repeat the patterns of the past. We must not go back to the beginning while yet another group considers what needs to be done. We must learn as we go, we must continue to move forward, and we must all remain committed for the long term. And above all we must all do whatever we can to keep our families/whānau free from violence.
### Appendix 1 - Timeline of Family Violence Prevention Initiatives in New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Guardianship Act 1968 passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare (DSW) formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>First women’s refuge opened in Christchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>First rape crisis group established in Auckland Children and Young Persons Act 1974 passed (repealed 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Establishment of halfway house refuge in Auckland and Wellington Rape Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Dunedin women’s refuge opened Inter-departmental committee on child abuse (Departments of Health, Social Welfare, Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11 new women’s refuges established First Parentline groups established in Auckland and Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>First national gathering of women’s refuges International Year of the Child New Zealand Committee for Children established (Department of Social Welfare 1984) National Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Child Abuse established First national gathering on child abuse held in Dunedin International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by UN General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges established National Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Child Abuse established by the Minister of Social Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Domestic Protection Act For Men Support begins in West Auckland – first group working with male abusers First national symposium on child abuse prevention, held in Palmerston North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Publication of <em>A Socio-economic Assessment of Women’s Refuges</em> DSW establishes women’s refuge funding programme New Zealand Child Abuse Prevention Service established – association of local Parent Line/Parent Help groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>First national gathering of men’s anger management groups DSW establishes funding for rape and sexual abuse services Rape Crisis groups move to form a national collective Pacific Island Women’s Project established, focusing on rape and sexual abuse of Pacific Island women Whakamaru Tinana formed – Māori women’s self-defence groups New Zealand Government ratifies UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 100 Families Commission Kōmihana ā Whānau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Refuge responds to need for culturally appropriate services with establishment of Māori women’s refuges, and implements a bicultural organisational model National Collective of Rape Crisis and Related Groups of Aotearoa formed Te Kākano o Te Whānau national organisation established Police research into domestic violence undertaken Family Violence Prevention Coordinating Committee (FVPCC) formed <em>Puao-Te-Ata-Tu</em> published (Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 1987 | Mental Health Foundation conference on family violence  
Victims of Offences Act passed  
Victims Task Force set up for five-year period  
Police Family Violence Policy adopted  
Review of the Children and Young Persons Bill (Department of Social Welfare 1987)  
Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Violence (Roper Report)  
Launch of Keeping Ourselves Safe Programme for primary schools (developed by the Police’s Law-Related Education Programme)  
FVPCC Statement on Family Violence issued; Tükino Tangata (Māori caucus) established  
Hutt Family Violence Network established – first community-based inter-agency co-ordinating body |
| 1988 | Men of Aotearoa formed – a national grouping of men’s groups working in the family violence area  
Telethon on violence prevention held, managed by the Home & Neighbourhood Trust  
Attitudes to Family Violence: A Study Across Cultures published (Synergy Applied Research & FVPCC 1988)  
Reach Out public education campaign launched, co-ordinated by FVPCC |
| 1989 | Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989  
Office of the Commissioner for Children established  
Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly |
| 1991 | Men for Non Violence Network established (based on Men of Aotearoa)  
Te Rūnanga Tāne established (Māori men’s network)  
FVPCC conference, Family Violence: Prevention in the 1990s, held in Christchurch  
Hamilton Abuse Intervention Pilot Project launched  
UN adopts Principles for Older Persons |
| 1992 | NCWR study of children in Refuge, Treasure the Child, published  
Crime Prevention Action Group established by government to develop a national strategy for crime prevention  
Victims Task Force published an abridged version of a report on protection orders, Protection from Family Violence  
Child abuse guidelines for health services published by the Department of Health  
Waitakere Anti Violence Essential Services (WAVES) formed – co-ordination of local response to family violence in West Auckland  
Domestic Violence Education Intervention Project (DOVE) opened in Hawke’s Bay, based on HAIPP model |
| 1993 | Police Family Violence Policy re-emphasised in Police Strategic Plan. Guidelines reissued  
Crime Prevention Unit established in the Prime Minister’s Department  
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child ratified  
UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women adopted; welcomed by New Zealand Government  
| 1994 | New Zealand Economic Cost of Family Violence published (Snively 1994)  
Launch of nation-wide campaign lead by Police “family violence is a crime”  
New Zealand Crime Prevention Strategy launched  
Family Violence Advisory Committee established by Minister of Social Welfare  
Report of inquiry into Family Court proceedings involving Christine Madeline Bristol and Alan Robert Bristol (Davison, Department of Justice 1994)  
Once were warriors movie  
Not Just a Domestic documentary airs on national television |
| 1995 | Domestic Violence Act 1995 passed  
Guardianship Amendment Act 1995 introduced a presumption that violent parents should not have unsupervised access to their children  
Beijing Platform for Action  
Men for Non-Violence changes to Te Kupenga Whakaoti Mahi Patunga/National Network of Stopping Violence Services, becomes a co-gendered and bicultural organisation and commits to a focus on women’s and children’s safety |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</table>
| 1996 | *New Zealand Government Statement of Policy on Family Violence* released (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 1996)  
Good Practice Guidelines for Coordination of Family Violence Services published (Department of Social Welfare, Family Violence Unit 1996)  
The Economic Cost of NCWIR Refuge Services published (Snively 1996)  
Revised Police family violence policy adopted  
Hitting Home survey published (Leibrich, Paulin and Ransom 1995)  
Crime Prevention Package (Budget 1996)  
Ministry of Health Guidelines for the Development of Practice Protocols  
MSP: Family Violence Unit, established  
Picking up the Pieces documentary airs on national television |
First national survey of crime victims published (Young, Morris, Cameron and Haslett 1997)  
DSW led Strengthening Families strategy approved by Cabinet  
Māori Family Violence in Aotearoa published (Balzer, Haimona, Henare and Matchitt 1997)  
New Zealand Police, National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges and CYPFA meet to develop interagency response to family violence and joint training initiative  
Ministry of Justice Responses to Crime strategy agreed by Cabinet |
*Family Violence: Guidelines for Health Sector Providers to Develop Practice Protocols* published (Ministry of Health 1998)  
Shakti Asian Women’s Support Group establish the first ever refuge/safehouse for Asian/ethnic women in New Zealand  
| 1999 | *Protecting Women and Children: An Interagency Response to Family Violence* training kit jointly developed by New Zealand Police, National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges and CYPFA. Joint-agency training of Police, social workers and community advocates is undertaken around the country  
Māori Provider Development Fund established, administered by Te Puni Kökiri  
Te Puni Kökiri to develop Family Violence Strategic Agenda for Iwi/Māori  
Family Violence Focus Group co-convened by the Ministry of Social Policy and Crime Prevention Unit, comprising representatives from both government and non-government sectors. The focus group worked on developing a strategic plan for family violence  
Children and Family Violence: Effective Interventions Now conference  
Family Violence Unit disbanded  
The domestic violence legislation and child access in New Zealand report |
*Family Violence: The Health Care Response; Bibliography* published (Elvidge 2000)  
New Zealand Health Strategy launched (Ministry of Health 2000)  
*If I really loved him enough, he would be okay: Women's accounts of male partner violence* (Towns and Adams 2000) |
Family Violence Strategic Agenda for Māori report published (Te Puni Kökiri 2001)  
Child Abuse Prevention Service New Zealand establishes a national office in Wellington |
| 2002 | *Free from abuse* published (Hand et al 2002)  
*Family Violence Intervention Guidelines* published (Fanslow 2002)  
*Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy* released (Ministry of Social Development 2002)  
Te Rito Advisory Group established involving government and non-government agencies in overseeing the 18 Areas of Action for preventing family violence in Aotearoa New Zealand  
Victim’s Rights Act 2002  
WHO publishes *World Report on Violence and Health* (WHO 2002) |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Care and Protection Blueprint published (Ministry of Social Development 2003)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second Shakti Safehouse/refuge opened</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children’s Commissioner Act 2003 passed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families Commission Act 2003 passed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work and Income New Zealand Family Violence Intervention Programme piloted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Women’s Refuge website launched <a href="http://www.womensrefuge.org.nz">www.womensrefuge.org.nz</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Transforming Whānau Violence published (Kruger 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families Commission established 1 July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families and Community Services, MSD established to co-ordinate and implement Work and Income</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Family Violence Intervention Programme</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 report released by the National Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Independent Women’s Refuges</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Open Hearing, New Zealand Parliamentarians Population Development</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family Violence Ministerial Group formed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Opportunities for All New Zealanders identifies family violence as area for priority action by the Government over the next 3-5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Violence and Harassment Legal Education Kit published (Legal Services Agency 2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beyond Zero Tolerance: Key issues and future directions for family violence work in New Zealand. research report 3/05 A report for the Families Commission (Fanslow)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White Ribbon Day (men opposing violence against women) is launched in New Zealand by UNIFEM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family Safety Teams pilot launched</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The First Report of the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand Standard NZS 8006:2006 Screening, risk assessment and intervention for family violence including child abuse and neglect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Creating a culture of non-violence. The report from the New Zealand Parliamentarians’ Group on Population and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family Violence Interagency Response System established as a collaboration between Police, Child Youth and Family, Women’s Refuge and other domestic violence agencies to respond to domestic violence incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of four new specialist Family Violence Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New national network of sexual violence agencies established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Repeal of Section 59 of Crimes Act (outlawing physical punishment of children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The scale and nature of family violence in New Zealand” A review and evaluation of knowledge. Ministry of Social Development (Lievore and Mayhew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Launch of national social marketing Campaign for Action on Family Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Living at the Cutting Edge: Women’s Experiences of Protection Orders University of Waikato (Robertson, Busch, D'Souza, Lam Sheung, Anand, Balzer, Simpson and Paina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual Violence Taskforce established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The Ongoing Programme of Action for the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>released in February 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family violence Intervention Guidelines for Elder abuse and neglect (Ministry of Health)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information from Fanslow (2005). Activities before 1993 in Fanslow’s table were identified by the Family Violence Unit, Ministry of Social Policy. Information for 2005–8 and some activities prior to 2005 have been added by the writer.
## National Leadership and Coordination of Strategy Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito</th>
<th>Establish a mechanism to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Action 1** | o promote a high level cross-sector commitment to and consistency in family violence prevention  
o monitor the implementation and progress of the New Zealand Family Violence prevention strategy |
| **Specified timeframe June 2002** | |
| **Status** | Completed in specified timeframe  
Completed but outside timeframe  
Not completed  
No action taken | |
| **Evidence** | Te Rito appears to have monitored progress well and reported extensively on what was being done. However indications are that Te Rito reporting was selective, reporting on areas where action was being taken and remaining silent on what wasn't being done.  
Te Rito promoted a high level of cross-sector commitment but this didn't necessarily produce action in some sectors of government |
| **Reasons for failure to implement** | n/a |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce</th>
<th>Develop the next programme of action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Action 1** | Ensure Taskforce actions are relevant and effective for all of New Zealand's families, whānau and communities  
Taskforce to review its role and advise the Government on, future leadership and collaboration arrangements, the implementation of its first Programme of Action and what further action is needed to end family violence  
Report on its achievements in the delivery of its Programme of Action  
We will continue to advise the Government on further actions needed to end family violence and on ways to encourage and support local, regional and national leadership on this critical issue |
| **Specified timeframe June 2007** | |
| **Status** | Completed in specified timeframe  
Completed but outside timeframe  
Not completed  
No action taken | |
| **Evidence** | The actions in the Taskforce's First report can not be seen collectively as the answer to 'ending family violence'. Rather they are a compilation of activities occurring in government agencies on FV initiatives (refer Chapters 3 and 4). The Taskforce's Ongoing Programme of Action was publicly released on 14th February 2008. This report sets out the Taskforce's Ongoing Programme of Action and includes actions due to be completed by July 2008. However, by the time it was released seven and a half months of the 2007/08 year has already passed. There is no mention of whether any other programmes of action will be released for out years and if so, when. The Ongoing Programme of Action is similar to the Taskforce's First Report in that it contains a range of actions that don't necessarily appear to link together to collectively constitute 'what further action is needed to end family violence'. It is assumed that an overall strategy containing the total package of all actions that would be needed to end family violence has not been done and hence it is assumed that the Taskforce has not advised Government on 'what further action is needed to end family violence'.  
It would not be possible to say whether Taskforce actions are ‘relevant and effective’ without an independent evaluation. In order to ascertain whether the Taskforce advised the Government on future leadership and collaboration arrangements it would be necessary to see the 2007/08 report to Cabinet. |
| **Reasons for failure to implement** | Strategy over-promised |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce</th>
<th>We will oversee and monitor the implementation of our programme of action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Status** | Completed in specified timeframe  
Completed but outside timeframe  
Not completed  
No action taken | |
| **Evidence** | The Taskforce monitoring reports are high level summary form only and do not of their own really constitute ‘monitoring of our programme of action’. There have been no Taskforce monitoring reports released since October 2007. It is possible that the Taskforce has access to much more detailed information to ‘oversee and monitor the implementation’ but as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 of this report there are a number of examples where what is being reported isn’t accurately reflecting the real status of implementation. This would indicate that the overseeing and monitoring isn’t robust enough to warrant ‘fully achieved’ status for this action. |
| **Reasons for failure to implement** | Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date |
### Multi-Agency Co-ordination Collaboration and Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 14</th>
<th>Address identified barriers to inter-agency co-ordination, collaboration and communication at all levels; and continue to establish and/or promote protocols, guidelines and systems between relevant agencies and service providers nationally, regionally and locally for information sharing and co-ordination of services. As part of this work: 2. Relevant legislation, particularly the operation of the Privacy Act 1993 and Public Finance Act 1989 on inter-agency co-ordination, collaboration and communication 3. Existing funding, contracting, reporting and compliance models on cross-sectoral coordination, collaboration and communication, with the aim of streamlining the funding and contracting processes: and 4. Existing systems, including information technology and data matching, on inter-agency co-ordination, collaboration and communication.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2004 and June 2006</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>This action area contained three detailed sub-action areas. Evidence to hand indicates that some initiatives were taken to address these but this never resulted in all sub-actions being fully achieved. One successful initiative under this action area was the Community Collaborative Initiatives Fund (NZFVC 2007). Funding was approved in Budget 2003 for $5.840m over four years, to establish a contestable fund for community-based collaborative initiatives to prevent family violence and to undertake a four-year evaluation programme. There are 30 funded collaborative networks throughout New Zealand undertaking projects on collaboration, education and awareness and training. The work done through the Family Violence Funding Circuit Breaker project (MSD) also contributed to this action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Blueprint Action 3

Establish mechanisms to ensure the views of children, young people and their families are incorporated into the planning and provision of care and protection services, including implementation of the Blueprint.  

**Specified timeframe June 2003**

| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement |
| Evidence | The last Blueprint update Care and Protection Final Update (MSD 2005) states ‘a web-based toolkit has been produced to encourage service providers to incorporate the views of children, young people and families into the development and design of care and protection services.’ This has been assigned only partial implementation because the development of a toolkit is not seen as satisfactory to ‘ensure the views of children young people and their families are incorporated’. The toolkit will help those planning and providing services to obtain these views if they choose, but that is somewhat removed from ‘ensuring those views are incorporated’ as the action states. |

### Blueprint Action 6

Develop strategies to address barriers to interagency co-ordination, collaboration and communication at all levels, and promote information sharing and co-ordination of services between agencies in the care and protection community.  

**Specified timeframe June 2004**

| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement |
| Evidence | The Blueprint Investment Strategy and the High and Complex Needs unit in MSD both provided mechanisms for inter-agency co-ordination, collaboration and communication. Indications from the evidence available are that no specific ‘strategies and systems’ were ever developed. The fact that Child Youth and Family Services are still working on information sharing under the Taskforce action area 58 indicates this Blueprint action has never been fully resolved. There are also indications are that there has been more inter-agency coordination, collaboration and communication between government agencies and less with non-government agencies. |

**Linked via Te Rito Action 14**
| Taskforce Action 9 | Work with [government agencies] on aligning their business planning with our vision and programme of action.  
Specified timeframe June 2007 |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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</table>
| **Evidence**     | The action statement indicates all [relevant] government agencies but the Taskforce monitoring reports indicate the intention is just those agencies on Taskforce – no indication of how the Taskforce agencies eg Health will ensure this requirement is reflected in Statements of Intent (SOIs) and business planning of other government health agencies eg the 21 District Health Boards. It is important that all these wider operational arms of government are also aligned not just the big central agencies. Family violence was a key deliverable for DHBs prior to 2007 but last year was not included as one of their top priorities.  
The Taskforce monitoring reports (April, June, August 2007) state ‘Taskforce work is reflected in the SOIs of all Govt. agencies on the Taskforce’  
Examination of the SOIs of the Govt. agencies represented on the Taskforce shows a wide variety of how each agency has done this. For example MSD and the Families Commission have both provided extensive detail in their SOIs regarding their family violence work.  
In contrast the only mention of family violence in the ACC and Office of Children’s Commissioner Statements of Intent appears to be respectively:  
o “ACC is a member of the inter-agency Taskforce, which is responsible for leading cross-sector work to prevent family violence in New Zealand”.  
o “Family violence, in particular, places too many children at risk of sustaining physical and mental damage that will reduce their opportunities to live full, happy and productive lives. There is strong inter-sectoral commitment to early intervention to promote best outcomes for all children, and implementing effective strategies to address family violence”  
It is unclear whether ‘business planning in action’ should be more than aligning SOIs but Taskforce reporting has been limited to SOIs. |

| Taskforce Action 12 | Maintain an overview of [Working for Families, the Early Years approach, and improvements to the child protection system] and other government strategies, to ensure their goals and activities are complementary with our work.  
Specified timeframe June 2007 |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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</table>
| **Evidence**     | It appears from the Taskforce monitoring reports that this action is being addressed by communicating Taskforce priorities to government agencies leading work and strategies that contribute to family violence prevention and having presentations on relevant government work/strategies as required.  
There is insufficient evidence to reach a conclusion with certainty but indications are that there is no formal mechanism to ensure the strategies of other government agencies (for example DHBs) are known to the Taskforce and no mechanism to ensure the goals and activities of these broader government sector agencies are aligned to the Taskforce. |

| Taskforce 2006 NN 5 | The MSD will enable appropriate sharing of information specific to child victims and witnesses to family violence (jointly with Police)  
Specified timeframe June 2007 |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>It is not clear whether this action relating to information sharing has been included as part of another action area. Possibilities would include: Action 22b ‘Child Witness’ pilot evaluated by ACC; Te Rito Action 17, the Child Advocacy project; Taskforce Action 71, the Family Violence Interagency Response System; Taskforce Action 43, legislative changes to better enable agencies to share information; or Taskforce Action 58 relating to information-sharing. As it is not being reported as an action in the Taskforce monitoring reports, there was no way to determine whether it has been picked up for implementation by either of these workstreams or whether no action is being taken on this issue.</td>
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121
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 71</th>
<th>Develop a new nationwide scheme to better support children affected by family violence and build stronger links between government and non-government agencies in communities. Establish a nationwide scheme to build stronger, more effective, working relationships between Police, CYFS and other government and non-government organisations in communities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe</strong></td>
<td><strong>Roll out to begin Sept 2006</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>In the Taskforce’s First Report this is the sole action under the chapter ‘Local Case Coordination’. The programme that has been developed is called the ‘Family Violence Interagency Response System’. This collaborative case management approach is seen by interviewees as one of the most effectively implemented Taskforce actions and is an excellent example of multi-agency approach being used successfully for all aspects of planning, development and implementation. This programme is being implemented across all districts in New Zealand and an implementation support team has been set up to assist. The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says ‘Anecdotal evidence from sites indicates that this approach is having positive effects.’ External contractors have been engaged to carry out an evaluation of this initiative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Strategies for Māori, Pacific and New Migrants

### Māori Strategies

| Te Rito Action 2 | Establish a process for monitoring policy and service development across all relevant agencies to ensure that Māori perspectives and approaches to family violence prevention and early intervention and prevention are given a high priority that is also reflected in existing funding and contracting arrangements. As part of this work, review existing funding and contracting arrangements in order to: a) reconcile cross-sectoral funding for provision of co-ordinated services, by Māori for Māori, that address the wide-ranging effects of violence in whānau, hapu and iwi and b) ensure that evaluation of family violence prevention services and programmes is given priority. Specified timeframe June 2003 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement |
| Evidence | There are conflicting views over whether this action was ever done. A decision was apparently made to drive this action from within mainstream initiatives and thus there was never a specific process established for "monitoring policy and service development…." An official paper dated 26 August 2006, provided as part of an OIA request however states “Prioritise Māori-based approaches, early intervention and prevention and evaluation was completed in 2004.” No evidence was found that any formal ‘process for monitoring policy and service development’ was ever established or that such monitoring was actually done via the mainstream initiatives to ensure Māori perspectives and approaches are given high priority. Information gathered during interviews suggests that the initial report was completed in October 2003 but further work did not happen on this action after 2003. |
| Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce |

| Te Rito Action 5 | Develop and implement a specific plan of action for preventing violence in Māori communities, based on consultation with whānau, hapu and iwi. Specified timeframe June 2003 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement |
| Evidence | $4.5m of government funding was provided (from May 2004 to May 2006) for this initiative and there was some good work done under this workstream (Project Mauriora). However the actions taken have only partially completed this overall action. A report entitled ‘Whānau Violence – A Māori Conceptual Framework’ was published in September 2002. The former Associate Minister of Māori Affairs (Social Development) accepted the recommendations of this 2002 report. A second edition entitled Transforming Whānau Violence – A Conceptual Framework report was published in September 2004. |
| Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce |

| Te Rito Action 15 | Continue to monitor and implement Māori capacity building projects. Investigate options and make recommendations for providing assistance, for making funding applications and administering contract compliance requirements to Māori service providers. Specified timeframe June 2006 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement |
| Evidence | No specific project was undertaken against this action area. Rather this was linked to a number of other on-going government initiatives. Indications are that it was not well coordinated and was never fully addressed. Hence more action is still needed. |
| Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce |
### Blueprint Action 1

**Develop a strategy to ensure that Māori have a significant leadership role at all levels in the planning and provision of care and protection services**

**Specified timeframe June 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>Two consultation hui were held with Māori working in the care and protection sector. The Blueprint Steering Group subsequently agreed that the intention behind this action area needed to be woven into all work underway to address family violence and child abuse and neglect. Key linkages were made with relevant Te Rito actions. There is no evidence of and specific strategy being developed or further follow up under the Blueprint to ensure that ‘Māori have a significant leadership role at all levels in the planning and provision of care and protection services’</td>
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- **Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce**

### Taskforce Action 7

**We will draw on the advice of Māori Advisory Group to ensure:**

- Māori perspectives are taken into account
- Robust processes of consultation and inclusion

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>It is now nearly 10 years since Te Rito and Blueprint first started looking into required strategies for Māori and still there is no evidence of an overall ongoing strategy for addressing family violence for Māori. There is also no evidence that the Te Rito actions (that were developed through nation-wide consultation) and Blueprint actions that were not implemented (or only partially implemented) have flowed through to be addressed at Taskforce level. The available data indicate that Māori are overrepresented as both victims and perpetrators of violence in families/whānau No evidence was found that the Government’s commitments under the Treaty of Waitangi coupled with the disproportionately high family violence statistics for Māori resulted in any Taskforce initiatives specifically focused and designed to have maximum benefit for Māori in the 2006/07 Programme of Action. The Taskforce monitoring reports say this will be addressed as part of the process to prepare the 2007/2008 Programme of Action (contained in the Ongoing Programme of Action 2007) but evidence gathered as part of the research for this thesis indicates that any consultation undertaken in 2006/07 was inadequate to ensure Māori perspectives of family violence are taken into account in all areas of the Programme of Action. The Ongoing Programme of Action (published 2007 but released 15th February 2008) says by June 2008 the Taskforce will ‘develop a Māori Programme of Action’. In light of the series of actions from Te Rito, the Blueprint and the Taskforce’s First Report, this new action both confirms this has not been satisfactorily implemented under previous action areas. The new Māori Programme of Action being developed by June 2008 needs to build on the work of Project Mauriora and Amokura and the other Te Rito and Blueprint action areas to ensure consistency and ongoing improvements in Māori family violence. Members of the Māori Reference Group appear to be pleased that there is a structure in place for Māori reps to interact at CEO level. There are some conflicting views around whether the Māori Reference Group has the required capacity, funding and resources to develop a plan of action specifically focused on Māori family violence.</td>
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- **Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce**
### Pacific Strategies

#### Te Rito Action 6
Develop draft strategic directions for preventing and/or reducing violence in Pacific Communities, based on the outcomes of consultations with pacific communities and conduct a nation-wide fono for Pacific peoples to come together and discuss and identify a way forward

**Specified timeframe June 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Evidence supports the fact that this action was completed. It has been assigned ‘completed in specified timeframe’ although evidence was not able to be obtained as to exactly when this work was completed. There are also indications that only two of the five actions under this strategy were funded. $1.79million of funding was provided over three years but implementation was only done in four regions (between 2005 and 2007) and funding ended in 2007. It is understood that on-going funding of this action area was being sought after June 2007.</td>
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<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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<td>Not completed</td>
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<td>No action taken</td>
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**Reasons for failure to implement n/a**

#### Te Rito Action 15
Continue to monitor and implement Pacific capacity building projects. Investigate options and make recommendations for providing assistance, for making funding applications and administering contract compliance requirements to Pacific service providers

**Specified timeframe June 2006**

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<th>Status</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td>No action taken</td>
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**Reasons for failure to implement Breakdown in implementation process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No specific project was undertaken against this action area. Rather this was linked to a number of other on-going government initiatives. Indications are that it was not well coordinated and was never fully addressed. Hence more action is still needed.</td>
<td>Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce</td>
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</table>

#### Blueprint Action 2
Establish mechanisms to ensure the views of Pacific peoples and other ethnic communities are incorporated into the planning and provision of care and protection services, including the implementation of the Blueprint.

**Specified timeframe June 2003**

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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>No action taken</td>
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**Reasons for failure to implement Breakdown in implementation process**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This action was not completed under the Blueprint workstream and was integrated into the Pacific strand of Te Rito and subsequently the Taskforce.</td>
<td>Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Taskforce Action 7
We will draw on the advice of Pacific Advisory Group to ensure:
- Pacific perspectives are taken into account
- Robust processes of consultation and inclusion

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tr>
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**Reasons for failure to implement Breakdown in implementation process**

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<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taskforce updates say this will be addressed as part of the process to prepare the Ongoing Programme of Action (contained in the Ongoing Programme of Action 2007) but evidence gathered as part of this research indicates that any consultation undertaken to date as been inadequate to ensure Pacific perspectives of family violence are taken into account in all areas of the Programme of Action. Evidence gathered from interviews suggests an advisory group of its own may not be the best vehicle for advancing the issue of Pacific family violence. There was no specific Taskforce workstream in 2006/07 for preventing violence within Pacific communities. The Ongoing Programme of Action released in February 2008 says the Taskforce will ‘develop a Pacific Programme of Action’ by June 2008. This confirms this has not been satisfactorily implemented under previous action areas. The new Pacific Programme of Action needs to build on work done under the Te Rito and Blueprint action areas to ensure consistency and ongoing improvements in Pacific family violence.</td>
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### Other Ethnicities/New Migrants

| Te Rito Action 15 | Investigate options and make recommendations  
|                  | 1. for providing assistance, for making funding applications and administering contract compliance requirements to other ethnic service providers; and  
|                  | 2. for building the capacity of other ethnic providers to deliver services to their communities.  
| Specified timeframe June 2006 |  

| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement  
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>No specific project was undertaken against this action area. Rather this was linked to a number of other on-going government initiatives. Indications are that it was not well coordinated and was never fully addressed. Hence more action is still needed.</td>
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**Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce**

| Taskforce Action 8 | Make sure migrant and refugee perspectives are taken account of in our work and that what we do is effective for these groups  
|                   | Specified timeframe June 2007  

| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken | Reasons for failure to implement  
|--------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------------------|  
| Evidence | A migrant and refugee perspective paper was circulated to Taskforce members in September 2006 copy of this was requested under OIA but rejected  

The Taskforce monitoring reports (April and June 2007) states "the broad-based consultative approach to developing the 2007/2008 POA [Programme of Action] will ensure that migrant and refugee perspectives are included". Indications are that at best consultation with agencies and individuals working with migrant and refugee family violence has been very limited |  

| 126 |
| Te Rito Action 8a | Continue to develop a series of information papers which are evidence-based and inform the general public on the definition of family violence, the level and nature of family violence in New Zealand, the underlying causes of family violence and what works to prevent family violence |
| Specified timeframe Dec 2002 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken |
| Reasons for failure to implement | Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date |
| Evidence | The New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (NZFVC) was established under this workstream. It started operating in Mid 2005, considerably behind the Dec 2002 target. $2.1m was allocated in 2003 budget over 4 years. This was used to fund the NZFVC and for action 8c (below) but the balance got consumed by other MSD initiatives |

| Te Rito Action 8d | Collate and disseminate information on the potential effects of violence portrayed in the media, with a particular emphasis on the effects on children |
| Specified timeframe June 2006 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken |
| Reasons for failure to implement | Breakdown in implementation process |
| Evidence | This action was not completed under Te Rito. It was subsequently picked up under the work of the Taskforce and is being reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports as Action 23 although it doesn’t arise from the Taskforce’s First Report |

Work continuing under the Taskforce. Being reported as Action 23

| Te Rito Action 8e | Update an agenda for family violence research, which specifically includes an indigenous component |
| Specified timeframe June 2006 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken |
| Reasons for failure to implement | Breakdown in implementation process |
| Evidence | There was some work done on this action under Te Rito but it was not completed and was then transferred the Taskforce (refer Taskforce action 13 below). Note however, that the requirement of the Te Rito action for the agenda for research to specifically include an indigenous component does not appear in the similar Taskforce action. |

Links to Taskforce Action 13a

| Taskforce Action 13a | Develop a cross-sectoral strategy in collaboration with CSRE (MSD). Put in place measures that set the strategic direction of research into family violence prevention |
| Specified timeframe June 2007 |
| Status | Completed in specified timeframe | Completed but outside timeframe | Not completed | No action taken |
| Reasons for failure to implement | Breakdown in implementation process |
| Evidence | This was not done by the specified date of June 2007. indications are that a new two staged process has now been proposed with new dates assigned. It is understood a framework for the research strategy will be developed but by June 2007 only the process for doing this had been drafted. |
**Taskforce Action13b**
Put in place measures that: coordinate research and evaluation

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<th>Specified timeframe June 2007</th>
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<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not completed</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
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**Reasons for failure to implement**
Breakdown in implementation process

**Evidence**
No evidence was found that this sub-action has been addressed.

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**Taskforce Action13c**
Put in place measures that: address the gaps in our knowledge of family violence in New Zealand

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<th>Status</th>
<th>Specified timeframe June 2007</th>
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<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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<td>Not completed</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
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**Reasons for failure to implement**
Strategy over-promised

**Evidence**
NZFVC was contracted to do an initial gap analysis. Indications are that MSD was to have then done the work required to put coordination measures in place but no evidence could be found that this has been done hence the action remains only partially completed.

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**Taskforce Action21a**
The Families Commission work [research] to measure the level of family violence in New Zealand accurately
(Improving family violence surveillance data)

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<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not completed</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasons for failure to implement**
Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date

**Evidence**
This work has taken longer than expected. Now targeted for completion late 2007 and publication early 2008. This work is a statistical compilation of current data. Different agencies have different data sets and different ways of measuring family violence. This work will form a baseline for ongoing monitoring (action 14)

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**Taskforce Action21b**
The Families Commission work [research] on elder abuse prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Specified timeframe June 2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not completed</td>
<td>No action taken</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reasons for failure to implement**
Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date

**Evidence**
The commissioned research on elder abuse was released early 2008 and makes recommendations regarding policy, practice and research. The report says ‘The informants and the research team all acknowledged that there is already a substantial policy base for many of the suggestions generated by this study for action to respond to elder abuse and neglect. These high-level policy documents were considered to provide important frameworks for action. A number of participants said that they considered some of the most important prevention strategies for elder abuse and neglect to be the widespread implementation and appropriate resourcing of these existing strategies. In particular, strategies to promote positive interaction among the generations and positive images of older people were identified as important for affirming the value of older people’.

The only mention of elder abuse in the Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action is to:
- enhance our research programme to improve our understanding of the nature of family violence and appropriate prevention strategies for … older people…
- broaden and deepen the reach of the campaign messages into communities including…older people
- engaging with high-need communities, for example …older people.

It is expected that the research recommendations regarding policy and practice will now also be incorporated into the Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action.
Taskforce Action 22

ACC is providing seed funding in 2006-07 for innovative research and evaluation activities that increase our knowledge of effective family violence initiatives, with priority given to early intervention. ACC will work with key agencies to ensure the successful handover and national implementation of successful interventions. It will also contribute to research that improves our understanding of the magnitude of family violence and its underlying causes and its links with other social problems.

Specified timeframe June 2007

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
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</table>

Evidence

In the Taskforce’s monitoring reports April and June 2007, it states that ACC’s research and development strategy and workplan will address its ongoing plan for research in the area of family violence. In response to an OIA request for a copy of this ‘research and development strategy and workplan ACC provided a document entitled ‘ACC Research and development Strategy’. However this is a generic strategy document (ie not specific strategy for family violence research and development) and doesn’t contain any specific mention of family violence. Hence there is no information available to ascertain exactly what ACC is doing to ‘contribute to research that improves our understanding of the magnitude of family violence and its underlying causes and its links with other social problems’.

In a letter dated 12 September 2007, in response to an OIA request, ACC advise the following status of these actions:

a) ACC are leading the implementation of the sensitive claims pilot and evaluation. The pilot will run from 1/12/06 to 31/12/08.

b) ACC worked with both government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the effectiveness evaluation of the ‘Child Witness’ pilot. The evaluation is complete and reports have been provided to MSD and Ministry of Justice. The New Zealand Police is coordinating the pilot and evaluation of the ‘All About Me’ programme. ACC is contributing by way of funding. A final report is expected in mid-2008.

c) The Whānau Ora Māori Research programme has yet to begin. A request for proposal is planned for release at the end of September 2007.

d) ACC contracted Massey University to conduct research which informed the development of the evidence-based guidelines. The technical reports and final guidelines will be published and made publicly available at the end of this year [2007].

The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states ‘ACC has completed its work programme for 2006/07 apart from the ongoing Whānau Ora research programme. This programme was re-scoped with extended timeframes.'

Reasons for failure to implement Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date
### Evaluation/Audit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 8b</th>
<th>Develop a framework for auditing/evaluating the effectiveness of family violence programmes and services for Māori</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2006</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>There is no evidence of this action ever being done and more than one interviewee confirmed this action had not been implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 8c</th>
<th>Review frameworks, in partnership with relevant community groups, for auditing/evaluating the effectiveness of family violence programmes and services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2006</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>A considerable amount of developmental work was done on this workstream to develop and trail an Internet-based self-evaluation toolkit for NGOs working in the area of family violence prevention (ref 1). Information about progress on this project up until July 2007 can be found at <a href="http://self-evaluation.info/">http://self-evaluation.info/</a> Information to hand suggests that the Ministry of Social Development have subsequently made a decision to stop the project. The fact that there have been no updates on the website since July indicates that this might be accurate information. The reasons for this initiative being ceased are not known.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blueprint Action 4</th>
<th>Establish outcome measures to enable the effectiveness of care and protection services in improving outcomes for children, young people and their families to be assessed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2004</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>The Care and Protection Final Update [on implementation of actions from Blueprint report][^1] says ‘initial work has identified range of New Zealand and international outcome measurement systems and frameworks. The introduction of a consistent approach to measuring outcomes among all providers of care and protection services is a long-term goal’. A paper provided in response to an OIA request advises that outcome measures for children and young people are described in the Ministry of Social Development’s Statement of Intent and in contracts with service providers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Blueprint Action 5**  
Develop mechanisms to promote and enhance the evaluation of services and programmes in order to build knowledge about what services are effective in preventing and responding to child abuse and neglect.

- a) The extent of evaluation practices in the care and protection community will be examined.
- b) Existing models and examples of good practice in evaluation including good practice for Māori and Pacific peoples will be identified.
- c) A strategy for enhancing practices in the care and protection community, incorporating priorities for early action, will be developed.
- d) Mechanisms for disseminating information about effective services and good practice in evaluation will be developed.

**Specified timeframe Dec 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
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<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>An action very similar to this one from the Blueprint also appears in Te Rito (8c above).</td>
<td>a) Research into the extent of evaluation practices in the non-government care and protection community was completed but evidence not available to conclude whether this was within the specified timeframe</td>
<td>b) Achieved by referring to generic ‘mechanisms’ provided via the Social Policy Evaluation and Research Committee (SREaR)</td>
<td>c) The Differential Response Model (DRM) was developed under this action. Ref 1 – Testing of the DRM began at selected sites in October 2005</td>
<td>d) Achieved via generic family violence mechanisms for disseminating information ie NZFVC but this wasn’t operational until mid 2005</td>
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**Taskforce Action 19**  
We will put in place measures that evaluate this programme of action.

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>There has been no independent evaluation(s) done on the Taskforce’s Programme of Action.</td>
<td>The chapter in Taskforce’s First report where this action is sited states ‘During the next year [2006/07] it is crucial that we learn rapidly both from the implementation of this programme of action and from work already going on in communities’</td>
<td>The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states ‘A workshop was held on 10 April 2007 where lessons learnt from the implementation of the first POA [Programme of Action] were discussed. The workshop was well attended’.</td>
<td>The workshop was however, only attended by one NGO (Relationship Services).</td>
<td>There is an extensive body of literature around post implementation evaluation. It is traditional for new initiatives to be formally evaluated by expert evaluators who are independent to those who have been managing the implementation. Such evaluations will focus on ensuring the new initiative achieved the outcomes expected and was an effective use of public funds. A workshop where lessons from implementation were ‘discussed’ does NOT constitute an evaluation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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27 http://www.cyf.govt.nz/2275.htm
## Monitoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action</th>
<th>We will put in place measures that monitor the level of family violence in New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe</strong></td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence**

Ongoing monitoring involves establishing a baseline, a ‘starting point’ and then monitoring changes over time against that baseline. Action 21a details the work to establish a baseline of family violence data for New Zealand. It is not possible to do this action until action 21a has been completed. It is not clear why these two actions were given the same timeframes for completion when action 14 could not commence until action 21a had been completed.

No action has been taken on Action 14 to date.

The Taskforce monitoring reports says ‘list of actions has been identified and will be included in Research Strategy’ (Action 13a above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce NN 2</th>
<th>We will put in place measures that: monitor the impact family violence prevention initiatives have on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe</strong></td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Not completed</th>
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<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence**

This action is not being reported separately in the Taskforce monitoring reports. Rather it has been combined with action 14 above stating “there are strong linkages between work to monitor the level of family violence in New Zealand and the work to ‘monitor the impact of family violence prevention initiatives have on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area”.

This research does not accept these claims of ‘strong linkages’. Action 14 is about monitoring people - the number of family violence cases (actual and reported) over a period of time and looking for trends and patterns. This action is about monitoring service activity ie determining what impact (both intended and unintended) new initiatives are having on government and non-government services. In fact it could be quite dangerous to confuse the two for example it is important to understand whether it was a new initiative that had a positive or negative impact on an organisation quite separate to whether the incidence of family violence is increasing or decreasing.

There is no evidence that any work has been done to put in place measures that “monitor the impact family violence initiatives are having on government and non-government organisations working in the family violence area”.

In recent months three NGOs have been collectively given $10,000 of funding to enable them to monitor the impact of new initiatives on their services but it is not clear if or how that money has been used by the NGOs to undertake this monitoring, or if that information is being provided back to the Taskforce to collate and utilise. This is a serious omission because such mechanisms should have been established before any of the new prevention initiatives were commenced and organisations shouldn’t be monitoring themselves – there should be an independent and formal mechanism to monitor consistently across multiple organisations.
Death Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 41</th>
<th>The Ministry of Health will identify improvements to be addressed by government and non-government organisations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>April 2007</td>
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<table>
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<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement n/a</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Initial work on death reviews was done in the time of Te Rito with Ministry of Justice as lead agency working with Ministry Social development. The initial work involved a literature review and focused on looking at international models for death reviews.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This was an interim piece of work to ascertain what different agencies were already doing. There is no requirement to monitor work arising from this report as the improvements that were identified as being required were all ones that individual agencies had already identified and assumed responsibility for.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>There was also a one-off report following a review done by MSD in 2007 of the family violence deaths from last few years but this has not been publicly released.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lead responsibility transferred from Ministry of Justice to Ministry of Social Development and the workstream was picked up by the Taskforce when it was established. A decision was subsequently made by the Taskforce and/or the Family Violence Ministerial Team that the Ministry of Health should be asked to takeover responsibility for this workstream.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 42</th>
<th>The Ministry of Health will design an ongoing process for reviewing all family violence-related deaths</th>
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<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Status</th>
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<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement n/a</th>
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</table>

<p>| Evidence | As per the wording of this action the requirement was only to ‘design an ongoing process’. That was completed within the specified timeframe. Whilst the action per se is completed there is now considerable implementation work to be done to establish a committee. The public nominations process for the committee is expected to begin in March 2008. The Ministry of Health’s intention is to work with committee members once they are appointed to do further development work and address establishment issues. Indications are that it will be up to two years before the committee and the death review process is fully operational. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action</th>
<th>We will put in place measures that help communities to learn from each other and service providers to share good knowledge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taskforce Action 15</strong></td>
<td>Specified timeframe June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states “A new contract with NZFVC has been developed. The contract will have clear objectives that create and promote horizontal learning”. There appears to be confusion over the intention behind this action. The Taskforce are interpreting it as being a service that could be provided by the NZFVC. Others interviewed felt strongly that this action was about community level initiatives for providers to learn from one another and share knowledge. The NZFVC has not had a contract for its services since June 2007 and hence this action has not become a contracted responsibility of NZFVC as the Taskforce monitoring report suggests.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce NN 3</th>
<th>We will use the information and infrastructure provided by the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse to help us to identify where we need to build our knowledge of family violence and what works to prevent it</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taskforce NN 3</strong></td>
<td>Specified timeframe June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>This action is not being reported separately in the Taskforce monitoring reports. It may be that this action statement has been combined with the one reported as action 15. However they are quite different and shouldn’t be confused. Action 15 is about actively facilitating communities to share knowledge and learn from each other. This action is about using the information from the NZFVC to inform the development of strategies and further programmes of action Evidence obtained from interviews indicates this action is not being done. There is no formal mechanism for using the extensive body of literature available via the NZFVC to inform the Taskforce’s programmes of action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce NN 4</th>
<th>We will work with and build on the efforts of the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse to share good practice and new research</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taskforce NN 4</strong></td>
<td>Specified timeframe June 2007</td>
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<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>This action is not being reported separately in the Taskforce monitoring reports. As above it may be assumed that this action will be addressed as part of action 15. However this action infers there will be an activity nationally that actively shares new information across the sector. The NZFVC makes information available to those who choose to access it – it is not contracted for a more active role and hence in its current form is not undertaking the role suggested in this action. Evidence obtained from interviews indicates this action is not being done. There doesn't appear to be a mechanism to build on the efforts of the NZFVC to share good practice and new research.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Workforce and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blueprint Action 8</th>
<th>Identify and examine workforce issues in the care and protection community, and develop strategies for addressing them</th>
<th>Specified timeframe April 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The Blueprint Workforce Development Group produced a report that identified workforce issues and made recommendations for addressing these. The report contained 28 recommendations. The Care and Protection Final Update <a href="http://www.msd.govt.nz/work-areas/children-and-young-people/care-protection-blueprint/care-and-protection-update.html">on implementation of actions from Blueprint report</a> says MSD is using this report to inform the development of a social services sector workforce programme of action and that implementing the proposed actions will involve consultation with the care and protection sector. No information has been sourced on whether these 28 recommendations have in fact been implemented.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 61</th>
<th>The Principal Family Court Judge is working with the Law Society to provide professional support and training programmes for lawyers working in family violence-related areas</th>
<th>Specified timeframe June 2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The Taskforce monitoring report dated 6th June 2007 states &quot;The Law Society is convinced that more lawyers will be available for domestic violence work if legal aid pay rates are increased&quot; and &quot;Training day for lawyers held April/May 2007&quot; and &quot;that by June 2007 the need for ongoing training will be reviewed&quot;. The Taskforce monitoring report dated 1 August states this action is 'complete' and notes &quot;The principal Family Court Judge has worked with the Law Society during this year to provide professional support and training programmes for lawyers working in family violence related areas.&quot; This action implies ongoing training and development of family violence awareness and skills among the legal profession. What has been provided to date is one off fee-based training that only a select number of family violence lawyers attended. This is not the same as professional support/development and training programmes</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 75</th>
<th>The MSD and non-government organisations will work together to build on existing workforce and organisational development initiatives</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>There appears to have been a significant deviation from the original intention of this action to what is being implemented and reported. The action clearly states that MSD and NGOs will “work together”. Page 28 of the Taskforce’s First Report states “Strengthening the non-government sector through adequate funding for service provision will help build on existing workforce and organisational development.” However the Taskforce monitoring reports (April, June and August 2007) only refer to training of MSD staff. The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states ‘Pathway to Partnership also supports workforce needs of community-based child and family services by building on existing workforce national approaches, including the NGO Family Support Services Workforce Programme of Action (2005). The 2005 report is not an initiative developed under this Taskforce action and it would appear that MSD and NGO sector have not worked together on this action as was intended but rather a retrospective decision has been made to use the ‘Pathways to Partnership’ workstream as having satisfied the NGO component of this action’. The information contained on the Ministry of Social Development website[^{30}] regarding the Pathways to Partnership initiatives doesn’t mention anything about workforce development being a core component of this initiative – it is more focused on funding. NGOs have expressed concerns[^{31}] that this has moved from being opportunity for MSD to develop relationships with Taskforce NGOs to only considering developments within MSD. The evidence does indicate that whilst the original action inferred action would be across all sectors, that it has subsequently been re-scoped to be just MSD workforce.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^31]: Paper entitled ‘Taskforce Programme of Action 2007/08’ submitted to the Taskforce
Service Development

Service Capacity and Range of Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 9</th>
<th>Examine and identify any shortfalls:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>In the capacity of family violence crisis intervention and post-support services to meet demand and to service diverse clients needs effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>In the capacity of family violence prevention services to meet Māori client needs effectively and the needs of Pacific and other ethnic clients and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c)</td>
<td>In accessing appropriate specialist family violence prevention training programmes for those requiring specialist training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once the examinations have been completed, investigate options and make recommendations for addressing identified shortfalls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe June 2004</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
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<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Budget 2006 provided $9million over 4 years but this was in recognition of lack of funding over the last 10 years and adjusts for consumer price index NOT to fund an increase in service capacity and hence does not address the issue of increased demand</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are a number of small government initiatives for service capacity but no evidence could be found that there was ever a systematic and formal project to “examine and identify any shortfalls…”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An official paper dated 25 August 2006, provided as part of an OIA request identifies this action area as one of those that has “not been adequately progressed under Te Rito”.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 12</th>
<th>Improve access to a range of services. As part of this work:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>review early intervention and prevention services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>develop and implement strategies to counteract barriers to accessing the services they require to remain safe and free from violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>investigate options and make recommendations for improving the availability and accessibility of remedial and support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>investigate options and make recommendations for improving the range of family violence intervention programmes and services to ensure adequate programmes and services are available and accessible for a diverse range of perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>continue to develop and implement initiatives to improve outreach services for children and families/whānau, particularly in rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe June 2004</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Consultation workshops were held with ethnic, migrant and refugee communities about access to family violence services but work on his project was stopped after the consultation. Indications are this was around 2003. Workshops were also held with NGO representatives on service capacity but there was no follow-up work done Budget 2005 provided funding to expand a number of areas of elder abuse and neglect prevention services. No overall plan has been developed but a number of separate actions have occurred An official paper dated 25 August 2006, provided as part of an OIA request states about this action area ‘work on improving access to a range of services (eg disability, women in gangs, lesbian and gays and rural women) is to be considered on completion of the work on service capacity’. However as noted above the same report says that work on service capacity (action area 9) has ‘not been adequately progressed under Te Rito’. A letter dated 18/9/07 from MSD in response to an OIA request states status of this action as ‘progresses through other projects, including through work on NGO capacity and Families Young and Old’. However the same letter reports the status of the service capacity action area as ‘work still to be done, work taken up by the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families’. A full service evaluation would be required to ascertain if these expected outcomes were ever achieved but the conclusion from the evidence available to this thesis is that it was never fully completed and although reports state this work was transferred to the Taskforce for completion there is no evidence that it is being continued under any of the Taskforce action areas.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incomplete; has not been taken up by the Taskforce</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

137
### Te Rito Action 17
**Continue to promote and increase child advocacy services across the sector**
**Specified timeframe June 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>This has been a successfully implemented initiative that arose from Te Rito and continues to be overseen by a staff member in Family and Community Services (MSD). Budget 2005 allocated $12m for 45 full time equivalent Advocates for Children and Young People who Witness Family Violence. There are now contracts in place with non-government agencies to employ a total of 20 advocates, contracts are currently being negotiated for a further 10 advocate positions. A tender process will be held mid 2008 for the remaining 15 advocates.</td>
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</table>

### Te Rito Action 18
**Continue to work on expanding home-based and community based family support services and pre-school and school-based services and programmes**
**Specified timeframe June 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>This was addressed through existing and new initiatives such as SKIP and other initiatives funded via Budget 2005 Early Intervention initiatives.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Blueprint Action 9
**Review the role of Care and Protection Resource Panels**
**Specified timeframe April 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>This review was completed following consultation and subsequent changes were made to legislation and operational aspects.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Taskforce Action 38
**We will identify opportunities for building the capacity of national non-government organisations to support family violence prevention**
We are developing partnerships with national organisations to build their capacity to prevent family violence (Reported by Taskforce: ‘We are identifying [developing] partnerships with national non-government organisations and will identify opportunities for building their capacity to support family violence prevention’) It is therefore assumed that Action 38 as reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports is a merger of these two separate action statements from the Taskforce’s First Report.
**Specified timeframe Dec 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
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<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Written on its own, outside the context of the chapter in the Taskforce’s First Report, this action reads as though the generic capacity of national NGOs will be expanded. However, it pertains specifically to funding prevention activities directly related to the ‘Changing Attitudes and Behaviours’ media campaign. The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states about this action “we have received two proposals for ongoing work with the campaign. Two further proposals are due by the end of June. The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says “we have undertaken scoping projects with four national organisations about how they can lead and influence the campaign.”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

138
### Taskforce Action 44

The Ministry of Justice will ensure that the victims of family violence know what support and services are available

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
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<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Delay in printing meant packs not available by specified date</td>
<td>In a letter dated 21 November 2007, The Ministry of Justice advised “the packs will soon be publically available”.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Taskforce Action 50

MSD will build safe and effective programmes for couples and families in addition to the existing programmes for victims and perpetrators (in consultation with the non-government sector and MOJ)

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
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<th>Not completed</th>
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<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The April 2007 Taskforce monitoring report informs us that work to establish a working group and key informants, identify best practice models, project costings and demand for services and develop a budget bid for this initiative were all completed by 30/11/06. Design specifications were completed by 31/3/07. By the June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report the update is that ‘The bid was not successful and MSD is now meeting with MOJ to work out the way forward in terms of next steps and implementation.’ Clearly at this point action 50 was not going to be implemented within the specified timeframe of June 2007. Yet for some reason the report gives this action a green smiley face denoting ‘on schedule’. The 1 August Taskforce monitoring report says that ‘These specifications will be piloted with counsellors who work with couples and families experiencing domestic violence, following consultation with the New Zealand Association of Counsellors and establishing an evaluation and monitoring framework. Timeframes will be set for this project as part of the consultation with the New Zealand Association of Counsellors’. These updates would indicate that there has been very little progress on this initiative since early 2007.</td>
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### Taskforce Action 51

MSD will build the capacity of interpreters in the courts (jointly with the Ministry of Justice) (Reported by Taskforce as: ‘MSD will build the capacity of interpreters in the courts and work with community groups to make better use of interpreters in court processes’)

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says work ongoing 2007/08 and beyond</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Service Funding and Contracting

**Te Rito**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action 7</strong></th>
<th>Progress and implement the policy developed for determining funding arrangements for victims without protection orders and perpetrators not mandated by the court, to attend family violence intervention programmes</th>
<th><strong>Specified timeframe June 2004</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>Budget 2003 allocated $1million (on-going funding) for CYFS to fund service providers across New Zealand to provide programmes and services for victims without protection orders and for perpetrators not mandated by the court to attend family violence intervention programmes. This funding was split between 88 agencies hence the average funding per agency was only $14705 and some interviewees felt this was insufficient particularly as there is increased demand for these ‘non-mandated’ services. Agencies are apparently in their third year of this funding with no indication that funding will continue past this point.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Te Rito**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Action 16</strong></th>
<th>Continue to work on developing a framework for government investment in parent support and development services, and as part of this work, investigate options and make recommendations for enhancing existing parent education and support services and/or developing additional parent education and support services that are more effective in preventing family violence</th>
<th><strong>Specified timeframe June 2004</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>Evidenced by fact this programme not funded until 2005 budget – target was 2004 Implemented but later than specified date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Blueprint**

| **Action 7** | Develop a government investment strategy for care and protection services with action outputs of:  
- The optimal range services will be defined by June 2004  
- A government investment strategy for care and protection services will be developed by Oct. 2004 | **Specified timeframe June 2004** |
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>The 2005 Blueprint update states that the intended “government investment strategy for care and protection services” is in the process of being implemented but not as a specific strategy but rather via a range of other mechanisms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Taskforce**

| **Action 39** | Communities will begin to receive additional funding for family violence prevention initiatives  
The following Taskforce action appears to have been merged with and reported under this action:  
We will identify communities without family violence prevention strategies and provide support for them through community development and training in areas including social marketing, media management, information about what works for supporting families, best practices and how to evaluate what works | **Specified timeframe March 2007** |
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Evidence** | The Community Innovations Fund is providing resources for community groups or networks to undertake their own education and violence prevention projects[^32]  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 54</th>
<th>Ministry of Justice will review purchasing plans for programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says work completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 74</th>
<th>The MSD and non-government organisations will work together to cost family violence and family support services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The June 2007 monitoring report says ‘Current discussions underway with the Steering group and with Ministers will result in reformulated milestones and deliverables.’ As the project was due to be completed in June 2007, this would indicate implementation is well off track. The June 2007 monitoring report talks about the Pathways to Partnership initiative and hence it is assumed that the intention is to address this action via Pathways to Partnership. As detailed in Action 73 below the Pathways to Partnership initiative is only in the early stages of development. It does have an intention to ‘develop a costing model and have it in place next year [2008]’. The New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse updated dated January 2007 states ‘In 2007, the true cost of a range of family violence services will be investigated. The costings will link with other initiatives aimed at improving the service capacity and capability of family violence service providers. The National Collective of Independent Women’s Refuges has recently undertaken a costing of Refuge services, in collaboration with Child Youth and Family. The costing models developed for this project will inform this current initiative’. It is understood that the costings determined in the above costing of Refuge services were used as the basis for a budget bid for increased funding which was rejected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 76</th>
<th>The MSD and non-government organisations will work together to continue to promote the use of integrated contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says the Funding for Outcomes initiative being led by MSD provides processes and that the action is ongoing. The Funding for Outcomes project involves finding ways to simplify the contracting process and improve and integrate the way services are funded and audited with two or more government agencies are involved as funders³³ From the information available it is difficult to measure this action for completeness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Taskforce Action 73

The MSD and non-government organisations will work together to review current funding models and develop a new model that ensures the appropriate use of grants, contributory funding and full funding.

**Specified timeframe:** June 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
<td>Page 27 of the Taskforce’s First Report states ‘As a first step towards putting the non-government sector on a sustainable footing, the Government is investing $9 million over the next four years. This recognises that funding has not kept pace with the demand for services over the past 10 years’. Although this is not an action statement it is being reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports as action 72. As the Taskforce’s First Report indicates this funding has been as a retrospective adjustment for past funding discrepancies – it is not new funding to cover further expansion in services. However, this fact is not clearly reflected in the Taskforce monitoring reports and without referring back to the original statement and subsequent documents the reader would think the $9m is for further service expansion. A number of the interviewees participating in this research were adamant that this $9m was a retrospective CPI adjustment not funding for further service expansion. In a press release by Relationship Services dated 10 May 2006 Relationship Services Chief Executive Jeff Sanders says ‘This additional funding is welcome, but it is only a start. The challenge is that as the government addresses the NGO funding deficit of the last 10 years, it also prioritises funding to meet the increasing needs of people seeking services to deal with family violence issues’. The Family Violence Funding Circuit Breaker was established to improve coordination of government funding processes across the Ministry of Justice (and Courts), Child, Youth and Family, Internal Affairs, ACC and Corrections. An undated report on the Family and Community Services website states “The Family Violence Funding Coordination (FVFC) networks represent a new phase of the work of the Family Violence Funding Circuit Breaker (FVFCB) project which has now finished. The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report has this to say about this action: ‘The Ministry of Social Development is now in the implementation phase of Pathway to Partnership which is a five year plan that will help community-based child and family service providers to get the support they need to deliver effective, high quality and accessible services to children and families’. The Family and Community Services’ (of the Ministry of Social Development) website notes several relevant points: o The Pathways to Partnership initiative is not specific to family violence services o Strategic collaborations (with community organisations) will be built in only five locations initially o A longer term plan is yet to be developed o In the longer term this initiative will work to: o Set guidelines on the results collectively sought o Look at ways to examine cost pressures o Work to build a strong, sustainable and effective community sector The $20.4m that has been allocated to this initiative over the first two years will be spent on: o Building five strategic partnerships in the first two years o Contributing 2.5% to the cost of inflation in service contracts o Moving some services towards full funding o Sector engagement o Evaluation o $7m remains unallocated at this stage Hence appear to have been three different projects over time trying to resolve the issue of funding for NGO and community family violence services. The latest of these does not yet have a long term plan agreed. It is understood that in April 2007 the National Family Violence NGO Alliance roundly criticised this latest funding model. Thus it appears this action is some way away from being fully implemented particularly as the action states the government and NGO sectors will work together to review current models and agree a new model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed but outside timeframe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not completed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No action taken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for failure to implement</td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Standards and Best Practice Guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 10</th>
<th>Review and evaluate the effectiveness and appropriateness of existing screening and risk assessment tools, guidelines and procedures for the identification of violence in families/whānau; and investigate options and make recommendations for extending and promoting the development and use of these tools, guidelines and procedures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Evidence | The evidence available indicates this work was done but not completed within the specified timeframe. The Standards New Zealand work (part of Action 11) that followed on from this preparatory work started in 2005 after this work was completed. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Te Rito Action 11</th>
<th>Develop and/or implement:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>minimum standards/competencies for identifying violence in families/whānau and for responding to situations of family violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>best practice guidelines to ensure that agencies model non-violent behaviour in their work with children and families/whānau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>best practice guidelines for relevant agencies and service providers around delivery of family violence prevention services to Māori and Pacific and other ethnic peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>review existing support and monitoring systems within relevant agencies for maintaining staff competency standards and best practice in family violence prevention work; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>improve safe practice within family violence prevention services by developing and monitoring guidelines around training, caseloads and supervision</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified timeframe</th>
<th>June 2006</th>
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<tr>
<td>Te Rito</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Evidence | New Zealand Police contracted Standards New Zealand to develop a generic screening and risk assessment tool which was released on 9 June 2006. However it appears there has never been any funding available to promote or implement this standard. Information gathered during interviews suggests the other 4 sub-actions have not been undertaken. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blueprint Action 10</th>
<th>Review standards for good practice in the delivery of care and protection services, including good practice for Māori and for Pacific peoples and other ethnic communities.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specified timeframe</td>
<td>Dec 2004</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blueprint</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Evidence | Two of the three stated sub actions were completed in the specified timeframe the uncompleted action transferred to Te Rito and eventually completed in mid 2006 |

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[^1]: New Zealand Standard NZS 8006:2006 Screening, risk assessment and intervention for family violence including child abuse and neglect
### Legislation, Courts and Law Enforcement

**Legislation**

**Te Rito Action 4**


**Specified timeframe June 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
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</table>

**Evidence**

An official paper dated 26 August 2006, provided as part of an OIA request identifies this action area as one of those that has ‘not been adequately progressed under Te Rito’.

Ref 1 – says ‘Proposed amendments[to the Domestic Violence Act 1995] will go to Cabinet by the end of 2006, and legislative changes will be introduced during 2007’

In December 2007 a discussion document entitled ‘A Review of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and related Legislation’ was released by the Ministry of Justice. This contains sections on the interface with Care of Children Act 2004 and other relevant legislation.

Written submissions on this document must be received by 13 February 2008.

Over five years since the release of the Te Rito report and a year after the specified completion date for this action a discussion document has just been released.

**Links to Taskforce Action 43 and work continuing**

**Taskforce Action 43**

Ensure that the review of the Domestic Violence Act (1995) enhances the ability of agencies and courts to share information in a way that promotes the safety and wellbeing of victims and their families

(Reported by Taskforce as: ‘The Ministry of Justice will ensure that the review of the Privacy Act enhances the ability of agencies and courts to share information in a way that promotes the safety and well being of victims and their families’)

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence**

There is confusion around this action.

The wording in the Taskforce’s First Report states “Ensure that the review of the Domestic Violence Act (1995) enhances…..”

The regular Taskforce monitoring reports (April and June 2007) are reporting on The wording in the reports states “The Ministry of Justice will ensure that the review of the Privacy Act enhances…..”

The April monitoring report states: ‘The MOJ is working on a mechanism to facilitate information sharing by agencies working on joint initiatives for common clients. The mechanism will be included in proposals for a Privacy Amendment Bill. Policy decisions expected this year’

The June monitoring report states ‘Policy decisions are expected in August.’

The October monitoring report states: ‘On 25 June 2007, Cabinet approved amendments to the Privacy Act 1993. The Prime Minister referred to this in her post-Cabinet briefing on that day. No subsequent public announcements have been made about the proposed amendments to the Privacy Act’.

None of these updates seem to particularly link together.

An implementation status of ‘not completed’ has been assigned to this action in the absence of any specific evidence that it has been completed.

As part of this research an OIA request was made to the Ministry of Justice asking for a copy of the project/implementation plan for this action including the latest timeline and milestones. In response, the Ministry of Justice advised (21 November 2007), ‘I have withheld information on the Privacy Act review under section 9 (2)(f)(iv) of the OIA. This section applies where the withholding is necessary to maintain the constitutional conventions which protect the confidentiality of the advice tendered by Ministers of the Crown and officials.

---

38 The closing date for submissions was originally 28 January 2008 following requests from agencies and individuals seeking more time to respond.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 45</th>
<th>The Ministry of Justice will maximise safety factors when managing court rosters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for failure to implement</strong></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Evidence** | The Taskforce update (6 June 2007) says the action is ‘on track’ for specified completion date of June 2007 but notes ‘Consultation with staff has shown that the security policy may need some revision. A further meeting with the Director of Technical and Judicial Security was held in mid May to discuss possible changes. The policy is being drafted at the moment and a report will be given to the Taskforce’.

In response to a question about this action under the OIA the Ministry of Justice reported ‘This matter is the subject of ongoing work in a number of areas on a court by court basis’. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 46</th>
<th>The Ministry of Justice will increase the threshold for eligibility for legal aid for Orders under the Domestic Violence Act. The Legal Services regulations 2006 and the Legal Services Amendment Act 2006 will take effect on 1 March 2007. The legislation will increase legal aid eligibility thresholds significantly. Original estimates indicate a 40% increase in the pool of people eligible for legal aid; that is an increase for 765,000 to approximately 1.2million.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for failure to implement</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>Completed according to Taskforce monitoring reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 47</th>
<th>A review of [legal aid] provider remuneration rates will also start in March 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe March 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for failure to implement</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report said the review had started in March 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action 48</th>
<th>The Ministry of Justice will improve information provided by the courts about Legal Aid Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for failure to implement</strong></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Evidence** | The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says new material is being developed and will be distributed to courts
In response to an OIA request provided November 2007 the Ministry of Justice advise the action is now complete. Hence it must be assumed it was completed between June 2007 and November 2007. |
### Taskforce Action 49

The Legal Services Agency is testing a system of fixed fees for most family legal aid cases (including domestic violence matters)

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence**

Testing complete by June 2007

**Light** August report says results of the test will be analysed and evaluated in 2007/08

### Taskforce Action 52

The MWA, in consultation with MOJ will investigate the introduction of advocates in courts to help people get information and access to the full range of support and services available to them by scoping what would be required to:

- Define the role of advocates would have
- Establish advocates
- Obtain funding
- Identify locations
- Provide wraparound services

(Reported by Taskforce as: ‘MWA will investigate the introduction of advocates in courts (in consultation with MOJ’)

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence**

Phase one of this action was essentially a feasibility study. The work is not just assuming that advocates in courts are the answer but rather making a full assessment after due consideration of overseas models and how to minimise the risk of duplicating services.

The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says ‘A report, outlining key findings – including gaps in current services and potential options for change, will be completed late November and presented to the Taskforce soon after’. As at March 2008 this report had still not been presented to the Taskforce.

The slippage in timeframes for this project were due to two main factors:

- it became clear that there would be value in taking more time to look at the evidence base
- the University of Waikato report on Women’s Experiences of Protection Orders commented on court advocates and that needed to be considered before concluding phase one work
- competing work priorities
- time taken to consult agencies.

There may be a Phase two for this work to develop a victim support advocacy role. Lead agency responsibility may therefore change from MWA to either MOJ or MSD for phase two.

### Taskforce Action 53

MOJ will enhance the ability of courts to contact victims directly

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence**

The Taskforce’s October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police have agreed on the process of enhancing the ability of courts to contact victims directly – hence the conclusion is that whilst a ‘process’ may have been agreed it has not yet been implemented. Further evidence that this action has not been completed is that a question pertaining to this was included in the consultation of the Domestic Violence Act (December 2007-February 2008) and so it is fairly clear that no decisions have yet been made.

A hard copy of a set of overhead slides was provided in response to an OIA request regarding this action. However the information contained in the overheads doesn’t appear to address the real question here which is ‘how’ the MOJ will enhance the ability of the courts to contact victims directly. It appears planning for implementation of this action has not involved any of the NGOs that work with victims, but rather there is an underlying assumption from the action statement that the most appropriate approach is for contact with the victim to be made directly by an officer of the court, not via a third party community family violence agency.
Taskforce Action 56
MOJ will establish four further dedicated family violence courts: three in Wellington region and one in Auckland
Specified timeframe June 2007

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Evidence
The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states ‘Four new Family Violence Courts were established during 2006/2007, bringing the total to six. The Ministry of Justice in collaboration with the Chief District Court Judge has now drafted project plans for work on establishing a national protocol for improving how Family Violence Courts are established and run, and for the establishment of another four to six new Family Violence Courts.’ This report also refers to one of the 47 recommendations from the recently released protection order research conducted by the University of Waikato. Recommendation 19 of the University of Waikato report states ‘That no more specialist domestic violence courts be established until the present courts have been properly evaluated to identify both good and problematic practices.’

The October monitoring report notes ‘The Taskforce is considering these recommendations [from the University of Waikato report] and will report back at the end of November 2007.’

Taskforce Action 57
MOJ will evaluate the existing models of dedicated family violence courts in Waitakere and Manukau
Specified timeframe June 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Evidence
The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report indicates that work on both these evaluations is underway. The October 2007 monitoring report states ‘Report writing and statistical analysis are continuing on the Manukau Family Violence Court evaluation. Evaluations of the Waitakere and Manukau Family Violence Courts will be released early 2008.’

In a letter dated 21 November 2007, in response to an OIA request as part of this research, the Ministry of Justice advised they had withheld the Family Violence Court evaluations under section 9(2)(f)(iv) of the OIA.

Taskforce Action 58
MOJ will establish a forum to identify best practice for effective information exchange between government agencies and communities, and between the District Court and the Family Court within existing legislation
Specified timeframe June 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Evidence
There appears to be confusion over what the intended workstream from this action was. The action wording “establish” a forum could suggest an ongoing forum. Likewise the wording “to identify best practice” could suggest that a multi-agency forum would be established to work collaboratively and identify and agree best practice.

However, the Ministry of Justice appear to have interpreted this action differently:
- There was a single forum held in March 2007
- It was attended by only two NGOs (Relationship Services and Age Concern) and seven Government departments (New Zealand Police, Department of Corrections, Child Youth and Family Services (of Ministry of Social Development) and the Ministries of Justice, Health, Social Development, the Accident Compensation Corporation) and the Office of the Commissioner for Children
- This single forum appears to have consisted of a number of presentations to identify and discuss the issues
- Under an OIA request the Ministry of Justice provide one set of overheads used at this forum entitled ‘Confidentiality in the Family Court’. These slides summarise the current situation and don’t contain anything specific about ‘best practice for effective information sharing’
- An OIA request for the notes and other presentation slides was declined.
- The Ministry of Justice have advised that “A request for information on any guidelines agencies have developed since the forum should be made to the individual agencies directly” This would suggest there is no intention of any multi-agency agreed best practice guidelines.

It is the conclusion of this research is that this action has not fulfilled the apparent intentions of the action statement.
Te Rito Action 3

Continue to establish and implement processes for ensuring that the legal sanctions under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 are effectively monitored and enforced

*Note: Such as the enforcement of protection orders other than provisions related to programme attendance*

**Specified timeframe June 2003**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
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<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The Te Rito December 2002 update on Te Rito on this action states ‘Underway – delays in key milestones but still on track to meet final deadline of June 2003’. Three years later an official paper dated 26 August 2006, provided as part of an OIA request identifies this action area as one of those that has ‘not been adequately progressed under Te Rito’. A letter from MSD dated 18/9/07 in response to a OIA request states for this action ‘work still to be done, work taken up by the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families’. The enforcement of protection order component of this action has been picked up under Taskforce action 60c below. The Ministry of Justice released a document consulting on proposed changes to the Domestic Violence Act in December 2007 and hence it is clear this was not done under the Te Rito strategy.</td>
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</table>

**Status**

- Completed in specified timeframe
- Completed but outside timeframe
- Not completed
- No action taken

**Reasons for failure to implement**

- Breakdown in implementation process

**Links to Taskforce Actions 60 a, b, and c.**

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Taskforce Action 55

MOJ will improve processes for prosecutions for non-attendance at programmes

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>There appears to be some confusion around this action. The April 2007 Taskforce monitoring report states that a formal policy proposal had been sent to New Zealand Police in November 2006, and ‘transfer of prosecutions to Police, once policy has been finalised. It also says that a ‘Working party met in February 2007. Information such as statistics of likely number of prosecutions, dummy file of information and a copy of current process have been forwarded to Police Prosecutions for consideration. A further meeting was held in March to progress this issue.’ The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report then says ‘There have been two further meetings between Justice and Police Prosecutions to develop respective processes. A MOU is currently being drafted.’ The June 2007 report also says the action is the action is ‘On Track’ for the transfer to be completed and processes improved by June 2007. The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report adds ‘Transfer of prosecutions from Crown Law to the Police will achieve consistency with other prosecutions.’ The main focus of the Taskforce monitoring reports to this point had been about the process of transferring responsibility for prosecuting non-attendance at programmes from Ministry of Justice to New Zealand Police. The action is about ‘improving processes for prosecutions’. It is unclear whether the expectation that transferring responsibility will, of itself, improve processes, or whether the work to improve processes will begin once responsibility has transferred to NZ Police. The October 2007 Taskforce monitoring report has no specific update on this action but does state ‘Consultation is also underway to determine objectives and milestones for: determining the level of attendance and performance of perpetrators at existing programmes; developing options to ensure perpetrators attend and complete programmes.’ In a communication from NZ Police dated 4/2/08 advice was given that the transfer of responsibility from MOJ has not progresses as quickly as anticipated for two reasons: internal operational practices had to be confirmed with the full Police executive; there were ongoing discussions regarding the financial implications of the transfer of function, because there is no discrete budget allocation within MOJ that can simply be transferred to NZ Police. The ‘formal policy proposal’ that according to the April 2007 Taskforce monitoring report, had been sent to NZ Police in November 2006, was in fact formal documentation about the existing processes undertaken by MOJ and referral to a crown solicitor, to inform the development of a process within NZ Police. Clearly it wasn’t a ‘policy proposal’ as the monitoring report suggested. In a communication dated 18/3/08 NZ Police advise ‘the documentation forwarded to NZ Police enabled a full policy and operational considerations for Police to be determined. Partly this included seeking Police executive approval to a model for frontline investigation and prosecution of files forwarded to Police by Ministry of Justice. NZ Police now expect this work to be completed by June 2008.</td>
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**Status**

- Completed in specified timeframe
- Completed but outside timeframe
- Not completed
- No action taken

**Reasons for failure to implement**

- Breakdown in implementation process
### Taskforce Action 60a

**The Police will improve the enforcement of protection orders and the safety of victims by developing training to improve investigation of breaches and the effectiveness of risk assessments undertaken at the time of the breaches**

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<td>n/a</td>
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</table>

**Evidence**

The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says the following were completed for 2006/07: ‘The delivery of mandated training for all front line staff on family violence investigation and risk assessment’ and ‘Supplementary line-up training on family violence and breaches of protection orders made available in all Districts’

The August and October 2007 Taskforce monitoring reports also state that work is ongoing for:

- The development of a new mandated four hour training package on protection orders for 2007/08. This training package is currently being developed and will be further informed by the findings of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs research [University of Waikato research ‘Living at the cutting edge’] project on protection orders.
- The development of a family violence training package for Police supervisors.

This matter was the subject of recommendation 34 of the University of Waikato research report ‘That the New Zealand Police substantially increases the amount of pre-service and in-service training in domestic violence, and ensures that such training pays particular attention to helping police officers understand the dynamics of family violence in diverse cultural contexts’. The Police response to the above recommendation states: ‘Police are currently working to increase the provision of in-service training. Police will consider increasing the provision of pre-service training given to recruits. Police response to family violence is supported by the appointment of additional family violence coordinators to assist frontline officers to understand and respond appropriately to family violence.’

An email communication from New Zealand Police dated 4/2/08 says they believe this action was completed by June 2007 with the mandated training on family violence investigation and risk assessment i.e that the mandated training on protection orders and other training referred to above it outside the scope of action 60a.

This action has been assigned status of ‘completed in specified timeframe’. However, this provides a good example of where it is unclear exactly what activities were scoped as being required to achieve the stated action.

**Links to Te Rito Action 3**

### Taskforce Action 60b

**The Police will improve the enforcement of protection orders and the safety of victims by developing appropriate performance measures for police and prosecutors**

**Specified timeframe June 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed in specified timeframe</th>
<th>Completed but outside timeframe</th>
<th>Not completed</th>
<th>No action taken</th>
<th>Reasons for failure to implement</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealisitc completion date</td>
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</table>

**Evidence**

Ten draft performance measures were developed and tested. The August 2007 Taskforce monitoring report says the results of this trial will inform work for the coming year. An email communication from New Zealand Police dated 4/2/08 says that work is still underway to find and finalise the most appropriate measures for family violence.

This action has been assigned status of ‘completed but outside timeframe’ status. It is acknowledged that work has been done within the specified timeframe but as noted in 60a above it is not clear whether this initial work on draft measures is what the Taskforce envisaged as being required in order to achieve this stated action.

**Links to Te Rito Action 3**

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taskforce Action60c</th>
<th>The Police will improve the enforcement of protection orders and the safety of victims by developing better co-ordinated investigation and prosecution policies to improve the rate of successful prosecution for breaches of Protection Orders.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specified timeframe June 2007</strong></td>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Evidence | This work has been undertaken in two stages:  
○ Development of the policy and related internal approval processes required at national and district levels  
○ Development of training materials and training staff  
The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report advises that the policy is unlikely to be fully developed before November 2007 and advises that the delay is because this policy needs to be informed by the General Police Prosecution Service policy and the Evidence Act 2006.  
Post implementation audits, collection of statistics and file audits will be done wherever possible to ensure the effectiveness of this new policy. However there are limitations to this as explained in a communication from New Zealand Police dated 18/3/08 ‘There are difficulties in quantitative comparisons between baseline data and post-implementation data. Currently there is no well-established pattern of recording which offences are family violence-related offences. This presents a problem for meaningful statistical interpretation of baseline and post-implementation data.’ In the same communication the Police suggest two quasi measures that could be used to indicate whether these new initiatives are working. |
## Public Education and Awareness

| Te Rito Action 13 | Develop a comprehensive family violence prevention education/communication strategy and then conduct regular family violence prevention public awareness campaigns, using a variety of media  
Establish a process for engaging communities, key sectors and a range of diverse groups  
Involve positive Māori role models in developing and implementing specific strategies  
Involve positive male role models in developing and implementing specific strategies  
Develop specific strategies to improve access to information and programmes particularly for women and children  
Identify methods for improving public information on existing family violence services  
Promote information/guidelines on 'what to do' when individuals are aware of violence in families/whānau  
maintain action to promote positive non-violent parenting  
Develop parent education resources aimed at raising parents’ awareness of children’s access to violence in media  
Maintain education resources for children and young people  
Develop specific education resources and programmes for whānau, hapu and iwi based on traditional Māori views of gender roles and responsibilities  
Specified timeframe June 2006 |
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<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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</table>
| Evidence | The Ministry of Health developed a draft strategy in 2005  
$2.5m (over four years) was allocated from Vote:Health to fund five public education projects  
A more extensive evaluation of the specific surrounding this action area would be required to assess the extent to which those initiatives funded met the extensive deliverables outlined by the Te Rito strategy, for example the requirement to “conduct regular family violence prevention public awareness campaigns, using a variety of media” does not appear to be encompassed in any of the specific initiatives contracted for by Ministry of Health  
The Ministry of Health funding ceased in 2007 and hence it is assumed that all ongoing work under this action has been included in the Taskforce Public Education and Awareness activities but no evidence is available to support or refute this assumption. |

### Links to Taskforce Actions 35 and 36

| Taskforce Action 29 | We will use research to develop key communication strategies and messages aimed at changing attitudes and behaviours to promote healthy relationships and discourage violence.  
We will develop key messages and influences for changing the attitudes of male perpetrators of intimate partner violence  
Specified timeframe early 2007 |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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</table>
| Evidence | These two action statements appear in different parts of page 17 of the Taskforce’s First Report. The monitoring reports contain updates on action 29a (that incorporates these two actions from the Taskforce’s First Report) and 29b which is an action area not contained in the Taskforce’s First Report and hence not investigated in this research  
Research into male perpetrator behaviour was apparently completed by December 2006 and the research findings have been made available at [www.areyouock.org.nz/files/test/research/CFAoFV_formative_research-1.pdf](http://www.areyouock.org.nz/files/test/research/CFAoFV_formative_research-1.pdf) |

| Taskforce Action 35 | The overall strategy for the campaign will be developed and an implementation plan developed through to 2010  
Specified timeframe early 2007 |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>The June 2007 Taskforce monitoring report advises that in October 2006 a working group agreed on the process for developing the campaign strategy and that by July 2007 an ‘issues management strategy had been developed and implemented’.</td>
</tr>
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</table>


| Taskforce Action 36 | Key messages will be rolled out at local and national level as part of the campaign  
(Reported by Taskforce as: ‘Mass Media Campaign’)  
**Specified timeframe early 2007** |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for failure to implement</strong></td>
<td>Action not adequately scoped and hence unrealistic completion date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Evidence** | April 2007 T/Light report says campaign will be launched July 2007  
Later delayed til Sept 2007 due to funding issues with NGOs |

| Taskforce Action 37 | We will support leadership at all levels and across all sectors to promote public education and awareness  
We will establish a national leadership group to promote public education and awareness with different sectors  
**Specified timeframe Dec 2006** |
<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>Completed in specified timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons for failure to implement</strong></td>
<td>Breakdown in implementation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>No evidence as not being reported anywhere. Information obtained during interviews is that this action has not been addressed despite the Taskforce monitoring reports giving this action a green smiley face. The action has re-appeared in the Taskforce’s Ongoing Programme of Action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3 - Bibliography

Literature

Auckland University of Technology. Institute of Public Policy; ... [et al.] (2002). Making it happen: implementing New Zealand’s Agenda for Children. Wellington, Institute of Public Policy, Auckland University of Technology


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Unpublished work


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Relationship Services. (10 May 2006). Additional Family Violence Funding Needed


Newspaper Articles

Dominion Post. (12 June 2007). Prosecutor’s daughter ‘strangled by partner’.

Dominion Post. (21 June 2007). Hammer used to hit children.

Dominion Post. (4 July 2007). Women killed, toddler sleeps in next room.

Dominion Post. (17 July 2007). Man jailed for beating former wife to death.


The Dominion Post. (8 September 2007). Women’s refuge stuck for space.


The Dominion Post. (1 March 2008). The unplugged civil servant.

Websites

Family Violence Ministerial Team


Ministry of Social Development. Family and Community Services website for family violence.  

Ministry of Social Development. Website for Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families  

New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse  
http://www.nzfvc.org.nz/

New Zealand Government. Website for individual District Health Board Statements of Intent.  
http://newzealand.govt.nz/record?recordid=4683

http://www.legislation.govt.nz/

Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families  

The Treasury. Departments’ Statements of Intent.  
Appendix 4 - About the Researcher

Ruth's background is in community work and community development. She became a household name in the 1980s when working under the non-deplume of Lorraine Webb, she led a high profile campaign of cot death parents calling for government action to reduce the unacceptably high number of babies dying from cot death. The campaign attracted extensive media coverage for several years. Key features of her work included; a 165,000 signature petition to Parliament; authorship of the book entitled Cot Death in New Zealand: Unfolding the Mystery, and a range of lecturing, public speaking and advisory roles.

In the 1990s Ruth turned her skills to working within the public health system initially implementing a number of the consumer focused initiatives that evolved from the 'Cartwright inquiry' in particular patient advocacy and interpreting services. Ruth is highly respected for her ability to manage complex projects and to work equally effectively with professionals, administrators, service providers and consumers.

For the past 12 years Ruth has run her own consultancy business specializing in strategy, implementation and evaluation. She has managed a range of major projects often undertaken in the political and media spotlight, and has a reputation for delivering results against tight timeframes. These have included projects in national and regional service development, change management, national and service level strategy, programme design, system and structural audits and reviews. Her work has included conceptualising and implementing organisational processes and protocols, and the role these play in the development of best practice and continuous improvement. These are some examples of projects Ruth has had overall leadership responsibility for:

- planning and implementation of Australasia's first digital breast screening programme
- independent review of New Zealand's four regional cancer networks
- planning, development and implementation of the national cervical cancer audit
- development and implementation of a diabetes retinopathy screening service
- planning and scoping of the national immunisation programme
- evaluation research on the options of sharing management services between developing Primary Health Organisations
- planning, development and establishment of the national breast screening programme
- planning and development of a new hospital ward, administration unit, and intensive care unit

In recent years Ruth has focused her energies on an area of long standing interest - family violence. She has spent the past three years gathering information on the subject within New Zealand and overseas. The research undertaken for this thesis has enabled Ruth to blend her extensive strategy, implementation and evaluation experience with her interest in family violence.
Project/Research Report

COURSE: MAPP575
STUDENT: Ruth Herbert
ITEM: Dissertation
"Learning our way forward: Implementation of NZ’s family violence strategies"

MARKER: Bill Ryan
MARK: 85/100
GRADE: A+

D: 40-49%  C: 50-54%  C+: 55-59%  B-: 60-64%  B: 65-69%  B+: 70-74%  A-: 75-79%  A: 80-84%  A+: 85-100%

OVERVIEW
Excellent. See detailed comments below

STRUCTURE
Appropriate

THEORETICAL OR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The study is primarily an empirical and evaluative one, not requiring a conceptual framework – other than expecting that government strategies can and should be implemented and reported as intended...

RESEARCH DESIGN
See detailed comments below

ANALYSIS
Ditto

CONCLUSIONS
Solid and justified in the light of the evidence presented.

PRESENTATION, EXPRESSION, REFERENCING
Very well presented.

OVERALL COMMENTS

Overall, this is an excellent piece of work.

In essence, it is an implementation evaluation of the strategies which concludes that a significant proportion of the actions prescribed have not been or not been fully implemented, despite a flow of information suggesting that implementation is on-track.

Stated thus, the objective and the character of this evaluation seem very straightforward. In fact, it has been anything but. Two points are particularly significant. The first is that implementation has been very complex; Te Rito seemed to become the Blueprint and then the Taskforce was established. Not only did the template and the cast change but, as a cross-government strategy, many actors and many agencies were involved – as chapter 4 points out, a complex implementation picture. The second point is that it proved difficult to gain the level of information required to conduct this evaluation in what would have been the preferred manner (e.g. ample interviews with the officials involved). As noted in chapter 2, several requests for documents and information made under OIA were refused. Ruth found it very difficult to get agreement to interviews with officials involved. She was able to establish relationships with some confidential sources in and around the family violence arena but was significantly restricted in what she could source or cite. This was a matter she and I discussed at some length. In this case, she was forced to do the only other thing that researchers can do in these circumstances and that is to turn to the publicly available documents and conduct an exhaustive examination of their contents – to pull together as large and comprehensive a pile of fragments as possible, looking for internal consistencies and inconsistencies, to be able to make a justifiable assessment of the state of implementation (almost literally, the ‘weight’ of evidence). This caution seemed warranted because of the political sensitivity of the issue and, as she notes early in the dissertation, to respect to the large numbers of hard-working officials involved in its implementation. Thus, this dissertation devotes considerable space to teasing out the precise detail of recommended actions from various documents, cross-matching them against subsequent ones and checking the precise status of their implementation.

This detailed and exhaustive approach to the analysis I regard as one of the key strengths of this dissertation, chapter 3 in particular. The cross-checking appears to be meticulous, from which the conclusion draws its strength. This does mean that chapter 3 can be heavy going for the reader but I take the view that it was an inevitable outcome of the enforced design of the research and analysis.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed overview of the implementation literature and successfully draws out the point that the wide range of cross-government agencies involved was always going to make implementation difficult. Perhaps even more telling is chapter 5 where Ruth throws doubt on the status of implementation as reported in the Taskforce monitoring reports. If correct – and the level of detail is convincing – the comparison pp. 104-5 is very revealing. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that implementation is not as successful as it could and should be and perhaps
not as good as is being reported. I would comment that chapter 5 is written in a particularly crisp and succinct way that captures the essence of her argument. I have no doubt that this chapter could be the basis of a journal article and would recommend this to Ruth.

The issue of family violence in NZ appears to be a serious one. Interestingly, the day after Ruth submitted this dissertation, afternoon news reports (e.g. RNZ National – Checkpoint) were full of details about a significant rise in the rates of reported abuse and the positive response given this by Police, Women’s Refuge organisation and so on – on the grounds that higher rates of reporting signalled an increased level of awareness and unwillingness to put up with the violence. Ruth had predicted this in her discussion of the success of the publicity component (‘It’s not OK’) of the strategies. In a sense, it confirms the urgency of the issue she has uncovered to say nothing of the magnitude it is believed to have (it is still unclear how much remains unreported).

In that sense, I would personally regard this dissertation as one of the most significant produced in SoG’s post-experience programmes over the last 2-3 years. I congratulate Ruth on her achievement and grade the dissertation at the A+ (85/100) level.

[Signature]

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11-4-08